sentinelone-alerts — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited sentinelone-alerts (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
All alert tools are read-only — you can view, search, and investigate alerts but cannot modify status, assignments, or take response actions.
For full field definitions, response examples, and error details see REFERENCE.md.
alerts or incidents, and both speak of severity, detection, and remediation — the vocabulary overlaps almost completely, the data does not. This skill reads only the SentinelOne console; a Huntress finding appears nowhere in it. Route by which sensor is on the endpoint, not by the word the ticket used — for Huntress use huntress-incidents.
quarantining a file, or rolling back a remediation. Every SentinelOne tool here is read-only; those actions exist only in the SentinelOne console. On a Huntress-managed endpoint the approve/execute remediation flow is huntress-incidents.
same severity, status, notes, and history shape as alerts and are easily mistaken for them; use sentinelone-vulnerabilities.
the XSPM misconfiguration surface — use sentinelone-misconfigurations.
platforms call a monitor firing an alert too, and none of them is an EDR detection. Use atera-alerts, superops-alerts, pagerduty-alerts, or rootly-alerts; M365 tenant alerts are cipp-alerts.
Parameters: severity, status, viewType, limit, cursor, sortBy, sortOrder
list_alerts severity=CRITICAL status=NEW sortBy=detectedAt sortOrder=DESC limit=50
list_alerts viewType=CLOUD limit=50Parameter: filters (array of {fieldId, filterType, values}), limit, cursor
search_alerts filters=[{"fieldId": "endpointName", "filterType": "CONTAINS", "values": ["workstation-01"]}]
search_alerts filters=[{"fieldId": "severity", "filterType": "IN", "values": ["CRITICAL", "HIGH"]}]Filter types: EQUALS, NOT_EQUALS, CONTAINS, IN, NOT_IN. Add "isNegated": true to invert any filter.
get_alert alertId=1234567890get_alert_notes alertId=1234567890
get_alert_history alertId=1234567890Severity: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | INFO | UNKNOWN
Status: NEW | IN_PROGRESS | RESOLVED | FALSE_POSITIVE
View types: ALL (default) | CLOUD | KUBERNETES | IDENTITY | INFRASTRUCTURE_AS_CODE | ADMISSION_CONTROLLER | OFFENSIVE_SECURITY | SECRET_SCANNING
Pagination: Pass limit on the first call, then pass the returned cursor to fetch subsequent pages until no results remain.
list_alerts with status=NEW, sortBy=severity, sortOrder=DESC, limit=50cursor — do not assume 50 covers everythingget_alert for full details, then get_alert_notes for prior contextget_alert returns not-found, the alert may have been merged or resolved — re-query list_alerts to confirmget_alert with the alertIdlist_alerts or search_alerts — alert IDs can change after merge operationsget_alert_notes — check for existing analyst notes before duplicating workget_alert_history — review timeline of status changes and assignmentspurple_ai to investigate the threat described in the alertlist_inventory_items for affected asset contextsearch_alerts with filters=[{"fieldId": "severity", "filterType": "IN", "values": ["CRITICAL", "HIGH"]}]viewType to reduce noisesiteName to identify which clients need attention firstget_alert_notes to avoid duplicating prior analyst worksiteName filter when investigating a specific client~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.