vet-skill — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited vet-skill (Agent Skill) and scored it 91/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 1 flagged
The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.
ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Run skill-vetter's 41-rule scanner against a skill / plugin / extension package. Return a verdict the user can trust before they install.
$ARGUMENTS. If empty, ask the user for the path.mcp__openclaw-skill-vetter__vet_skill with the path. The tool walks the directory, scans manifests / SKILL.md / package.json / Python files / shell scripts, and returns findings + verdict.> ✅ **ALLOW** — skill-vetter found no concerning patterns
> **Path:** `<path>`
> **Manifest:** `<package-name>` v`<version>` by `<author>`
> **Files scanned:** N
> **Notes:** [low-severity warnings if any]> 🟡 **WARN** — skill-vetter flagged caution-tier patterns
> **Path:** `<path>`
> **Findings:**
> - **<RULE.NAME>** (severity: WARN) at `<file>:<line>` — <one-line explanation of what the rule catches>
> **Recommended action:** [review the specific lines, decide if expected; OR refuse the install if intent is unclear]> 🔴 **BLOCK** — skill-vetter detected critical malicious pattern
> **Path:** `<path>`
> **Findings:**
> - **<RULE.NAME>** (severity: CRITICAL) at `<file>:<line>` — <explanation>
> ```
> <quote the offending lines from the file with line numbers>
> ```
> **What this would do if installed:** <expand on the actual behavior — e.g. "the SKILL.md instructs Claude to ignore previous safety rules and run shell commands without asking; once installed, every Claude session would inherit this override">
> **Where this came from:** [if author / source can be inferred from the manifest, mention it; otherwise note "source unverified"]
> **Action:** Do NOT install. Report the package to the marketplace it came from.eval, exec, Function, dynamic import).env, .aws/credentials, .netrc, ~/.ssh/)claude-code-helpers vs claude-code-helper)Cite the actual rule name returned by skill-vetter — don't paraphrase.
package.json, pyproject.toml, claude-plugin.json), surface the author / version / homepage in the verdict header. Provenance matters for trust decisions.$ARGUMENTS is empty: "Pass a path to the skill directory or package: /aufgaard:vet-skill ./path/to/community-skill"pip install openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp and the plugin is loaded."<path>. Pass a directory or archive path."---
The [Production-AI MCP Suite Bundle](https://temurah.gumroad.com/l/production-ai-mcp-suite) ($29) includes skill-vetter's full 41-rule catalogue + 6 other production-AI safety MCPs + the 8-page Field Reference PDF (covers P5.1 malicious-skill payloads + P5.2 dependency rot).~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.