Abnormal Security Account Takeover — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Abnormal Security Account Takeover (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Abnormal Security's Account Takeover Protection monitors sign-in activity and mailbox behavior to detect compromised internal accounts. By analyzing user behavior patterns, device fingerprints, sign-in locations, and mailbox rule changes, Abnormal identifies accounts that have been taken over by attackers. This skill covers ATO case management, investigation workflows, and remediation actions.
| Indicator | Description | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
| Impossible Travel | Sign-ins from geographically distant locations in short time | High |
| Unusual Sign-in Location | Sign-in from a country or region not seen before | Medium |
| New Device | Sign-in from an unrecognized device or browser | Medium |
| Suspicious Mailbox Rules | Auto-forward, delete, or move rules targeting sensitive emails | Critical |
| Bulk Email Sending | Account sending mass emails to internal or external recipients | High |
| Password Change | Unexpected password or MFA changes | High |
| Lateral Phishing | Compromised account sending phishing to internal users | Critical |
| Data Exfiltration | Large file downloads or email forwarding to external addresses | Critical |
| Token Theft | Session token stolen and used from different location/device | High |
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
caseId | string | Unique account takeover case ID |
affectedUser | string | Email address of the compromised account |
severity | string | Critical, High, Medium, Low |
detectedAt | datetime | When the takeover was first detected |
status | string | Open, Investigating, Remediated, Closed |
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
signInEvents | object[] | List of suspicious sign-in events |
signInEvents[].timestamp | datetime | When the sign-in occurred |
signInEvents[].ipAddress | string | IP address of the sign-in |
signInEvents[].location | string | Geographic location (city, country) |
signInEvents[].device | string | Device or browser fingerprint |
signInEvents[].status | string | Success, Failed, MFA Challenged |
signInEvents[].riskLevel | string | Risk assessment of the sign-in |
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
mailboxRules | object[] | Suspicious mailbox rules created |
mailboxRules[].type | string | Forward, Delete, Move |
mailboxRules[].target | string | External email or folder target |
mailboxRules[].createdAt | datetime | When the rule was created |
emailsSent | int | Number of emails sent during compromise |
emailsForwarded | int | Number of emails auto-forwarded |
| Tool | Description | Key Parameters |
|---|---|---|
abnormal_ato_cases_list | List account takeover cases | pageSize, pageNumber, filter, fromDate, toDate |
abnormal_ato_cases_get | Get ATO case details | caseId |
abnormal_ato_activity | Get sign-in and mailbox activity for a user | email, fromDate, toDate |
abnormal_ato_remediate | Take remediation action on an ATO case | caseId, action |
List open ATO cases:
{
"tool": "abnormal_ato_cases_list",
"parameters": {
"filter": "status eq 'Open'",
"pageSize": 25
}
}Get ATO case details:
{
"tool": "abnormal_ato_cases_get",
"parameters": {
"caseId": "ato-abc123"
}
}Get sign-in activity for a user:
{
"tool": "abnormal_ato_activity",
"parameters": {
"email": "[email protected]",
"fromDate": "2026-03-20T00:00:00Z",
"toDate": "2026-03-27T00:00:00Z"
}
}| Action | Description | When to Use |
|---|---|---|
FORCE_PASSWORD_RESET | Reset the user's password | Confirmed account compromise |
REVOKE_SESSIONS | Terminate all active sessions | Active compromise with attacker logged in |
DISABLE_ACCOUNT | Temporarily disable the account | Severe compromise with ongoing activity |
REMOVE_RULES | Remove suspicious mailbox rules | Malicious forwarding/delete rules found |
| Factor | Medium | High | Critical |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indicator Type | New device, unusual location | Impossible travel, password change | Lateral phishing, data exfiltration |
| User Role | Standard user | Manager, finance | Executive, admin |
| Activity | Suspicious sign-in only | Mailbox rules created | Emails sent to internal users |
| MFA Status | MFA active, blocked | MFA bypassed | MFA disabled by attacker |
| Data Access | No sensitive access | Read sensitive emails | Forwarded sensitive data |
| Code | Message | Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| 400 | Invalid email format | Check email address format |
| 401 | Unauthorized | Check API token |
| 403 | Insufficient permissions | Token needs ATO scope |
| 404 | Case not found | Verify case ID |
| 429 | Rate limited | Wait and retry |
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.