Checkpoint Avanan Threats — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Checkpoint Avanan Threats (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Harmony Email runs several detection engines over mail and SaaS content and records each verdict as a security event. The event is the engine's finding — type, state, severity, confidence — not the message itself. MSP work here is sweeping events across a window, judging which are real, and following the ones that are through to the message.
attachments, and the quarantine and restore actions all live on the entity, not the event. Use avanan-quarantine.
avanan-exceptions.
avanan-api-patterns.
shared currency across the email-security stack. Abnormal is abnormal-security-threats, Proofpoint is proofpoint-tap, Mimecast is mimecast-threat-intelligence, IRONSCALES is ironscales-incidents.
hec_query_events takes only filters — no required argument, and no limit. Every filter is an array except the dates.
| Argument | Accepts |
|---|---|
eventTypes | see type table |
eventStates | new, detected, pending, remediated, dismissed, exception |
severities | free-form strings, e.g. Critical, High, Medium, Low |
startDate / endDate | ISO 8601; endDate defaults to now |
saas | see platform table |
eventIds | fetch specific events by id |
scrollId | next page cursor |
| Value | What fired |
|---|---|
phishing | Credential harvesting, impersonation, deceptive links |
malware | Confirmed malicious attachment or link |
suspicious malware | Probable malware, below the confirmed threshold |
dlp | Outbound or internal content matched a data-loss rule |
anomaly | Behavioural outlier — unusual sender, volume or pattern |
shadow_it | Unsanctioned SaaS application activity |
malicious_url | A malicious link was present in content |
malicious_url_click | A user actually clicked one |
alert | Generic platform alert |
suspicious malware contains a space and no underscore, unlike every other multi-word value. Sending suspicious_malware filters to nothing.
There is no separate bec, ato, ransomware, spear_phishing or spam type. Business email compromise and targeted phishing arrive as phishing; ransomware arrives as malware. Judge those distinctions from the event's description and confidenceIndicator, not from the type filter.
new and detected are open; remediated means an action completed; dismissed and exception mean a human or an exception rule closed it.
Omitting `eventStates` does not return everything — it defaults to new/detected. A sweep that means to include already-handled events must name the states explicitly. This is the most common cause of an event "disappearing" between two queries: it moved to remediated.
email, office365_emails, office365_onedrive, office365_sharepoint, google_mail, google_drive, slack, ms_teams, box2, dropbox2.
Box and Dropbox carry a 2 suffix. email and office365_emails are not synonyms — a tenant may report under either depending on how it was onboarded, so a mail-only sweep that names just one can miss the other.
The query result summarises each event as eventId, type, state, severity, saas, eventCreated, description, confidenceIndicator and availableActions. hec_get_event adds entityId, customerId, data, additionalData and the actions history.
Two fields do most of the work:
event → entityId → hec_get_email.
Read it before attempting an action rather than assuming quarantine is available — an event's state constrains what it still offers.
confidenceIndicator is the engine's own certainty and is the field to weigh when deciding whether a detection deserves a human. severity is about potential impact, not certainty — a high-severity, low-confidence phishing event is exactly the shape of a false positive.
hec_query_events with an explicit startDate, the types you care about,and — if you want more than open items — explicit eventStates.
scrollId until no cursor comes back. Do not report a countbefore the scroll is exhausted.
severity then confidenceIndicator.hec_get_event for the entityId.Both arrive as phishing. The distinguishing evidence is on the entity, not the event, so pull the message with hec_get_email and compare:
fromName against fromEmail — a display name matching an executive overan unrelated address is the classic BEC signature.
lookalike and typosquatted domains.
event indicate targeting rather than a broad campaign.
Scope the campaign with hec_search_emails filtered on fromEmail or senderDomain over the same window; the event surface will only show you the detections, not the messages from the same sender that were not flagged.
malware is confirmed; suspicious malware is not. For either, take the entityId and read the entity's attachments array for names, MIME types, sizes and MD5 hashes. Those hashes are what you feed to endpoint and network controls — this plugin has no threat-intelligence lookup of its own.
dlp events are usually outbound or internal. Treat the entity payload as sensitive by construction: for a DLP detection the matched content is the regulated data itself, so pull it only when the investigation needs it and keep it out of anything long-lived.
unrecognised one silently matches nothing rather than erroring. Confirm casing against a value the API has actually returned before trusting an empty result.
eventIdsto fetch known events; combining it with type or state filters narrows rather than broadens and is rarely what is meant.
a window outside retention all return zero records without an error. See avanan-api-patterns.
dismissed and exception arefilterable states, but no tool transitions an event into them. Closing a detection as a false positive is a console action, or an exception via avanan-exceptions.
Present in the Harmony Email console, absent from this surface:
IPs as a structured indicator set. What exists is the entity's attachment metadata and whatever the event's data / additionalData blobs carry.
actions array on a full event record is thenearest equivalent.
assignee or note anywhere in the surface.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.