Three.Ws— plugin

Three.Ws — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by nirholas·Plugin·github.com/nirholas/three.ws

Is Three.Ws safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Three.Ws (Plugin) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 4 high-severity and 6 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 132d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings6 warnings · 4 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 10 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 10 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · agent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/create.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptagent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/create.json· json
89"Program TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb consumed 958 of 116724 compute units",
90"Program TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb success",
91"Program data: G3KpTd7rY3YFAAAAdGhyZWUFAAAAVEhSRUUkAAAAaHR0cHM6Ly90aHJlZS53cy9tZXRhZGF0YS90a
… (104 chars elided on L91)
92"Program 6EF8rrecthR5Dkzon8Nwu78hRvfCKubJ14M5uBEwF6P invoke [2]",
93"Program 6EF8rrecthR5Dkzon8Nwu78hRvfCKubJ14M5uBEwF6P consumed 2087 of 108968 compute units",
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L91, also L134
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L91
agent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/create.json
L134
agent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/create.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562bddd0bf1fd80970…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · agent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/trade-buy.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptagent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/trade-buy.json· json
30"Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 invoke [3]",
31"Program 11111111111111111111111111111111 success",
32"Program data: vdt/007mYe7ZlWNa60+kzgbBxoYK1n+fCcKd3PeuvhRX4KVBAXY/Hzj86QIAAAAAtFOElGIFAAABj
… (104 chars elided on L32)
33"Program 6EF8rrecthR5Dkzon8Nwu78hRvfCKubJ14M5uBEwF6P invoke [3]",
34"Program 6EF8rrecthR5Dkzon8Nwu78hRvfCKubJ14M5uBEwF6P consumed 2087 of 71571 compute units",
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L32
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a26a2033c23d2cd1…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · agent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/trade-sell.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptagent-payments-sdk/src/solana/fixtures/pump-events/trade-sell.json· json
24"Program TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb consumed 2475 of 171296 compute units",
25"Program TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb success",
26"Program data: vdt/007mYe7ZlWNa60+kzgbBxoYK1n+fCcKd3PeuvhRX4KVBAXY/H2aS4wcAAAAAQMM7gVcBAAAAb
… (104 chars elided on L26)
27"Program 6EF8rrecthR5Dkzon8Nwu78hRvfCKubJ14M5uBEwF6P invoke [3]",
28"Program 6EF8rrecthR5Dkzon8Nwu78hRvfCKubJ14M5uBEwF6P consumed 2087 of 157631 compute units",
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L26
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256fe96e4ed26b5cc5d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · CLAUDE.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptCLAUDE.md· markdown
28Before stopping to ask anything, load the `self-unblock-playbook` skill (`.claude/skills/sel
… (108 chars elided on L28)
29 
30**Standing resource approvals (so you never ask):** the owner has approved spending the Goog
… (108 chars elided on L30)
31 
32If a task cannot be 100% finished inside this session (an external review must land, a third
… (108 chars elided on L32)
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L30, also L138
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L30
CLAUDE.md
L138
CLAUDE.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · STRUCTURE.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptSTRUCTURE.md· markdown
247| Motion Swap (avatar body-swap in video) | [pages/motion-swap.html](pages/motion-swap.html)
… (107 chars elided on L247)
248| Video to Motion (video → downloadable animation file) | [pages/video-to-motion.html](pages
… (108 chars elided on L248)
249| Smart home (`/smart-home`) | Page [pages/smart-home.html](pages/smart-home.html) `→ /smart
… (108 chars elided on L249)
250| Sign Language (feature home) | [pages/sign-language.html](pages/sign-language.html) `→ /si
… (108 chars elided on L250)
251| ASL alphabet (learn + practice) | [pages/asl-alphabet.html](pages/asl-alphabet.html) `→ /a
… (108 chars elided on L251)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L249
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256183eb789192b5159…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · CHANGELOG.md×3
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptCHANGELOG.md· markdown
854- **Docs · Fork a trade** (`/docs/fork-trade`): One tap on any coin across the Radar, the Li
… (108 chars elided on L854)
855- **Docs · Give your voice assistant a face** (`/docs/home-satellite`): Point an existing Ho
… (108 chars elided on L855)
856- **Docs · Home households and roles** (`/docs/home-households`): Sharing a connected house
… (108 chars elided on L856)
857- **Docs · Home plans and quotas** (`/docs/home-plans`): What a connected house costs and wh
… (107 chars elided on L857)
858- **Docs · Home privacy and retention** (`/docs/home-privacy`): Everything three.ws stores a
… (108 chars elided on L858)
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L856, also L877, L1445
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L856
CHANGELOG.md
L877
CHANGELOG.md
L1445
CHANGELOG.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2560be97c10a18c2bb9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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