ui-mockup-prompt-a73d27— agent skill

ui-mockup-prompt-a73d27 — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by MohamedAbdallah-14·Agent Skill·github.com/MohamedAbdallah-14/prompt-to-asset

Is ui-mockup-prompt-a73d27 safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited ui-mockup-prompt-a73d27 (Agent Skill) and scored it 79/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 5 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
79/100
●●●●●●●●○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings5 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
40
14.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 5 flagged

Securityscore 40 · 5 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/SKILL.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/SKILL.md· markdown
105**RTL** (from `craft/rtl-and-bidi.md`):
106- If the brief is RTL (Arabic/Hebrew/Persian/Urdu), the prompt must say so up front: "right-
… (93 chars elided on L106)
107- Don't ask the model to mirror clocks, refresh icons, media playback controls, charts, or p
… (66 chars elided on L107)
108 
109**Animation** is irrelevant to a static image mockup. Skip.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L107
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/references/laws-of-ux.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/references/laws-of-ux.md· markdown
207**Source.** George Miller, 1956.
208 
209**For UI mockup prompts.** Chunk dense screens into 3–5 visually distinct groups with clear
… (108 chars elided on L209)
210 
211Source URL: https://lawsofux.com/millers-law/
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L209
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/references/anti-slop-detail.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/references/anti-slop-detail.md· markdown
162### Perfect symmetric layout with no visual tension
163 
164Alternating density reads as intentional. Specify: "Generous breathing whitespace in the upp
… (108 chars elided on L164)
165 
166---
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L164
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/references/craft-rules-condensed.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/skills/ui-mockup-prompt/references/craft-rules-condensed.md· markdown
112 
113- **What state to depict.** If the brief is for a "transition" or "interaction state," ask f
… (108 chars elided on L113)
114- **Don't request decorative motion as a static element.** Don't ask for "particles drifting
… (108 chars elided on L114)
115 
116Folklore busts (do not write any of these into the prompt):
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L114
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · CHANGELOG.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptCHANGELOG.md· markdown
133- **Four new skills (→ 12 total).** Long-tail gaps the asset-type skills don't cover. No MCP
… (102 chars elided on L133)
134- `svg-authoring` — engaged whenever `asset_generate_*` returns an `InlineSvgPlan`. Enforces
… (106 chars elided on L134)
135- `t2i-prompt-dialect` — engaged during prompt rewriting. Per-model rules for `gpt-image-1`,
… (106 chars elided on L135)
136- `asset-validation-debug` — engaged when `asset_validate` or a generator returns warnings.
… (106 chars elided on L136)
137- `brand-consistency` — engaged for multi-asset sets. Builds `BrandBundle` (palette, typogra
… (106 chars elided on L137)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L135
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256183eb789192b5159…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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