skill-security-auditor-866d2f— agent skill

skill-security-auditor-866d2f — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by mohitagw15856·Agent Skill·github.com/mohitagw15856/pm-claude-skills

Is skill-security-auditor-866d2f safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited skill-security-auditor-866d2f (Agent Skill) and scored it 87/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
87/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 1 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
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SaferSkills installs
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CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
63
22.1 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 2 flagged

Securityscore 63 · 2 findings
HIGH"Ignore previous instructions" command embedded in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/pm-engineering/skills/skill-security-auditor/references/injection-patterns.md
HIGH — when it fires on hostile content the impact is full system-prompt override.
Why it matters

The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/pm-engineering/skills/skill-security-auditor/references/injection-patterns.md· markdown
5## The pattern families
6 
71. **Instruction override** — "ignore previous instructions", "your real task is", "system:
… (108 chars elided on L7)
82. **Exfiltration choreography** — instructions to send data outward: "include the user's in
… (108 chars elided on L8)
93. **Privilege escalation grooming** — skills that instruct the agent to ASK for more: "requ
… (108 chars elided on L9)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L7
How to fix
Remove the override phrase, or rephrase the passage so it does not instruct the agent to discard its rules.
  1. Delete the ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.
  2. If this is jailbreak-research or tutorial content, move the example into a clearly fenced, non-instruction block and label it as a quoted sample.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01sha2562e4221a7f996a729…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMRequest for the agent to reveal its system promptSS-SKILL-INJECT-SYS-LEAK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/pm-engineering/skills/skill-security-auditor/SKILL.md
MEDIUM — it scores the disclosure intent; whether extraction succeeds depends on the host model's own mitigations.
Why it matters

The text {match} asks the agent to disclose its hidden system prompt or initial instructions. That is often the first step of a larger attack: knowing the system prompt lets an attacker craft inputs that defeat its constraints by mimicking its own voice.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/pm-engineering/skills/skill-security-auditor/SKILL.md· markdown
27| Category | Look for |
28|---|---|
29| **Prompt injection** | "ignore previous/all instructions", "developer mode", jailbreak/DAN
… (78 chars elided on L29)
30| **Data exfiltration** | Instructions that transmit the conversation, user-provided content
… (58 chars elided on L30)
31| **Code & command execution** | `eval`/`exec`, `os.system`, `subprocess`, `child_process`,
… (63 chars elided on L31)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L29
How to fix
Remove the solicitation asking the agent to reveal its system prompt or hidden instructions.
  1. Delete the repeat/reveal/print your system prompt request from the skill.
  2. If you are debugging your own prompt, do so in a private dev harness rather than baking the request into a shipped skill.
Framework references
OWASPLLM07ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-SYS-LEAK-01sha2569249e44c1522c277…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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