Bastion — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Bastion (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
A local-first control plane for your AI agent's tools. Bastion is a gateway that sits between an AI agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop, …) and the MCP servers it uses — capping spend, rate-limiting, enforcing per-tool permissions, redacting or blocking dangerous arguments, and auditing every call.
One config file, one command, no cloud, no database.
Model Context Protocol won — every major AI vendor ships it and there are 17,000+ MCP servers. But agents call those servers with no spend caps, no rate limits, no permissions, and no audit trail. A looping agent can burn real money in minutes, and you have no record of what it did.
Bastion is the missing control layer. One config file, one command, no cloud, no database.
Your agent points at Bastion instead of at its MCP servers directly. Bastion is both an MCP server (to the agent) and an MCP client (to the real "upstream" servers). It aggregates your upstreams behind one endpoint and enforces rules on every tools/call:
AI agent ──MCP──▶ Bastion ──MCP──▶ upstream server A
(policy + upstream server B
audit) upstream server Cpip install bastion-mcpThis installs the bastion command. To run it without installing globally, use uv:
uvx --from bastion-mcp bastion --helpTo hack on Bastion itself, see CONTRIBUTING.md.
Create bastion.yaml:
upstreams:
files:
command: npx
args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/path/to/project"]Validate it:
bastion validatePoint your agent at the gateway — e.g. for Claude Code:
claude mcp add --transport stdio bastion -- bastion run --config ./bastion.yamlYour agent now reaches the filesystem server through Bastion. With a single upstream, tools keep their original names; configure several and Bastion namespaces each tool by its upstream key (files_read_file, search_query, …) so they never collide.
bastion.yaml — upstreams is required; everything else is optional. A small example with permissions and audit:
upstreams:
files:
command: npx
args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/data"]
audit:
enabled: true
path: ./bastion-audit.jsonl
policy:
default: allow
permissions:
- { tool: "files_read_*", action: allow }
- { tool: "files_delete_*", action: deny }A denied call is blocked before reaching the upstream and recorded in the audit log. Rate limits, budgets (call-count and cost), and argument guards (block or redact) layer onto the same policy section.
See [`docs/configuration.md`](docs/configuration.md) for the full reference of every section, [`docs/security.md`](docs/security.md) for the security model (secrets in the audit log, unauthenticated surfaces), and [`examples/`](examples/) for runnable starter configurations.
bastion dashboard serves a local web view of the audit log — every tool call, live, with arguments, outcomes, and timings:
bastion dashboard --config bastion.yaml # then open http://127.0.0.1:8787Bastion shipped one feature per release, milestone by milestone:
pip install bastion-mcp)bastion tail/logs/stats/init) + Windows CIv1.0.0 🎉Issues and PRs welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.