routeros-hotspot — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited routeros-hotspot (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Hotspot traffic intercept runs before the regular firewall input/forward chains. This is the single most important fact to internalize:
/ip/hotspot binds to a bridge or interface — all traffic on that interface enters the hotspot chain firsths-unauth, hs-auth chains) — do not manually create, remove, or interfere with these hotspot-managed rulesCommon mistake: Adding a DROP rule for port 443 from bridge-hotspot to "fix a security gap" — this breaks the HTTPS login page silently.
/ip/hotspot/profile/add \
name=my-profile \
hotspot-address=10.20.0.1 \
login-by=https,mac,http-pap \
mac-auth-mode=mac-as-username-and-password \
dns-name=login.example.com \
ssl-certificate=login.example.com.crt_0 \
nas-port-type=ethernet \
use-radius=yes \
radius-accounting=yes \
html-directory-override=hotspot-filesKey properties:
ssl-certificate= — reference the name after import (RouterOS appends _0 to imported certificate names)nas-port-type= — use ethernet for wired hotspots and wireless-ieee-802-11-g for wireless hotspotshtml-directory-override= — must match the exact folder name on the router's filesystemlogin-by=https — serves the login page over HTTPS; requires www-ssl service enabled with the same certificateuse-radius=yes — when set, local `/ip/hotspot/user` entries are bypassed; adding them has no effect/ip/hotspot/add \
name=hotspot1 \
interface=bridge-hotspot \
profile=my-profile \
address-pool=pool-hotspot \
addresses-per-mac=2 \
idle-timeout=5m \
keepalive-timeout=none \
disabled=noNote: keepalive-timeout=none disables the keepalive. keepalive-timeout=0 is NOT valid — it is ignored.
Note: RouterOS hotspot relies on NAT and is IPv4-only. IPv6 clients are not supported by the hotspot subsystem.
Option 114 (standardized 2020, RFC 8910) signals the captive portal URI to clients. It is underrepresented in LLM training data.
# force=yes is REQUIRED — without it, clients whose DHCP Parameter Request
# List does not include code 114 (e.g. iOS, Android) silently skip the option
/ip/dhcp-server/option/add \
name=captive-portal \
code=114 \
force=yes \
value="'https://login.example.com/api'"
/ip/dhcp-server/option/sets/add \
name=captive-portal-set \
options=captive-portal
/ip/dhcp-server/set my-dhcp-server dhcp-option-set=captive-portal-setOption value syntax: outer double quotes, inner single quotes — "'https://...'". Missing inner quotes cause the option to be sent as a binary blob, not a string URI.
api.json timing: RouterOS creates hotspot/api.json only after the first client CAPPORT probe — not at hotspot enable time. Move it to the html-directory-override folder after first client connects:
# Handles both flash/ and non-flash storage layouts
:local srcPath "hotspot/api.json"
:local dstPath "hotspot-files/api.json"
:if ([:len [/file find name="flash"]] > 0) do={
:set srcPath "flash/hotspot/api.json"
:set dstPath "flash/hotspot-files/api.json"
}
:if ([:len [/file find name=$srcPath]] > 0) do={
/file set [find name=$srcPath] name=$dstPath
} else={
:log warning "api.json not yet created — run after first client CAPPORT probe"
}Use a consistent comment= tag for idempotent add/remove. Without it, repeated script runs accumulate duplicate entries.
# Remove only our entries, not manually-added ones
/ip/hotspot/walled-garden/ip/remove [find comment="my-wg"]
/ip/hotspot/walled-garden/ip/add dst-host=example.com action=accept comment="my-wg"
/ip/hotspot/walled-garden/ip/add dst-host=*.example.com action=accept comment="my-wg"IP vs HTTP walled garden:
/ip/hotspot/walled-garden/ip — layer 3 match by destination host, applied BEFORE authentication. Use for HTTPS destinations./ip/hotspot/walled-garden — layer 7 URL pattern match, requires HTTP. Does NOT work for HTTPS.The hotspot profile references ssl-certificate=name.crt_0 (RouterOS appends _0 on import). Enable www-ssl with the same certificate:
/ip/service/set www-ssl disabled=no certificate=login.example.com.crt_0 tls-version=only-1.2Quick import pattern:
/certificate import file-name=login.example.com.crt passphrase=""
/certificate import file-name=login.example.com.key passphrase=""
# After import, the certificate appears as login.example.com.crt_0RouterOS substitutes $(variable) server-side in any file under html-directory-override before serving it. These are not JavaScript variables — they are filled before the browser receives the page.
Most external captive portal setups override login.html, alogin.html, and status.html. Keep the full servlet page list, POST fields, RADIUS pass-through variables, multi-language target= mechanics, and HTTP response-control syntax in references/template-variables.md.
Use $(link-login-only) as the login POST endpoint, pass the original destination through dst, and always pick escaped variants such as $(link-orig-esc), $(mac-esc), and $(username-esc) when embedding values into URLs or query strings. The non-escaped variants can break parsing or open injection paths if a value contains &, =, ?, or #.
Conditional syntax (server-side, not JavaScript):
$(if logged-in == "yes")
<a href="$(link-logout)">Logout</a>
$(else)
<form action="$(link-login-only)" method="post">...</form>
$(endif)Operators: presence ($(if VAR)), ==, !=. Also $(elif ...). No nested arithmetic / string ops.
Generic login.html pattern for external captive portal:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta http-equiv="pragma" content="no-cache">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
<!-- External auth provider loads redirect logic -->
<script src='https://auth.example.com/snippets/router-os/redirect'></script>
</head>
<body>
<div id="entryPoint">Redirecting...</div>
<script>
window.addEventListener('load', function () {
ExternalAuth_redirect(
'$(server-name)', '$(mac-esc)', '$(link-login-only)',
'$(link-orig-esc)', '$(error-orig)', '$(logged-in)', '$(ip)'
);
});
</script>
</body>
</html>The external provider authenticates the user and redirects the browser back to $(link-login-only) with username + password + dst POST fields. RouterOS validates (local DB or RADIUS), issues the auth cookie, and redirects to dst.
Walled-garden must include the external auth host (and any CDN/asset hosts) — otherwise the unauthenticated browser cannot reach the redirect script in step 2.
| Mistake | Correct behavior |
|---|---|
| DROP TCP 443 from hotspot interface | Hotspot chain runs before firewall — breaks the HTTPS login page |
keepalive-timeout=0 to disable keepalive | Use keepalive-timeout=none |
Option 114 value= without inner single quotes | Must be "'https://...'" — outer double, inner single |
Option 114 without force=yes | iOS/Android silently skip option if not in their DHCP PRL |
Adding /ip/hotspot/user when use-radius=yes | Local users are bypassed when RADIUS is active |
Wildcard HTTPS domains in /ip/hotspot/walled-garden | Use /ip/hotspot/walled-garden/ip for HTTPS (layer 3 match) |
| Hotspot on dual-stack network with IPv6 | Hotspot is IPv4-only — IPv6 not supported |
$(link-login) treated as JavaScript variable | It is RouterOS server-side substitution, not JS |
Embedding $(link-orig) / $(mac) / $(username) into another URL | Use the -esc variant — non-esc breaks parsing on &, =, ? and may enable injection |
| Hotspot with PCC / multiple routing tables | Hotspot uses only the default routing table — split-WAN setups need explicit /ip route rule for hotspot traffic |
Related skills:
routeros-fundamentals — RouterOS CLI syntax, REST API, scripting basicsrouteros-certificates (in backlog) — for the full certificate chain handling patternMCP tools:
rosetta MCP server — /tool/ping, /ip/hotspot command tree inspection (routeros_search, routeros_get_page)MikroTik docs:
See references/radius-client.md for RADIUS client configuration patterns.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.