hig-technologies— agent skill

hig-technologies — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by raintree-technology·Agent Skill·github.com/raintree-technology/hig-doctor

Is hig-technologies safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited hig-technologies (Agent Skill) and scored it 87/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 3 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
87/100
●●●●●●●●●
↑ +0 since first scan (87 → 87)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 27, 2026 · 30d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings3 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
64
22.4 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 64 · 3 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/hig-technologies/SKILL.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/hig-technologies/SKILL.md· markdown
283. **Siri: natural, predictable, recoverable.** Clear conversational intent phrases that com
… (108 chars elided on L28)
29 
304. **Payments: transparent and frictionless.** Standard Apple Pay button styles. Never ask f
… (108 chars elided on L30)
31 
325. **Health data is deeply personal.** Explain the health benefit before requesting access.
… (108 chars elided on L32)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L30
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/hig-technologies/references/sign-in-with-apple.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/hig-technologies/references/sign-in-with-apple.md· markdown
35**Clarify whether the additional data you request is required or just recommended.**
36 
37**Don’t ask people to supply a password.**
38 
39**Avoid asking for a personal email address when people supply a private relay address.**
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L37
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2567fd804810fbc46dfrubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/hig-technologies/references/siri.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/hig-technologies/references/siri.md· markdown
95**Design your intents to be long-lived.**
96 
97**Don’t request permission to use Siri.**
98 
99**Support background operation.**
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L97
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2563e1e6f83da98a28crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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