Promptlint Mcp— agent skill

Promptlint Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by sean-sunagaku·Agent Skill·github.com/sean-sunagaku/promptlint-mcp

Is Promptlint Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Promptlint Mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 71/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 7 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
71/100
●●●●●●●○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 25, 2026 · 132d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings7 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
16
5.6 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 7 flagged

Securityscore 16 · 7 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · CHANGELOG.md×5
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptCHANGELOG.md· markdown
34 
35- **`contradiction` / `asking`**: extended the pair's `a` and `b` arrays so
36`Never ask clarifying questions. Always ask for clarification.` is now
37detected (previously scored 100/0 — silent false-negative). Added
38`never ask clarifying`, `never ask any`, `do not ask any`,
Occurrences
5 occurrences · first at L36, also L38, L38 +2 more
Show all 5 locations
Line
File
L36
CHANGELOG.md
L38
CHANGELOG.md
L38
CHANGELOG.md
L38
CHANGELOG.md
L39
CHANGELOG.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/promo/x-thread.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/promo/x-thread.md· markdown
13- "be concise" ↔ "be thorough"
14- "do not comment" ↔ "explain each step"
15- "never ask the user" ↔ "ask the user when unclear"
16 
17Promptlint flags them as `error` and clamps your score to 59/100 if any exist.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L15
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/promo/reddit-localllama.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/promo/reddit-localllama.md· markdown
10**What it catches:**
11 
12- Contradicting directives (`"be concise"` + `"be thorough"`, `"never ask"` + `"ask when unc
… (7 chars elided on L12)
13- Near-duplicate sentences (Jaccard sim > 0.6, code-block-masked so example code doesn't fal
… (12 chars elided on L13)
14- Ambiguous `it/this/that` without a mid-sentence referent
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L12
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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