spritecook-workflow-essentials— agent skill

spritecook-workflow-essentials — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by SpriteCook·Agent Skill·github.com/SpriteCook/skills

Is spritecook-workflow-essentials safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited spritecook-workflow-essentials (Agent Skill) and scored it 92/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 2 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
92/100
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↑ +0 since first scan (92 → 92)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 31d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings2 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 755a9a5
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
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CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
76
26.6 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 2 flagged

Securityscore 76 · 2 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/spritecook-workflow-essentials/SKILL.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/spritecook-workflow-essentials/SKILL.md· markdown
20## Credential Safety
21 
22- Never ask the user to paste a SpriteCook API key into chat, prompts, code blocks, shell co
… (27 chars elided on L22)
23- Never print, persist, echo, or inline API keys or `Authorization` headers in agent output.
24- Prefer SpriteCook MCP tools, presigned URLs, or a preconfigured local connector/helper tha
… (44 chars elided on L24)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L22
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · skills/spritecook-workflow-essentials/SKILL.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/spritecook-workflow-essentials/SKILL.md· markdown
31- Use `remove_background(asset_id=...)` for owned SpriteCook assets that need a transparent
… (107 chars elided on L31)
32- Use `update_asset_label(asset_id=..., label=...)` after generation, import, or cleanup whe
… (76 chars elided on L32)
33- Do not tell the user to use the SpriteCook HTTP API or API keys for local image import whe
… (82 chars elided on L33)
34 
35## Preset Tools
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L33
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha256d26ffdabaeeedc2erubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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