vulnhunter — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited vulnhunter (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
A comprehensive security audit skill for identifying dangerous APIs, footgun patterns, error-prone configurations, and hunting for vulnerability variants across codebases. Inspired by Trail of Bits' sharp-edges and variant-analysis methodologies.
VulnHunter combines two powerful security analysis techniques:
Activate this skill when:
#### 1. Dangerous Default Configurations Look for configurations that are insecure by default:
- CORS: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
- Debug modes enabled in production
- Default credentials or API keys
- Permissive file permissions (777, 666)
- SSL/TLS verification disabled
- Insecure deserialization settings#### 2. Error-Prone APIs
Memory Safety:
// Dangerous: No bounds checking
strcpy(), strcat(), sprintf(), gets()
memcpy() without size validation
// Safer alternatives
strncpy(), strncat(), snprintf(), fgets()
memcpy_s() with explicit sizeCryptography Footguns:
- ECB mode encryption
- MD5/SHA1 for security purposes
- Hardcoded IVs or salts
- Custom crypto implementations
- Random without CSPRNG (Math.random for tokens)Concurrency Issues:
- Race conditions in file operations
- Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU)
- Double-checked locking anti-patterns
- Non-atomic increment/decrement operations#### 3. Language-Specific Footguns
JavaScript/TypeScript:
// Dangerous patterns
eval(), new Function(), setTimeout(string)
innerHTML, outerHTML, document.write()
Object.assign() for deep clone (shallow only!)
== instead of === (type coercion)Python:
# Dangerous patterns
pickle.loads(untrusted) # RCE vector
yaml.load(untrusted) # Use safe_load
exec(), eval()
os.system(), subprocess with shell=TrueRust:
// Patterns requiring extra scrutiny
unsafe { }
.unwrap() in production code
mem::transmute()
raw pointer dereferenceSolidity/Smart Contracts:
// High-risk patterns
tx.origin for authentication // Phishing vulnerable
delegatecall to untrusted // Storage collision
selfdestruct // Permanent destruction
block.timestamp for randomness // Miner manipulableWhen reviewing code, systematically check for:
#### Template 1: Missing Validation Pattern
Original bug: User input flows to SQL query without sanitization
Pattern: [user_input] -> [sink_function] without [validation_function]
Search for:
- Direct database calls with string concatenation
- ORM raw query methods with user parameters
- Similar data flows in adjacent modules#### Template 2: Authentication Bypass
Original bug: Endpoint missing auth middleware
Pattern: Route definition without auth decorator/middleware
Search for:
- Routes defined after the vulnerable one
- Similar API patterns in other modules
- Admin/internal endpoints#### Template 3: Race Condition
Original bug: Check-then-act without atomicity
Pattern: if (check_condition()) { act_on_condition() }
Search for:
- File existence checks followed by file operations
- Permission checks followed by privileged actions
- Balance checks followed by transfers#### Grep-Based Search
# Find potential SQL injection
grep -rn "execute.*%s" --include="*.py"
grep -rn "query.*\+" --include="*.js"
# Find dangerous deserialize
grep -rn "pickle.loads\|yaml.load\|eval(" --include="*.py"
# Find command injection vectors
grep -rn "os.system\|subprocess.*shell=True" --include="*.py"#### Semantic Search (AST-Based) For more precise matching, use AST-based tools:
## Variant Analysis Report
### Original Finding
- **ID**: FINDING-001
- **Severity**: High
- **Root Cause**: [Description]
- **Affected File**: path/to/file.ext:line
### Pattern Extracted
[Code pattern or regex]
### Variants Discovered
| # | Location | Severity | Status | Notes |
|---|----------|----------|--------|-------|
| 1 | file.ext:42 | High | Confirmed | Same root cause |
| 2 | other.ext:100 | Medium | Suspected | Needs validation |
### Recommendations
[Systematic fix approach]# Example: Detect SQL injection in Python
rules:
- id: sql-injection-format
patterns:
- pattern: $CURSOR.execute($QUERY % ...)
message: "Potential SQL injection via string formatting"
severity: ERROR
languages: [python]// Find tainted data flowing to dangerous sinks
import python
import semmle.python.dataflow.TaintTracking
from DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
where TaintTracking::localTaint(source.getNode(), sink.getNode())
and sink.getNode().asExpr().(Call).getTarget().getName() = "execute"
select sink, source, sink, "Tainted input reaches SQL execution"See the /examples folder for:
resources/sharp-edges-catalog.md - Comprehensive catalog of dangerous patternsresources/variant-patterns.md - Common vulnerability pattern templatestemplates/variant-report.md - Report template for variant analysisvulnhunter/
├── SKILL.md # This file
├── resources/
│ ├── sharp-edges-catalog.md # Categorized dangerous patterns
│ └── variant-patterns.md # Vulnerability pattern templates
├── examples/
│ ├── smart-contracts/ # Solidity/blockchain examples
│ ├── web-apps/ # Web application examples
│ └── native-code/ # C/C++/Rust examples
├── templates/
│ └── variant-report.md # Analysis report template
└── docs/
└── methodology.md # Detailed methodology guide~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.