configure-a0c4d0 — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited configure-a0c4d0 (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
You are walking the user through configuring the sponsio-openclaw plugin so it actually wraps tool calls in this OpenClaw session. Without these steps, the plugin loads but every per-plugin library is empty and every tool call passes through unguarded.
The plugin sends host: "openclaw" in its hook payload so the runtime fallback library is _host_openclaw (OpenClaw canonical tool names — exec / read / write / edit / apply_patch / web_fetch / send_message — with path / command / url params), not the Claude-Code-shaped _host. Both libraries live under the same ~/.sponsio/plugins/ tree.
Run:
sponsio --versionpip install sponsio (orpip install -e ".[all]" from a local clone). Stop here until they confirm.
If the user owns the agent code and wants to wire Sponsio into their own framework integration instead of running it as an OpenClaw host plugin, delegate to the sponsio skill (sponsio onboard .). This skill is only for the host-plugin case where the user is gating tool calls inside an OpenClaw session.
Sponsio has two layers, and rules must land in the right YAML or they do nothing. When the user hands you a policy document / instruction file / "list of things the agent must not do" and asks you to encode it, classify each rule before writing anywhere.
| Signal | → Layer 1 (this skill — write to ~/.sponsio/plugins/<id>/sponsio.yaml) | → Layer 2 (delegate to sponsio skill — writes <project>/sponsio.yaml) |
|---|---|---|
| Tool names mentioned | exec, read, write, edit, apply_patch, web_fetch, send_message (OpenClaw primitives), mcp__* | tool names from the user's project's tool inventory |
| Path form | absolute or ~/... paths outside the user's project | paths relative to the project (src/...) |
| Subject of the rule | "OpenClaw must not…", "the coding agent must not…" | "the loan agent must…", "the chatbot should…" |
| Domain language | shell, git, file system, MCP server primitives | AML, KYC, refund, PII, approval, faithfulness, hallucination |
./sponsio.yaml exists in cwd | weaker signal — Layer 2 is in play, but rule may still be Layer 1 | stronger signal — most rules belong here |
Process:
"rules X, Y look like rules for the agent you're building, not the OpenClaw host — switching to the sponsio skill (sponsio onboard) for those". Do not silently dump them into a host-plugin YAML.
which layer they mean before writing.
The default failure mode is over-writing to Layer 1 because that's this skill's home turf. Cross-layer leakage is a worse user error than the extra clarification round.
Run:
sponsio plugin initThis creates ~/.sponsio/plugins/_host/sponsio.yaml (Claude-Code- shape, mostly inert in an OpenClaw session) and ~/.sponsio/plugins/_host_openclaw/sponsio.yaml (OpenClaw-shape, the one that actually fires for OpenClaw fallback tools — exec fork-bombs, dotenv reads, SSH-key writes, ~/.clawdbot/.env exfiltration patterns, etc.). Show the user the output verbatim; if the smoke test fails, stop and surface the error — the install is broken.
If the file already exists (re-running setup), the command prints …already exists. Re-run with --force to overwrite. Informational, not an error.
You need to know which plugins / MCP servers the user actually has installed before deciding which contract libraries to author. Two discovery paths:
~/.openclaw/plugins.json or theequivalent the user's install uses. If they don't know, ask them to list registered plugins from their OpenClaw config.
.mcp.jsonin any registered plugin's directory.
There are no bundled OpenClaw starter libraries today (Claude Code ships github / filesystem / playwright because those MCP servers were prioritised first). Every OpenClaw plugin goes through Step 3 below.
sponsio plugin scanThree discovery paths in priority order:
--introspect (preferred for MCP servers)sponsio spawns the server, does the JSON-RPC initialize + tools/list handshake, and auto-populates the tool inventory along with parameter schemas. Read the plugin's manifest to find the spawn command, then:
sponsio plugin scan \
--plugin-id <name> \
--target-host openclaw \
--introspect "<spawn-cmd>"For OpenClaw, ALWAYS pass --target-host openclaw so the generated contracts use flat tool names (matching how OpenClaw surfaces them) rather than Claude Code's mcp__<plugin>__ prefixed shape.
When the plugin doesn't run an MCP server (e.g. an OpenClaw skill that exposes tools through the SDK directly), pass tool names via --tools:
sponsio plugin scan <plugin-dir> --tools tool_a,tool_b,tool_c \
--target-host openclawLast resort — ask the user "what tools does this plugin expose?" and pass them via --tools. Use only when introspection fails or the plugin isn't structured as an MCP server.
sponsio plugin scan --plugin-id <id> --target-host openclaw \
--introspect "<spawn-cmd>"Output has two parts:
rules covering destructive verbs, rate-limit / loop-detection caps. Deterministic floor.
# === tool inventory ... === —every tool's name, description, input_schema, plus tool_name_in_contracts (flat for OpenClaw — no mcp__ prefix). This is the input for the agent's own contract extraction.
The heuristic engine catches obvious cases by name; the agent (you) fills semantic gaps by reading each tool's description + input_schema. No API call needed — you ARE the LLM the prompt is written for.
sponsio plugin prompt openclawJSON object:
{"contracts": [{"desc": "...", "pattern": "...", "args": [...]}]}each semantic contract with source: agent-extracted for later traceability.
ALWAYS start with the dry-run. Never --apply until the user has seen the output.
For each contract proposed, state:
starter_irreversible,starter_bash, starter_rate_limit, starter_loop) or the LLM's desc. LLM proposals carry source: plugin-scan-llm for traceability.
the user doesn't assume coverage they don't have.
If a rule is wrong, drop it from the rendered yaml or add a customized: block:
customized:
- match: { desc: "<offending desc>" }
disabled: trueOnce the user is happy with the dry-run:
sponsio plugin scan <plugin-dir> --target-host openclaw \
--introspect "..." --applyThis writes one yaml per routed group under ~/.sponsio/plugins/<plugin-id>/.
After every successful apply, render the contract digest so the user sees what's now enforced before any later tuning:
sponsio plugin show <plugin-id>The digest groups rules by category (hard denies, rate limits, arg blocks, …). Surface it verbatim — paraphrasing strips the detail the operator needs to spot misroutes. sponsio plugin install <bundled-name> already calls this digest internally; for scan --apply, you call it manually.
Walk through three tuning axes the user should answer before flipping to enforce:
OpenClaw's capability/filesystem and incident/openclaw packs use <workspace>/ as path-allowlist root. If the user wants those included (they're NOT in the default _host_openclaw to avoid the no-workspace-set crash), add:
agents:
_host_openclaw:
workspace: /Users/<them>/projects/<repo>
include:
- sponsio:capability/shell
- sponsio:capability/filesystem
- sponsio:incident/openclaw| Profile | Adjustment |
|---|---|
| Local dev | leave defaults |
| Staging | enable audit_after on destructive tools |
| Production | move delete_* from rate_limit 0 to assumption-gated (require explicit confirm_reconfirmed) |
| Regulated / PII | tighten the deterministic PII / dangerous-arg rules and lower their thresholds |
Common cases:
| Rule | When false-positives | Customization |
|---|---|---|
_host_openclaw "Block reads of dotenv secrets" | dotenv rotators, secret-rotation agents | disabled: true for read only (keep write) |
incident/openclaw "navigation must not target internal hosts" | testing one's own internal app | replace with allowlist of actual internal hostnames |
Per-plugin libraries live in a single file:
~/.sponsio/plugins/<id>/sponsio.yamlInside, shipped contracts carry source: bundle:<id> (stamped at install). The user's customisations sit beside them: new contracts get appended (no source tag), and adjustments to shipped rules go into a customized: block (disabled: true, retuned args:, narrowed A:).
sponsio plugin install <id> (or sponsio host install <host>) is idempotent — re-run any time to pull a new bundle (e.g. after pip install -U sponsio) without losing customisations. Default contracts are wholesale replaced from the new bundle; every user-authored contract and the entire customized: block survive. Hand-editing a default contract's body in place is the one thing that doesn't survive — express changes as a customized: entry instead.
The agent must NOT use Edit, Write, MultiEdit, or shell redirects on this file — the runtime self-modify pack blocks those calls. The agent also must NOT hand the user a YAML snippet it composed from the conversation. Legitimate sources of contract content: bundle libraries (sponsio plugin install), CLI extraction (sponsio plugin scan / sponsio scan / sponsio onboard), and the user's own keystrokes. An LLM-composed snippet has none of those provenances.
For every customization the walkthrough produces:
rule it affects. sponsio plugin show <id> prints the desc of every loaded rule; quote a desc verbatim from that output if you need to reference one — but do NOT compose YAML around it.
(~/.sponsio/plugins/<id>/sponsio.yaml) and describe the change in words ("add a customized: entry beside the agent's contracts: list whose match.desc is the rule you want to silence, with disabled: true"). Point them at the existing pack's syntax; let them write the YAML themselves.
sponsio validate --config ~/.sponsio/plugins/<id>/sponsio.yaml and help them debug if it doesn't parse.
Run a synthetic event through the hook:
echo '{"hook_event_name":"PreToolUse","tool_name":"exec","tool_input":{"command":"rm -rf /"},"host":"openclaw"}' \
| sponsio plugin guard --stdinExpect: a JSON deny payload on stdout. If empty:
~/.sponsio/plugins/_host_openclaw/sponsio.yaml ismissing or wrong — re-run sponsio plugin init --force.
pip install -U sponsio.
For a per-plugin library you scanned in step 3, do the same with one of its tool names + a pattern you expect to block.
OpenClaw runtime needs to re-pick up the manifest. The exact reload mechanism depends on the OpenClaw version — typically restarting the OpenClaw runtime or running its plugin-reload command. Confirm the plugin is loaded before testing further.
Operator wants observe mode (log, don't block):
export SPONSIO_GUARD_MODE=observeThis dial only affects this plugin; other Sponsio integrations in the same shell still respect SPONSIO_MODE independently.
Operator wants per-plugin overrides instead of editing the library:
agents:
<plugin-id>:
contracts: [...shipped...]
customized:
- match: { desc: "<rule desc>" }
disabled: true"My rule looks right but the deny doesn't fire."
Most common causes:
--target-host openclaw?With claude-code the contract gets mcp__<plugin>__<tool> — that won't match OpenClaw's flat names. Re-scan with the right target.
~/.sponsio/plugins/<routed-id>/sponsio.yaml where the routed id matches what derive_plugin_id would return. For OpenClaw flat names that don't match a namespace, fallback is _host_openclaw, not _host.
stateless hook gets a fresh empty trace per fire. Until daemon mode lands, only argument-level rules (arg_blacklist, arg_value_range, scope_limit, arg_length_limit, dangerous_*) reliably fire on a single call.
can't list them, say so — don't fabricate.
--force on a user-edited library without explicitconsent.
--target-host claude-code for an OpenClaw user —the rules won't match.
sponsio/contracts/*.yaml inside theinstalled Sponsio package. User-level adjustments go in ~/.sponsio/plugins/<plugin>/sponsio.yaml.
SPONSIO_GUARD_MODE=observe "to make the smoketest pass". A failing smoke test means something's broken; silencing it hides the bug.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.