Claude Skills Governance Risk And Compliance— plugin

Claude Skills Governance Risk And Compliance — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

Is Claude Skills Governance Risk And Compliance safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Claude Skills Governance Risk And Compliance (Plugin) and scored it 83/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 4 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
83/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 22, 2026 · 134d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings4 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 755a9a5
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SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
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CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
52
18.2 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 4 flagged

Securityscore 52 · 4 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · grc-workspace/iteration-2/ccpa/eval-88-adtech-sharing/without_skill/outputs/response.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptgrc-workspace/iteration-2/ccpa/eval-88-adtech-sharing/without_skill/outputs/response.md· markdown
180- Implement a process to receive and honor opt-out requests within 15 business days
181- When you receive an opt-out request, notify your third-party recipients so they also stop
… (25 chars elided on L181)
182- Do not ask consumers to re-consent to sale/sharing within 12 months of opting out
183- Train your customer service and privacy team on how to handle CCPA/CPRA rights requests
184 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L182
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · grc-workspace/iteration-1/nist-csf/eval-5-board-reporting/without_skill/outputs/response.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptgrc-workspace/iteration-1/nist-csf/eval-5-board-reporting/without_skill/outputs/response.md· markdown
1723. **Tool inventories instead of outcomes**: Boards don't need to know you use "CrowdStrike"
… (66 chars elided on L172)
173 
1744. **No decisions requested**: The board should leave every cybersecurity briefing with clea
… (107 chars elided on L174)
175 
1765. **Incident reporting only after it's over**: Boards expect timely notification of signifi
… (59 chars elided on L176)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L174
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · grc-workspace/iteration-1/gdpr-compliance/eval-3-subject-access-request/without_skill/outputs/response.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptgrc-workspace/iteration-1/gdpr-compliance/eval-3-subject-access-request/without_skill/outputs/response.md· markdown
83 
841. **Acknowledge immediately**: Send a confirmation of receipt and the expected response dat
… (1 chars elided on L84)
852. **Verify identity if needed**: If you're not certain who is making the request, you can a
… (69 chars elided on L85)
863. **Search all systems**: Include CRM, email, support tickets, analytics, backups, and any
… (22 chars elided on L86)
874. **Flag third-party data**: Go through the responsive data and redact any third parties' p
… (34 chars elided on L87)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L85
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · grc-workspace/iteration-2/ccpa/eval-87-consumer-rights-request/without_skill/outputs/response.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptgrc-workspace/iteration-2/ccpa/eval-87-consumer-rights-request/without_skill/outputs/response.md· markdown
59 
60If you cannot verify the consumer's identity after a reasonable attempt:
61 
62- Do NOT disclose or delete the information.
63- Notify the consumer that you were unable to verify and explain (in general terms) what inf
… (24 chars elided on L63)
64- Document your verification attempts in your internal records.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L61
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25612d0253c2329457c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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