g-event— agent skill

g-event — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by SashaMarchuk·Agent Skill·github.com/SashaMarchuk/claude-plugins

Is g-event safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited g-event (Agent Skill) and scored it 78/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 2 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
78/100
●●●●●●●●○○
↑ +0 since first scan (78 → 78)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 29d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 2 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
38
13.3 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 38 · 3 findings
HIGH"Ignore previous instructions" command embedded in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/g-event/skills/g-event/references/event-format.md×2
HIGHwhen it fires on hostile content the impact is full system-prompt override.
Why it matters

The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/g-event/skills/g-event/references/event-format.md· markdown
18## Title rules
19 
20**L-7 — prompt-injection defense for re-read titles.** When event titles, descriptions, atte
… (108 chars elided on L20)
21 
22- **Imperative or noun phrase**. `Weekly Sync`, `Sprint Planning`, `Interview: Misha — Senio
… (94 chars elided on L22)
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L20, also L20
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L20
plugins/g-event/skills/g-event/references/event-format.md
L20
plugins/g-event/skills/g-event/references/event-format.md
How to fix
Remove the override phrase, or rephrase the passage so it does not instruct the agent to discard its rules.
  1. Delete the ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.
  2. If this is jailbreak-research or tutorial content, move the example into a clearly fenced, non-instruction block and label it as a quoted sample.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01sha256087b391ca4342386rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/g-event/skills/g-event/references/modes.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/g-event/skills/g-event/references/modes.md· markdown
126 
1271. **Safety-net check first** (see SKILL.md → `--auto` safety net). On refuse condition, HAL
… (23 chars elided on L127)
1282. **Extract + resolve** as in default Steps 1–3, but never ask questions. Use defaults for
… (22 chars elided on L128)
1293. **Past-time refuse** — don't silently schedule in the past.
1304. **Conflict check** at the `--auto` threshold per SKILL.md → Conflict detection: block on
… (108 chars elided on L130)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L128
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Vendor response · right of reply
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