branding— agent skill

branding — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by piprail·Agent Skill·github.com/piprail/piprail

Is branding safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited branding (Agent Skill) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 4 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
↑ +0 since first scan (45 → 45)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 31d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 4 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 4 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 4 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/jszip/.travis.yml×2
HIGHonce decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/jszip/.travis.yml· yaml
13env:
14global:
15- secure: MhA8GHU42X3GWTUMaqdZVvarx4BMjhQCUGNi3kvuD/iCmKVb7gMwj4jbds7AcJdsCRsRk8bBGzZs/E7Hid
… (90 chars elided on L15)
16- secure: qREw6aUu2DnB+2reMuHgygSkumRiJvt7Z5Fz4uEVoraqbe65e4PGhtzypr9uIgCN43vxS2D5tAIeDbfid5
… (90 chars elided on L16)
17script: npm run $COMMAND
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L15, also L16
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L15
.claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/jszip/.travis.yml
L16
.claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/jszip/.travis.yml
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25659dcde4fbbca0856rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/readable-stream/.travis.yml×2
HIGHonce decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/readable-stream/.travis.yml· yaml
31env:
32global:
33- secure: rE2Vvo7vnjabYNULNyLFxOyt98BoJexDqsiOnfiD6kLYYsiQGfr/sbZkPMOFm9qfQG7pjqx+zZWZjGSswh
… (90 chars elided on L33)
34- secure: g9YINaKAdMatsJ28G9jCGbSaguXCyxSTy+pBO6Ch0Cf57ZLOTka3HqDj8p3nV28LUIHZ3ut5WO43CeYKwt
… (90 chars elided on L34)
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L33, also L34
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L33
.claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/readable-stream/.travis.yml
L34
.claude/skills/branding/design/deck/node_modules/readable-stream/.travis.yml
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2563d469e5116428c71rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Vendor response · right of reply
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