ppt-mcp— agent skill

ppt-mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by trsdn·Agent Skill·github.com/trsdn/mcp-server-ppt

Is ppt-mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited ppt-mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 79/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 5 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
79/100
●●●●●●●●○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 25, 2026 · 132d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings5 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
40
14.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 5 flagged

Securityscore 40 · 5 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/ppt-mcp/SKILL.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/ppt-mcp/SKILL.md· markdown
59## CRITICAL: Execution Rules (MUST FOLLOW)
60 
61### Rule 1: NEVER Ask Clarifying Questions
62 
63**STOP.** If you're about to ask "Which file?", "What table?", "Where should I put this?" -
… (6 chars elided on L63)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L61
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256e4809c5054a52fcf…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/ppt-mcp/references/behavioral-rules.md×3
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/ppt-mcp/references/behavioral-rules.md· markdown
8 
9- **Execute tasks immediately without asking for confirmation**
10- **Never ask clarifying questions — make reasonable assumptions and proceed**
11- Ask the user whether they want PowerPoint visible or hidden when starting multi-step tasks
12- When the user asks to "show PowerPoint" or "watch" the work, use `window(show)` + `window(
… (24 chars elided on L12)
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L10, also L67, L86
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L10
skills/ppt-mcp/references/behavioral-rules.md
L67
skills/ppt-mcp/references/behavioral-rules.md
L86
skills/ppt-mcp/references/behavioral-rules.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/ppt-mcp/references/ppt_agent_mode.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/ppt-mcp/references/ppt_agent_mode.md· markdown
16- User says "show me", "let me watch", "I want to see" → Show immediately
17- User says "just do it", "work in background" → Keep hidden
18- Simple one-shot operations (e.g., "how many slides?") → Keep hidden, no need to ask
19 
20## Three Workflows
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L18
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2569d2900765099c939…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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