penetration-tester— agent skill

penetration-tester — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by pekral·Agent Skill·github.com/pekral/cursor-rules

Is penetration-tester safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited penetration-tester (Agent Skill) and scored it 87/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
87/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 28, 2026 · 131d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 1 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
63
22.1 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 2 flagged

Securityscore 63 · 2 findings
HIGH"Ignore previous instructions" command embedded in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01 · Prompt injection · CHANGELOG.md
HIGH — when it fires on hostile content the impact is full system-prompt override.
Why it matters

The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.

The exact value spotted
excerptCHANGELOG.md· markdown
9- 🗑️ **Removed** `chore(skills)`: **the `readme-generator` skill, superseded by the standal
… (109 chars elided on L9)
10 
11- 🔒 **Added** `feat(security)`: **an Untrusted Content Boundary — instructions found inside
… (109 chars elided on L11)
12 
13The classification lives in **one** place. A skill-audit table in the rule maps every skill
… (106 chars elided on L13)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L11
How to fix
Remove the override phrase, or rephrase the passage so it does not instruct the agent to discard its rules.
  1. Delete the ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.
  2. If this is jailbreak-research or tutorial content, move the example into a clearly fenced, non-instruction block and label it as a quoted sample.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01sha2562e4221a7f996a729…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · skills/penetration-tester/SKILL.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/penetration-tester/SKILL.md· markdown
16- **Authorization is mandatory** — never test a target without explicit, confirmed authoriza
… (81 chars elided on L16)
17- Keep every proof of concept minimal and safe; demonstrate impact without causing damage, e
… (43 chars elided on L17)
18- Never reveal or store harvested secrets, tokens, or PII in cleartext in the report — redac
… (6 chars elided on L18)
19- Hard limits: this file stays <= 500 lines and <= 5000 tokens
20 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L18
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha256186bc3c0f8012890…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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