red-team-tactics — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited red-team-tactics (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Red teaming exists to make defenders better by safely rehearsing how a real attacker would behave. Everything below assumes written authorization, a defined scope, and an intent to report rather than to harm.
An engagement moves through recognizable stages. They are not strictly linear -- escalation and discovery often loop -- but each has a job:
| Stage | What it accomplishes |
|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | chart the attack surface |
| Initial access | establish the first foothold |
| Execution | run code on the target |
| Persistence | survive reboots and logouts |
| Privilege escalation | reach admin or root |
| Defense evasion | stay below detection thresholds |
| Credential access | collect usable credentials |
| Discovery | learn the internal layout |
| Lateral movement | reach additional hosts |
| Collection | gather the data of interest |
| Command & control | hold a reliable channel back |
| Exfiltration / impact | remove data or demonstrate effect |
The first trade-off is passive versus active. Passive collection never touches the target -- low risk, limited yield. Active probing engages it directly -- richer data, higher chance of being noticed. Sequence accordingly: exhaust passive sources before generating traffic.
What is worth finding, and why:
| Finding | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Technology stack | shapes which exploits are viable |
| Staff and roles | feeds social-engineering pretexts |
| IP/network ranges | bounds the scanning scope |
| Vendors and partners | opens supply-chain angles |
Choose the vector that fits the target and the rules of engagement:
| Vector | When it fits |
|---|---|
| Phishing | a human target with reachable email |
| Public exploit | an exposed, unpatched service |
| Valid credentials | leaked, reused, or cracked logins |
| Supply chain | trusted third-party access exists |
The checks differ by platform.
On Windows, look for unquoted service paths you can hijack, services with weak permissions you can modify, abusable token privileges (such as SeDebugPrivilege), and credentials sitting in memory or config.
On Linux, look for SUID binaries that run as a more privileged owner, sudo rules that permit unintended commands, kernel versions with known local exploits, and cron jobs pointing at scripts you can write to.
The aim is to operate without tripping alerts. Common techniques: living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) so legitimate tools do the work, obfuscating payloads, altering file timestamps, and clearing logs.
Operational discipline matters as much as technique -- act during business hours so activity blends in, shape traffic to look ordinary, keep channels encrypted, and avoid behavior that stands out from the baseline.
Movement usually rides on harvested credentials. The material you hold dictates the method:
| Material | Technique |
|---|---|
| Cleartext password | standard authentication |
| NTLM hash | pass-the-hash |
| Kerberos ticket | pass-the-ticket |
| Certificate | certificate-based auth |
Typical paths between hosts: administrative shares, remote-access services (RDP, SSH, WinRM), and exploitation of internal-only services.
AD is a frequent objective because it concentrates access. Recurring techniques and their targets:
| Technique | Target |
|---|---|
| Kerberoasting | service-account passwords |
| AS-REP roasting | accounts lacking pre-authentication |
| DCSync | domain credential replication |
| Golden ticket | durable, forged domain access |
The deliverable is the point of the engagement. Reconstruct the full chain: how the foothold was obtained, which techniques followed, what was ultimately reached, and -- critically -- where detection should have fired but did not.
For every technique that succeeded, answer three questions: What control or alert should have caught this? Why did it fail to? What concrete change would catch it next time?
Always: keep inside the agreed scope, hold impact to the minimum, raise the alarm immediately if you stumble onto a genuine live threat, and log every action you take.
Never: destroy production data, knock services offline unless that test is explicitly scoped, push past proof-of-concept, or retain sensitive data after the engagement.
| Sloppy | Disciplined |
|---|---|
| Sprinting straight to exploitation | following the methodology in order |
| Causing collateral damage | minimizing footprint and impact |
| Treating the report as an afterthought | documenting throughout |
| Drifting past scope | staying inside agreed boundaries |
The purpose is always defensive: simulate the adversary so the organization can close the gaps before a real one finds them.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.