coding-discipline— agent skill

coding-discipline — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by viktorbezdek·Agent Skill·github.com/viktorbezdek/skillstack

Is coding-discipline safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited coding-discipline (Agent Skill) and scored it 92/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 2 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
92/100
●●●●●●●●●
↑ +0 since first scan (92 → 92)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 29d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings2 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
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CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
76
26.6 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 2 flagged

Securityscore 76 · 2 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · coding-discipline/skills/coding-discipline/SKILL.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptcoding-discipline/skills/coding-discipline/SKILL.md· markdown
32- State your top 2–3 assumptions in one line each. Proceed unless one is high-impact and unc
… (7 chars elided on L32)
33- Ask **only** when (a) the request has multiple plausible interpretations AND (b) the diffe
… (107 chars elided on L33)
34- When you ask, ask **once**. Batch as multiple-choice (2–4 options) with a recommended defa
… (37 chars elided on L34)
35 
36**Three uncertainty types — label explicitly:**
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L34
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · coding-discipline/skills/coding-discipline/references/principles.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptcoding-discipline/skills/coding-discipline/references/principles.md· markdown
166"Loop until verified" combined with "if uncertain, ask" creates a conflict the agent resolve
… (108 chars elided on L166)
167 
168### Think Before Coding vs. Anthropic's "don't ask too many questions"
169 
170The Claude Constitution explicitly penalizes excessive clarification. Resolution: the thresh
… (67 chars elided on L170)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L168
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24frubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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