supply-chain-security — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited supply-chain-security (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Any task involving dependency management, package auditing, build integrity, software bill of materials, or defending against supply chain attacks.
npm audit, pip audit, or equivalent).actions/checkout@abc123def.# Verify lockfile hasn't been tampered with
npm ci # Uses lockfile exactly (fails if lockfile/package.json mismatch)
# Alert on unexpected lockfile changes in CI
git diff --name-only | grep -q "package-lock.json" && echo "LOCKFILE CHANGED"package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml).npm ci (not npm install) in CI — it respects the lockfile exactly.# Node.js
npm audit --audit-level=high
npx socket-security/cli scan
# Python
pip-audit
safety check
# Go
govulncheck ./...# CycloneDX format (preferred for security)
npx @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm --output-file sbom.json
# SPDX format (preferred for compliance)
syft . -o spdx-json > sbom.spdx.json# npm provenance (verify publisher identity)
npm publish --provenance
npm audit signatures # Verify all installed packages
# Container image provenance
cosign verify --certificate-identity=... --certificate-oidc-issuer=... image:tag.nvmrc, Go via go.mod).# Pin actions to SHA, not tag
- uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608 # v4.1.0
# Minimal permissions
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
# Restrict network in build steps
# Use dependency caching to reduce fetch surface| Attack | Defense |
|---|---|
| Typosquatting | Verify package name carefully, use scoped packages |
| Dependency confusion | Configure .npmrc with registry scoping |
| Compromised maintainer | Pin versions, verify provenance, review changelogs |
| Malicious install scripts | Use --ignore-scripts where possible, audit scripts |
| Hijacked CI action | Pin to SHA, fork critical actions |
| Registry compromise | Verify signatures, use multiple registries |
# .npmrc — scope internal packages to private registry
@mycompany:registry=https://npm.internal.company.com/
# Everything else falls through to public npmlatest or ^ in production lockfiles without CI audit gates.v4) instead of SHAs (tags can be force-pushed).npm install instead of npm ci in CI.Before marking a task done when this skill was active:
npm ci (or equivalent)?~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.