sota-devsecops — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited sota-devsecops (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
This skill encodes the 2026 state of the art for securing the path from source code to running workload: pipeline hardening, dependency and artifact supply chain, build integrity, analysis gates, IaC/deployment security, and runtime policy enforcement. It is defensive: every rule exists to prevent a real, named class of compromise (token theft, workflow injection, dependency confusion, tag mutation, state leakage, bypassable gates).
Two operating modes. Pick one explicitly at the start of the task.
Use when creating or extending pipelines, Dockerfiles, Terraform, GitOps configs, or dependency tooling.
build → artifact → deploy → runtime) and read the matching rules files from the index below BEFORE writing config.
keys, SHA pins, digest pins, frozen lockfile installs, non-root distroless runtime. Loosen only with a written reason in a comment.
is continue-on-error: true is documentation, not a control.
SBOMs, also wire the consumer (admission policy, gh attestation verify, cosign verify in CD). Unverified attestations are dead weight.
config) at the end of your work so the operator can confirm them.
Use when reviewing existing pipelines, workflows, Dockerfiles, IaC, or dependency posture.
Process: enumerate workflows/build files/IaC; for each, walk the relevant Audit checklist at the end of every rules file; report findings in the format below; do not report style nits as security findings.
| Severity | Meaning | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Remote compromise of pipeline, secrets, or artifacts is achievable now by an external party | pull_request_target checking out PR head with secrets; script injection from PR title into run:; long-lived cloud admin keys in repo secrets used by fork-triggered workflow; unauthenticated registry push |
| High | Compromise achievable by a contributor, or a single upstream event away | Actions pinned to mutable tags; no branch protection on default branch; CI token with write-all; no lockfile / unfrozen installs; Terraform applies from un-reviewed plans with admin creds |
| Medium | Weakens defense in depth or detection | Missing SBOM/provenance; scanners non-blocking; no drift detection; mutable image tags in deploy manifests; no secret-scanning push protection |
| Low | Hygiene, hardening headroom | Missing .dockerignore; unpinned dev-only tooling; verbose CI logs; missing CODEOWNERS on workflows |
Severity is judged by reachability: who can trigger the path (anonymous > fork PR author > org member > admin) and what it yields (secrets/artifact write > code exec in CI > info leak).
[SEVERITY] <short title>
File: <path>:<line>
Issue: <what is wrong, one or two sentences>
Attack path: <who exploits it and how — concrete, not theoretical>
Fix: <exact config change, with snippet when short>
Rule: <rules file # and section>End every audit with: counts per severity, the top 3 fixes by risk reduction per effort, and an explicit list of what was OUT of scope (org settings, registry config, runner infra you could not see).
| File | Read this when... |
|---|---|
| rules/01-pipeline-security.md | Writing or auditing CI workflows: GITHUB_TOKEN permissions, OIDC to cloud, SHA-pinning actions, pull_request_target / fork PR handling, script injection, self-hosted runners, branch/environment protection, signed commits, workflow-file ownership |
| rules/02-provenance-signing.md | Artifact integrity: SLSA levels, build provenance, in-toto attestations, Sigstore/cosign keyless signing, GitHub artifact attestations, npm/PyPI trusted publishing, release and tag integrity, verification at deploy time |
| rules/03-dependencies.md | Anything touching package manifests or lockfiles: frozen installs, dependency review gates, dependency confusion and registry scoping, typosquatting and malicious-package indicators, SBOM (CycloneDX/SPDX), vuln scanning with osv-scanner/grype, VEX and triage discipline, Renovate/Dependabot strategy, vendoring |
| rules/04-build-containers.md | Dockerfiles and build systems: hermetic/reproducible builds, multi-stage builds, build secrets, base image strategy (distroless/Chainguard, digest pinning), image scanning, registry security, immutable tags |
| rules/05-analysis-gates.md | CI quality/security gates: SAST (Semgrep/CodeQL), secret scanning and push protection, IaC scanning (checkov/trivy/tfsec), DAST, license compliance, making gates non-bypassable (required checks, no continue-on-error), flaky-test discipline |
| rules/06-iac-deployment.md | Terraform and delivery: state security, plan/apply separation with review, saved-plan apply, drift detection, GitOps (Flux/Argo) security model, progressive delivery (canary/blue-green/flags), rollback readiness, build-once-promote-many environment parity |
| rules/07-runtime-ops.md | Runtime enforcement and operations: admission control for signed images (Kyverno/policy-controller), policy as code (OPA/Kyverno) with tests, Pod Security, incident-ready CI/CD audit logging, deployment traceability, backup/restore testing, break-glass |
| rules/08-registry-security.md | Securing the container/artifact registry as infrastructure: the registry as a tier-0 supply-chain trust anchor; no anonymous push/pull and least-privilege robot/CI accounts (Zot accessControl, Harbor robots, cloud IAM); immutable tags and digest pinning to defeat tag mutation; OCI referrers for signature/SBOM/scan storage; scan-on-push and continuous re-scan; pull-through cache and image-layer dependency confusion; retention/GC that won't break running deploys; registry HA/backup; network hardening (no anonymous internet exposure, no hostNetwork, TLS) |
When a task spans stages (most do), read every matching file. For a full pipeline audit, read all eight.
Violations of these are at minimum High in AUDIT mode and must never be introduced in BUILD mode:
contents: read(or {}), elevating per job only. Never rely on org/repo default token permissions.
sub-claim conditions scoped to repo + ref/environment.
version comment, updated by Renovate/Dependabot. Tags are mutable attack surface.
pull_request_target(or workflow_run) must not check out or execute PR head content; treat fork artifacts as hostile input.
issue bodies, commit messages go through env: indirection, quoted.
npm ci, --frozen-lockfile,--require-hashes, --locked). A build that resolves versions at build time is not reproducible and not reviewable.
continue-on-error, no || true, no unprotected default branch, no "admins bypass".
reference image digests (or signed, verified tags), never :latest.
access, plan on PR with read-only creds, apply only a reviewed saved plan via a protected environment.
verifyImages or equivalent), non-root, pinned digests — enforce, don't just audit.
If the user asks for something that violates a non-negotiable, implement the secure alternative and explain the delta; only comply after they acknowledge the risk explicitly.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.