ceo-assistant-e3b0c4— agent skill

ceo-assistant-e3b0c4 — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by sacredvoid·Agent Skill·github.com/sacredvoid/ceo-assistant

Is ceo-assistant-e3b0c4 safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited ceo-assistant-e3b0c4 (Agent Skill) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 7 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 26, 2026 · 129d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings7 warnings · 1 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 8 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 8 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · README.md
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptREADME.md· markdown
6```
7 
8[![Built with Claude Code](https://img.shields.io/badge/Built%20with-Claude%20Code-7c3aed?st
… (108 chars elided on L8)
9[![MIT License](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-22c55e?style=for-the-badge)](LICENS
… (2 chars elided on L9)
10[![GitHub Pages](https://img.shields.io/badge/Live%20Demo-GitHub%20Pages-0ea5e9?style=for-th
… (65 chars elided on L10)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L8
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a6f34b753e2a6c67…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · commands/ceo-interview.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptcommands/ceo-interview.md· markdown
38## Rules (Non-Negotiable)
39- NEVER pitch first, discover first
40- NEVER ask "Would you use X?" (hypothetical, unreliable)
41- NEVER ask leading questions ("Don't you think...?")
42- Listen 80%, talk 20%
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L40, also L41
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L40
commands/ceo-interview.md
L41
commands/ceo-interview.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2564e0873a3c77e8cc3…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/business-templates.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/business-templates.md· markdown
4172. Ask about specifics in the past, not hypotheticals about the future
4183. Talk less, listen more (aim for 80/20 listening to talking ratio)
4194. Never ask "Would you use X?" or "Would you pay for X?" (everyone says yes to be polite)
4205. Never ask leading questions ("Don't you think it would be great if...?")
421 
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L419, also L420
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L419
docs/business-templates.md
L420
docs/business-templates.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/validation-frameworks.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/validation-frameworks.md· markdown
137- "What would a solution need to do for you to switch from what you use now?"
138 
139### Questions You Must NEVER Ask
140 
141| Bad Question Type | Example | Why It Fails |
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L139
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256e4809c5054a52fcf…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · research/v3-research-findings.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptresearch/v3-research-findings.md· markdown
136**Rules:**
137- Never pitch your product during these interviews
138- Never ask "would you use X?" (hypothetical answers are worthless)
139- Never ask leading questions ("don't you think X is a problem?")
140- Take verbatim notes, don't paraphrase
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L138, also L139
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L138
research/v3-research-findings.md
L139
research/v3-research-findings.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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