Mcp Compliance— agent skill

Mcp Compliance — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by YawLabs·Agent Skill·github.com/YawLabs/mcp-compliance

Is Mcp Compliance safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Mcp Compliance (Agent Skill) and scored it 74/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 2 high-severity and 2 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
74/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings2 warnings · 2 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
26
9.1 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 4 flagged

Securityscore 26 · 4 findings
HIGH"Ignore previous instructions" command embedded in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01 · Prompt injection · COMPLIANCE_RUBRIC.md
HIGH — when it fires on hostile content the impact is full system-prompt override.
Why it matters

The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.

The exact value spotted
excerptCOMPLIANCE_RUBRIC.md· markdown
2368- **Default required:** No (required at runtime when `tools` is declared)
2369- **Spec reference:** [server/tools#security-considerations](https://modelcontextprotocol.io
… (63 chars elided on L2369)
2370- **Description:** Scans tool names, descriptions and parameter descriptions for prompt-inje
… (107 chars elided on L2370)
2371- **Pass criteria:** No tool name, title, description, or parameter description matches a pr
… (107 chars elided on L2371)
2372- **Fail criteria:** Any match (the tool and pattern are named in the details). Also fails w
… (98 chars elided on L2372)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L2370
How to fix
Remove the override phrase, or rephrase the passage so it does not instruct the agent to discard its rules.
  1. Delete the ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.
  2. If this is jailbreak-research or tutorial content, move the example into a clearly fenced, non-instruction block and label it as a quoted sample.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01sha2562e4221a7f996a729…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGH"Ignore previous instructions" command embedded in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01 · Prompt injection · mcp-compliance-rules.json
HIGH — when it fires on hostile content the impact is full system-prompt override.
Why it matters

The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.

The exact value spotted
excerptmcp-compliance-rules.json· json
2518"capabilityGated": "tools",
2519"specRef": "server/tools#security-considerations",
2520"description": "Scans tool names, descriptions and parameter descriptions for prompt-injecti
… (102 chars elided on L2520)
2521"passCriteria": "No tool name, title, description, or parameter description matches a prompt
… (102 chars elided on L2521)
2522"failCriteria": "Any match (the tool and pattern are named in the details). Also fails when
… (95 chars elided on L2522)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L2520
How to fix
Remove the override phrase, or rephrase the passage so it does not instruct the agent to discard its rules.
  1. Delete the ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.
  2. If this is jailbreak-research or tutorial content, move the example into a clearly fenced, non-instruction block and label it as a quoted sample.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01sha2562e4221a7f996a729…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/anthropic-outreach-draft.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/anthropic-outreach-draft.md· markdown
49- Link to mcp.hosting/compliance/leaderboard once it has ≥20 entries.
50- **What NOT to do.**
51- Don't ask for endorsement.
52- Don't ask them to link to us.
53- Don't promise we won't change scoring; we will, and that's fine.
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L51, also L52
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L51
docs/anthropic-outreach-draft.md
L52
docs/anthropic-outreach-draft.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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