Zymtrace Skills— plugin

Zymtrace Skills — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

Is Zymtrace Skills safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Zymtrace Skills (Plugin) and scored it 75/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 6 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
75/100
●●●●●●●●○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 28, 2026 · 130d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings6 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
28
9.8 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 6 flagged

Securityscore 28 · 6 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · zymtrace/agents/zymtrace-perf-engineer.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptzymtrace/agents/zymtrace-perf-engineer.md· markdown
53frame in the working directory and **apply the fix** (code edit, or launch-config / Helm-val
… (5 chars elided on L53)
54env-var change for a flag fix), then show the diff. Applying a localized, well-understood fi
… (8 chars elided on L54)
55**default action, not a confirmation checkpoint** — don't ask "shall I apply this?"; apply i
… (5 chars elided on L55)
56show what changed.
57 
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L55, also L115
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L55
zymtrace/agents/zymtrace-perf-engineer.md
L115
zymtrace/agents/zymtrace-perf-engineer.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · zymtrace/shared/analysis-conventions.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptzymtrace/shared/analysis-conventions.md· markdown
35- **Gateway API as fallback** when the MCP isn't available — read its endpoints from `<gatew
… (51 chars elided on L35)
36 
37**Pulling traces — `hot_traces` first.** For the call-tree / flamegraph step on **all three
… (108 chars elided on L37)
38 
39This tool preference is for the **call-tree / flamegraph** step only. For **ranking** ("whic
… (108 chars elided on L39)
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L37, also L61
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L37
zymtrace/shared/analysis-conventions.md
L61
zymtrace/shared/analysis-conventions.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · zymtrace/shared/conventions.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptzymtrace/shared/conventions.md· markdown
142. **Multiple existing releases** — list them and ask the user which one to act on.
153. **Explicit user override** — if the user named a non-`zymtrace` namespace and gave a reas
… (80 chars elided on L15)
164. **Fresh install, no preference stated** — use `zymtrace`. Don't ask.
17 
18Never hardcode `zymtrace` in commands without first running the auto-detect (step 1) — there
… (41 chars elided on L18)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L16
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · README.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptREADME.md· markdown
106```
107 
108It identifies the entity, pulls metrics, then the flamegraph(s), and returns one finished re
… (108 chars elided on L108)
109 
110### Set your CPU cost rate (optional)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L108
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256627f92ff2a5134a6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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