trtc-ai-service— agent skill

trtc-ai-service — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by Tencent-RTC·Agent Skill·github.com/Tencent-RTC/agent-skills

Is trtc-ai-service safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited trtc-ai-service (Agent Skill) and scored it 65/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 10 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
65/100
●●●●●●●○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 28, 2026 · 130d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings10 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 10 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 10 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md×8
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md· markdown
603. The scripts themselves (`start.sh` / `add-capability.py` / `post-install-patch.py`) alrea
… (14 chars elided on L60)
61(via `__file__` / `BASH_SOURCE`), so as long as you invoke them with their **absolute path**
… (30 chars elided on L61)
624. If `SKILL_ROOT` cannot be determined immediately, fall back to a one-shot detection (do n
… (37 chars elided on L62)
63```bash
64find "$PWD" -maxdepth 4 -name SKILL.md -path '*ai-service*' 2>/dev/null | head -1
Occurrences
8 occurrences · first at L62, also L66, L235 +5 more
Show all 8 locations
Line
File
L62
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
L66
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
L235
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
L246
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
L288
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
L296
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
L846
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
L931
skills/trtc-ai-service/SKILL.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/trtc-ai-service/scenarios/custom-builder/prompts/q1-business-scenario.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/trtc-ai-service/scenarios/custom-builder/prompts/q1-business-scenario.md· markdown
28- Length ≥ 8 and ≤ 600 characters. If too short, follow up: "That's quite brief — could you
… (58 chars elided on L28)
29- Must contain at least one noun phrase (industry name, product name, user type); pure inter
… (36 chars elided on L29)
30- Do not ask the user to provide brand name / company name (if needed, the template uses pla
… (45 chars elided on L30)
31 
32---
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L30
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · skills/trtc-ai-service/scenarios/customer-service/system-prompt.template.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/trtc-ai-service/scenarios/customer-service/system-prompt.template.md· markdown
78- Do not request / repeat / store sensitive information such as user IDs, bank cards, login
… (34 chars elided on L78)
79- If you receive such information, immediately remind the user to stop sending, and only rec
… (39 chars elided on L79)
80- Do not disclose any internal system interfaces, key names, file paths, or service architec
… (13 chars elided on L80)
81 
82# Scope Boundary
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L80
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25640f836ae691c1fe8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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