legadoSkill— agent skill

Automate creating Legado reading source files by analyzing websites with AI to generate valid JSON for efficient source development.

by rezmdie·Agent Skill·github.com/rezmdie/legadoSkill
5starsReview on GitHub →

Is legadoSkill safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited legadoSkill (Agent Skill) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 3 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
↑ +0 since first scan (45 → 45)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 28, 2026 · 26d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 3 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
25
8.8 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 25 · 3 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · assets/knowledge_base/book_sources/1751_🏷晋江文学_书源_20260218_102134.md
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptassets/knowledge_base/book_sources/1751_🏷晋江文学_书源_20260218_102134.md· markdown
104"loginCheckJs": "if(!cache.get(\"jjtime\")) {\n cache.put(\"jjtime\", true, 11600);\n
… (106 chars elided on L104)
105"loginUi": "[\n{\n \t name:\"☕️支持源作者\",\n \t type: \"button\",\n action: \"toT
… (106 chars elided on L105)
106"loginUrl": "function toScan(){\n\ttry{\n\theaders = {\t\n\t\t\t\"source\":\"android\",\n\t\
… (106 chars elided on L106)
107"respondTime": 180000,
108"ruleBookInfo": {
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L106
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25623f5206990d05cde…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · assets/knowledge_base/book_sources/1751_🏷晋江文学_书源_20260218_103141.md
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptassets/knowledge_base/book_sources/1751_🏷晋江文学_书源_20260218_103141.md· markdown
104"loginCheckJs": "if(!cache.get(\"jjtime\")) {\n cache.put(\"jjtime\", true, 11600);\n
… (106 chars elided on L104)
105"loginUi": "[\n{\n \t name:\"☕️支持源作者\",\n \t type: \"button\",\n action: \"toT
… (106 chars elided on L105)
106"loginUrl": "function toScan(){\n\ttry{\n\theaders = {\t\n\t\t\t\"source\":\"android\",\n\t\
… (106 chars elided on L106)
107"respondTime": 180000,
108"ruleBookInfo": {
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L106
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25623f5206990d05cde…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · assets/knowledge_base/book_sources/5718_书耽_书源_20260218_103302.md
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptassets/knowledge_base/book_sources/5718_书耽_书源_20260218_103302.md· markdown
142"updateTime": "{{$.word_count}} 字 发布于 {{$.uptime}}"
143},
144"searchUrl": "@js:\n\nu=decode(decodeURIComponent(\"hYKytSMHsACWNRRED+zq8asscl2eVP6HdvA4q5Im
… (106 chars elided on L144)
145"weight": 0
146}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L144
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256aea1770b069ee1d1…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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