CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
35.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
15.0 pts
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Security
✓—All security checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Supply chain
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenance
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparency
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Community
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
7064e61
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
MCP Shield
<!-- mcp-name: io.github.sophiacave/mcp-shield -->
Open-source security scanner for MCP servers. 20 rules across 6 categories. Scan any server in seconds. Get a grade from A to F.
36.7% of MCP servers are SSRF-vulnerable (BlueRock, 2026). 82% have path traversal flaws. Only 17% are production-ready. MCP Shield finds the vulnerabilities before attackers do.
Quick Start
git clone https://github.com/sophiacave/mcp-shield
cd mcp-shield
# Scan a file
python3 src/cli.py scan path/to/mcp_server.py
# Scan a project
python3 src/cli.py scan path/to/mcp-project/What It Checks (20 Rules)
| Rule | Severity | What It Detects |
|---|---|---|
| SSRF-01 | Critical | User input in HTTP request URLs |
| SSRF-02 | Medium | Dynamic URLs without validation |
| SSRF-03 | Medium | DNS rebinding (URL validated but no IP pinning) |
| PATH-01 | High | User input in file paths |
| PATH-02 | Medium | No path traversal protection |
| PATH-03 | Medium | Symlink following without check |
| INJ-01 | Critical | eval/exec on user input |
| INJ-02 | Critical | SQL string interpolation |
| INJ-03 | High | subprocess with shell=True |
| INJ-04 | High | Template injection via .format() |
| INJ-05 | Critical | Unsafe deserialization (pickle/yaml) |
| AUTH-01 | Medium | No auth on tool handlers |
| AUTH-02 | Critical | Hardcoded secrets/API keys (OpenAI, Stripe, GitHub, AWS) |
| AUTH-03 | Low | No rate limiting on tool endpoints |
| SEC-01 | High | SSL verification disabled |
| SEC-02 | Medium | Wildcard CORS |
| SEC-03 | Medium | Stack traces/error details exposed to client |
| SEC-04 | Low | No input length validation (DoS risk) |
| LOG-01 | Low | No logging/audit trail on tool invocations |
Testing
python3 tests/test_integration.py
# 28 tests, 0 failuresMCP Server Integration
Add to ~/.claude/mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"mcp-shield": {
"command": "python3",
"args": ["/path/to/mcp-shield/src/mcp_server.py"]
}
}
}Claude Code tools: shield_scan_file, shield_scan_directory, shield_scan_code
Example Output
MCP Shield: my-server/ — 3 finding(s)
[CRIT] SSRF-01: Potential SSRF: Dynamic URL from user input
requests call with dynamic URL that may include user input
Location: server.py:45
Fix: Validate URL against allowlist. Block internal IPs.
CWE: CWE-918
[HIGH] INJ-03: Command injection: subprocess with shell=True
subprocess called with shell=True. User input in args = RCE.
Location: tools.py:112
Fix: Use subprocess with shell=False and pass args as list.
CWE: CWE-78
[MED] AUTH-01: No authentication detected on tool handlers
MCP tool handlers found but no auth logic detected
Fix: Add authentication middleware.
CWE: CWE-306
Grade: F | 1 critical, 1 high, 1 mediumFeatures
- Zero dependencies — Pure Python, no pip installs required
- 20 security rules across SSRF, path traversal, injection, auth, config, and logging
- CWE references — Every finding maps to a Common Weakness Enumeration ID
- Actionable fixes — Each finding includes specific remediation steps
- A-F grading — Instant security posture assessment
- Dual mode — Run as CLI or as an MCP server inside Claude Code
- Fast — Scans a typical MCP server in under 1 second
Why This Exists
The MCP ecosystem has 9,400+ servers and 97M monthly SDK downloads. Security tooling hasn't kept up. We built MCP Shield because every MCP server deployed without a security scan is a liability.
Built by Like One, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. Security tooling should be free.
License
MIT — Like One