sumsub-api-auth — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited sumsub-api-auth (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
How to sign and send authenticated requests to https://api.sumsub.com, per the official reference.
Never share, paste, or use a production Sumsub App Token / secret with Claude. If the user offers a prod token, refuse and ask for the sandbox pair instead.
mode**. They are scoped to sandbox data only — leaking one cannot expose real applicant PII or move real money.
including their identity documents. Treat it like a banking credential.
returns 401 against production data and vice versa, so insisting on sandbox is also the practical default.
If the user pastes what looks like a production secret into the conversation, flag it immediately, advise rotating it in the dashboard, and continue only with a freshly-generated sandbox pair.
| Var | Where it comes from |
|---|---|
SUMSUB_APP_TOKEN | <https://cockpit.sumsub.com/checkus/devSpace/appTokens> — switch the workspace toggle to Sandbox first, then Connect Sumsub to your AI agent -> Build & configure -> Generate token . Shown once. |
SUMSUB_SECRET_KEY | Same dialog as the token. Also shown once. |
SUMSUB_BASE | https://api.sumsub.com (same host for sandbox and prod — the token decides the mode). |
⚠️ The token + secret are revealed exactly once at creation. Copy both into .env (or your secret store) before closing the dialog — there's no recovery flow, only re-generation.
Advise the user to store them in .claude/settings.local.json (gitignored, auto-loaded by Claude Code) or in .env:
// .claude/settings.local.json
{
"env": {
"SUMSUB_APP_TOKEN": "sbx:...",
"SUMSUB_SECRET_KEY": "..."
}
}# .env
SUMSUB_APP_TOKEN=sbx:...
SUMSUB_SECRET_KEY=...If either credential is missing, stop and ask. Do not invent placeholders.
Every request to api.sumsub.com must carry:
| Header | Value |
|---|---|
X-App-Token | The App Token, verbatim. |
X-App-Access-Ts | Current Unix time in seconds (UTC). Must be within ±60s of Sumsub's clock. |
X-App-Access-Sig | Lowercase hex HMAC-SHA256 of the signing string, keyed by the secret. |
HTTPS is mandatory — plain http:// is rejected.
Concatenate, with no separators:
<ts><HTTP_METHOD_UPPER><request_uri_with_query><body_bytes_or_empty>ts — the exact value you put in X-App-Access-Ts (string of digits).HTTP_METHOD_UPPER — GET, POST, PATCH, PUT, DELETE — uppercase.request_uri_with_query — path starting with /, including the query stringif any. Examples: /resources/applicants/-/one, /resources/accessTokens?userId=abc&levelName=basic-kyc-level.
GET / DELETE with no body, appendnothing (empty string). For JSON, sign the exact bytes you'll transmit — re-serializing later will break the signature.
Then hex(hmac_sha256(secret, signing_string)), lowercase.
Signing string for POST /resources/accessTokens?userId=...&levelName=basic-kyc-level&ttlInSecs=600 with no body, at ts 1607551635:
1607551635POST/resources/accessTokens?userId=cfd20712-24a2-4c7d-9ab0-146f3c142335&levelName=basic-kyc-level&ttlInSecs=600The official multi-language examples live at SumSubstance/AppTokenUsageExamples (Java, JS, Python, Ruby, Go, PHP, C#). Use those for production integrations.
For one-off calls or debugging, this skill ships two small helpers:
scripts/sumsub_sign.py — print the three headersfor a given method/path/body. No network calls.
scripts/sumsub_curl.sh — sign + curl in oneshot. Reads SUMSUB_APP_TOKEN / SUMSUB_SECRET_KEY from the environment.
Run scripts using ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/<script> so they resolve correctly regardless of the working directory.
export SUMSUB_APP_TOKEN='sbx:...' # sandbox token, refuse prod
export SUMSUB_SECRET_KEY='...'
${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/sumsub_curl.sh GET '/resources/applicants/-/count'A 200 with a JSON body confirms the signature is correct. A 401 with {"description":"Invalid signature"} means the signing string or secret is off — re-check, in order:
/ and the full query string.newlines added by editors / heredocs).
multipart/form-data requestsSome endpoints take a file upload — most commonly idDoc photo upload at POST /resources/applicants/{applicantId}/info/idDoc. For these:
markers, part headers, JSON metadata, and file bytes. There is no multipart-specific exemption — the rule is the same as for JSON: signing string = ts + METHOD + path + body_bytes.
Content-Type header is multipart/form-data; boundary=<boundary>,where <boundary> matches the one woven into the body bytes you signed.
The pitfall: most HTTP libraries (curl -F, requests with files=, fetch with FormData) generate the boundary internally and never expose the exact bytes — so you cannot sign what they will send. Workaround: build the body in memory yourself, hash it, then transmit those exact bytes with --data-binary / a raw send.
import hashlib, hmac, json, os, time, uuid
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
APP_TOKEN = os.environ["SUMSUB_APP_TOKEN"]
SECRET = os.environ["SUMSUB_SECRET_KEY"]
APPLICANT = "6a170f852f9d88fe6eda2636" # from create-applicant response
FILE = Path("/path/to/passport.png")
METADATA = {"idDocType": "PASSPORT", "country": "RUS"}
boundary = "----sumsub-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
crlf = b"\r\n"
parts = [
b"--" + boundary.encode(),
b'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="metadata"',
b"Content-Type: application/json",
b"",
json.dumps(METADATA).encode(),
b"--" + boundary.encode(),
f'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="content"; filename="{FILE.name}"'.encode(),
b"Content-Type: image/png",
b"",
FILE.read_bytes(),
b"--" + boundary.encode() + b"--",
b"",
]
body = crlf.join(parts)
method, url_path = "POST", f"/resources/applicants/{APPLICANT}/info/idDoc"
ts = str(int(time.time()))
sig = hmac.new(
SECRET.encode(),
ts.encode() + method.encode() + url_path.encode() + body,
hashlib.sha256,
).hexdigest()
req = Request(
"https://api.sumsub.com" + url_path,
data=body, method="POST",
headers={
"X-App-Token": APP_TOKEN,
"X-App-Access-Ts": ts,
"X-App-Access-Sig": sig,
"Content-Type": f"multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}",
"Content-Length": str(len(body)),
"X-Agent-Source": "sumsub-skills",
"X-Agent-Source-Ver": "1.1.0",
},
)
print(urlopen(req).read().decode())Curl-based fallbacks (e.g. curl --data-binary @raw-multipart.bin after pre-building the body to disk) work too, but the boundary in the body and in Content-Type must match exactly — easier to keep them in sync in code.
The most-asked endpoint after auth works:
POST /resources/accessTokens?userId=<your_user_id>&levelName=<level>&ttlInSecs=600Body is empty. Response contains token — pass that to the Web / Mobile SDK. Full reference: <https://docs.sumsub.com/reference/generate-access-token>.
gotcha that produces 401 Invalid signature and how to spot it.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.