owasp-security — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited owasp-security (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Apply these security standards when writing or reviewing code.
| # | Vulnerability | Key Prevention |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Deny by default, enforce server-side, verify ownership |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Harden configs, disable defaults, minimize features |
| A03 | Supply Chain Failures | Lock versions, verify integrity, audit dependencies |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS 1.2+, AES-256-GCM, Argon2/bcrypt for passwords |
| A05 | Injection | Parameterized queries, input validation, safe APIs |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Threat model, rate limit, design security controls |
| A07 | Auth Failures | MFA, check breached passwords, secure sessions |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Sign packages, SRI for CDN, safe serialization |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Log security events, structured format, alerting |
| A10 | Exception Handling | Fail-closed, hide internals, log with context |
When reviewing code, check for these issues:
# UNSAFE
cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}")
# SAFE
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s", (user_id,))# UNSAFE
os.system(f"convert {filename} output.png")
# SAFE
subprocess.run(["convert", filename, "output.png"], shell=False)# UNSAFE
hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
# SAFE
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
PasswordHasher().hash(password)# UNSAFE - No authorization check
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
def get_user(user_id):
return db.get_user(user_id)
# SAFE - Authorization enforced
@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
@login_required
def get_user(user_id):
if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
abort(403)
return db.get_user(user_id)# UNSAFE - Exposes internals
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
return str(e), 500
# SAFE - Fail-closed, log context
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
error_id = uuid.uuid4()
logger.exception(f"Error {error_id}: {e}")
return {"error": "An error occurred", "id": str(error_id)}, 500# UNSAFE - Fail-open
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return auth_service.check(user, resource)
except Exception:
return True # DANGEROUS!
# SAFE - Fail-closed
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return auth_service.check(user, resource)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Auth check failed: {e}")
return False # Deny on errorWhen building or reviewing AI agent systems, check for:
| Risk | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| ASI01: Goal Hijack | Prompt injection alters agent objectives | Input sanitization, goal boundaries, behavioral monitoring |
| ASI02: Tool Misuse | Tools used in unintended ways | Least privilege, fine-grained permissions, validate I/O |
| ASI03: Identity & Privilege Abuse | Delegated trust, inherited credentials, role chain exploits | Short-lived scoped tokens, identity verification |
| ASI04: Supply Chain | Compromised plugins/MCP servers | Verify signatures, sandbox, allowlist plugins |
| ASI05: Code Execution | Unsafe code generation/execution | Sandbox execution, static analysis, human approval |
| ASI06: Memory Poisoning | Corrupted RAG/context data | Validate stored content, segment by trust level |
| ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Comms | Spoofing/intercepting agent-to-agent messages | Authenticate, encrypt, verify message integrity |
| ASI08: Cascading Failures | Errors propagate across systems | Circuit breakers, graceful degradation, isolation |
| ASI09: Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | Over-trust in agents leveraged to manipulate users | Label AI content, user education, verification steps |
| ASI10: Rogue Agents | Compromised agents acting maliciously | Behavior monitoring, kill switches, anomaly detection |
When reviewing any language, think like a senior security researcher:
For any language not listed: Research its specific CWE patterns, CVE history, and known footguns. The examples above are entry points, not complete coverage.
Important: The examples below are illustrative starting points, not exhaustive. When reviewing code, think like a senior security researcher: consider the language's memory model, type system, standard library pitfalls, ecosystem-specific attack vectors, and historical CVE patterns. Each language has deeper quirks beyond what's listed here.
Different languages have unique security pitfalls. Here are the top 20 languages with key security considerations. Go deeper for the specific language you're working in:
Main Risks: Command injection, word splitting, globbing
# UNSAFE: Unquoted variables
rm $user_file
# SAFE: Always quote
rm "$user_file"
# UNSAFE: eval
eval "$user_command"
# SAFE: Never eval user inputWatch for: Unquoted variables, eval, backticks, $(...) with user input, missing set -euo pipefail
Main Risks: Sandbox escape, loadstring injection
-- UNSAFE: Code injection
loadstring(user_code)()
-- SAFE: Use sandboxed environment with restricted functionsWatch for: loadstring, loadfile, dofile, os.execute, io library, debug library
Main Risks: Prototype pollution, XSS, eval injection
// UNSAFE: Prototype pollution
Object.assign(target, userInput)
// SAFE: Use null prototype or validate keys
Object.assign(Object.create(null), validated)
// UNSAFE: eval injection
eval(userCode)
// SAFE: Never use eval with user inputWatch for: eval(), innerHTML, document.write(), prototype chain manipulation, __proto__
Main Risks: Pickle deserialization, format string injection, shell injection
# UNSAFE: Pickle RCE
pickle.loads(user_data)
# SAFE: Use JSON or validate source
json.loads(user_data)
# UNSAFE: Format string injection
query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'" % user_input
# SAFE: Parameterized
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (user_input,))Watch for: pickle, eval(), exec(), os.system(), subprocess with shell=True
Main Risks: Mass assignment, YAML deserialization, regex DoS
# UNSAFE: Mass assignment
User.new(params[:user])
# SAFE: Strong parameters
User.new(params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email))
# UNSAFE: YAML RCE
YAML.load(user_input)
# SAFE: Use safe_load
YAML.safe_load(user_input)Watch for: YAML.load, Marshal.load, eval, send with user input, .permit!
Main Risks: Buffer overflow, use-after-free, format string
// UNSAFE: Buffer overflow
char buf[10]; strcpy(buf, userInput);
// SAFE: Bounds checking
strncpy(buf, userInput, sizeof(buf) - 1);
// UNSAFE: Format string
printf(userInput);
// SAFE: Always use format specifier
printf("%s", userInput);Watch for: strcpy, sprintf, gets, pointer arithmetic, manual memory management, integer overflow
Main Risks: Unsafe blocks, FFI boundary issues, integer overflow in release
// CAUTION: Unsafe bypasses safety
unsafe { ptr::read(user_ptr) }
// CAUTION: Release integer overflow
let x: u8 = 255;
let y = x + 1; // Wraps to 0 in release!
// SAFE: Use checked arithmetic
let y = x.checked_add(1).unwrap_or(255);Watch for: unsafe blocks, FFI calls, integer overflow in release builds, .unwrap() on untrusted input
Main Risks: Race conditions, template injection, slice bounds
// UNSAFE: Race condition
go func() { counter++ }()
// SAFE: Use sync primitives
atomic.AddInt64(&counter, 1)
// UNSAFE: Template injection
template.HTML(userInput)
// SAFE: Let template escape
{{.UserInput}}Watch for: Goroutine data races, template.HTML(), unsafe package, unchecked slice access
Main Risks: orce unwrapping crashes, Objective-C interop
// UNSAFE: Force unwrap on untrusted data
let value = jsonDict["key"]!
// SAFE: Safe unwrapping
guard let value = jsonDict["key"] else { return }
// UNSAFE: Format string
String(format: userInput, args)
// SAFE: Don't use user input as formatWatch for: force unwrap (!), try!, ObjC bridging, NSSecureCoding misuse
Main Risks: Null safety bypass, Java interop, serialization
// UNSAFE: Platform type from Java
val len = javaString.length // NPE if null
// SAFE: Explicit null check
val len = javaString?.length ?: 0
// UNSAFE: Reflection
clazz.getDeclaredMethod(userInput)
// SAFE: Allowlist methodsWatch for: Java interop nulls (! operator), reflection, serialization, platform types
Main Risks: Injection, privilege escalation, data exfiltration
-- UNSAFE: String concatenation
"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userId
-- SAFE: Parameterized query (language-specific)
-- Use prepared statements in ALL casesWatch for: Dynamic SQL, EXECUTE IMMEDIATE, stored procedures with dynamic queries, privilege grants
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.