substrate-vulnerability-scanner — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited substrate-vulnerability-scanner (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Systematically scan Substrate runtime modules (pallets) for platform-specific security vulnerabilities that can cause node crashes, DoS attacks, or unauthorized access. This skill encodes 7 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Substrate/FRAME-based chains.
.rs// Substrate/FRAME indicators
#[pallet]
pub mod pallet {
use frame_support::pallet_prelude::*;
use frame_system::pallet_prelude::*;
#[pallet::config]
pub trait Config: frame_system::Config { }
#[pallet::call]
impl<T: Config> Pallet<T> {
#[pallet::weight(10_000)]
pub fn example_function(origin: OriginFor<T>) -> DispatchResult { }
}
}
// Common patterns
DispatchResult, DispatchError
ensure!, ensure_signed, ensure_root
StorageValue, StorageMap, StorageDoubleMap
#[pallet::storage]
#[pallet::call]
#[pallet::weight]
#[pallet::validate_unsigned]pallets/*/lib.rs - Pallet implementationsruntime/lib.rs - Runtime configurationbenchmarking.rs - Weight benchmarksCargo.toml with frame-* dependenciesWhen invoked, I will:
I check for 7 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Substrate/FRAME. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.
+, -, *, / operators wrap in release modechecked_* or saturating_* methodsunwrap(), expect(), array indexing without bounds checkensure!#[transactional]pallet_randomness_collective_flip vulnerable to collusionpallet_babe::RandomnessFromOneEpochAgo)random(subject) not random_seed()ensure_signed allows any user for privileged operationsensure_root or custom origins (ForceOrigin, AdminOrigin)For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.
pallets/*/lib.rs)runtime/lib.rs)For each #[pallet::call] function:
# Search for panic-prone patterns
rg "unwrap\(\)" pallets/
rg "expect\(" pallets/
rg "\[.*\]" pallets/ # Array indexing
rg " as u\d+" pallets/ # Type casts
rg "\.unwrap_or" pallets/# Find direct arithmetic
rg " \+ |\+=| - |-=| \* |\*=| / |/=" pallets/
# Should find checked/saturating alternatives instead
rg "checked_add|checked_sub|checked_mul|checked_div" pallets/
rg "saturating_add|saturating_sub|saturating_mul" pallets/cargo test --features runtime-benchmarks# Find privileged operations
rg "ensure_signed" pallets/ | grep -E "pause|emergency|admin|force|sudo"
# Should use ensure_root or custom origins
rg "ensure_root|ForceOrigin|AdminOrigin" pallets/Report on every pattern in §5, whether or not it turned anything up. This skill has no Finding Template, so the table opens the report and the findings follow it, with all 7 rows present:
| # | Pattern | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Arithmetic Overflow | found | src/lib.rs:212 -- + on BalanceOf<T> in do_transfer |
| 2 | Don't Panic | ||
| 3 | Weights and Fees | ||
| 4 | Verify First, Write Last | ||
| 5 | Unsigned Transaction Validation | ||
| 6 | Bad Randomness | ||
| 7 | Bad Origin |
Each verdict is one of:
file:line and write the finding up in full after the table.arithmetic method you searched for, so a reader can repeat the search.
transactions"). Not having looked is not n/a. Note that pattern 4 is version-scoped (pre-v0.9.25): say which runtime version the pallet targets rather than dropping the row.
A table with fewer than 7 rows is an incomplete scan and must be reported as one. A row whose Verdict cell is empty is incomplete in the same way: row 1 above is filled in to show the shape, and every row is filled in the same way before the report is done. Seven clear verdicts is a result a reader can act on. A report that covers three patterns and says nothing about the other four reads exactly like a clean pallet, and that is the failure this table exists to prevent.
// Use test-fuzz for property-based testing
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use test_fuzz::test_fuzz;
#[test_fuzz]
fn fuzz_transfer(from: AccountId, to: AccountId, amount: u128) {
// Should never panic
let _ = Pallet::transfer(from, to, amount);
}
#[test_fuzz]
fn fuzz_no_panics(call: Call) {
// No dispatchable should panic
let _ = call.dispatch(origin);
}
}# Run benchmarks to generate weights
cargo build --release --features runtime-benchmarks
./target/release/node benchmark pallet \
--chain dev \
--pallet pallet_example \
--extrinsic "*" \
--steps 50 \
--repeat 20# Test runtime upgrades
cargo build --release --features try-runtime
try-runtime --runtime ./target/release/wbuild/runtime.wasm \
on-runtime-upgrade live --uri wss://rpc.polkadot.iobuilding-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/substrate/Before completing Substrate pallet audit:
Arithmetic Safety (CRITICAL):
+, -, *, / operators in dispatchableschecked_* or saturating_*try_into() with error handlingPanic Prevention (CRITICAL):
unwrap() or expect() in dispatchablesensure!Weights & DoS (CRITICAL):
Access Control (CRITICAL):
ensure_root or custom originsensure_signed only for user-level operationsStorage Safety (HIGH):
#[transactional]Other (MEDIUM):
random(subject) not random_seed()Testing:
found, clear or n/a with a reasonn/a costs oneclause and makes the judgment reviewable. Silence records nothing, and a reader cannot tell it apart from not having checked.
+ on aBalance is pattern 1 whether or not the compiler said anything, and debug assertions do not run on a production node.
not a precondition for starting it. Rank by severity after the table is complete, not by leaving rows out.
That table is the deliverable: it is what distinguishes a pallet that was examined from one that was glanced at.
did. Pattern 7 is about which origin is required, and ensure_signed where ensure_root belongs passes this rationalization while failing the check.
whose worst case depends on storage size or an unbounded loop is pattern 3 even with a benchmark attached.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.