harness-engineering — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited harness-engineering (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Design the system around AI agents for reliable, safe production use.
Harness Engineering protects the quality ceiling of Agentic Engineering. It turns fast agent output into controlled execution through permissions, observability, recovery, and adversarial validation.
Treat the agent harness as the kernel around an LLM OS:
| Kernel concern | Agent harness responsibility |
|---|---|
| Memory management | Curate context, summarize bulky outputs, persist state to wiki/logs. |
| Syscall boundary | Expose tools with contracts, allowlists, deny rules, and retries. |
| Process isolation | Separate write scopes, sandboxes, credentials, and state per agent. |
| Scheduling | Decide sequential, parallel, or event-driven execution. |
| Interrupts | Stop, ask approval, rollback, or route to a safer action. |
| Observability | Log tool calls, decisions, outputs, costs, and verification evidence. |
| Garbage collection | Close idle agents, remove stale tasks, compact context, and record risks. |
Google I/O '26 added a practical pressure test for harness design: the same runtime pattern now appears in developer tools, personal agents, search, commerce, generative media, and smart glasses.
| Product surface | Harness control that must exist |
|---|---|
| Agent-first IDE | task queue, subagent ownership, hooks, sandbox, test proof |
| Personal agent | user mandate, memory scope, tool allowlist, resumable log |
| Agentic search | source provenance, comparison criteria, action preview |
| Agentic commerce | budget, merchant/payment boundary, mandate, receipt trail |
| Generative media | prompt/edit history, watermark/disclosure, content credentials |
| Ambient eyewear/device | sensor consent, privacy mode, physical-world fallback |
If a harness cannot produce an audit trail for what the agent saw, decided, called, changed, and verified, the agent is not ready for delegated action.
For production-like agents, separate the runtime into three resources:
| Resource | Defines | Harness questions |
|---|---|---|
| Agent | Model, persona, system prompt, skills, MCP/tools | Is the role narrow enough? Are capabilities necessary? |
| Environment | Execution space, container, network, credentials, filesystem | What can the agent reach? What is allowlisted or denied? |
| Session | Agent instance, mounted context, event stream, durable state | How is state resumed, deleted, audited, and recovered? |
The session event log is the backbone of reliability. It should capture user messages, tool calls, tool results, agent responses, verification evidence, errors, and recovery actions. A response without an inspectable event trail is not enough for delegated production work.
Escalate autonomy by proven reliability, not by confidence in a prompt:
| Stage | Allowed capability | Required proof |
|---|---|---|
| Observe | Read, search, summarize, recommend | Sources and assumptions are inspectable. |
| Co-drive | Draft, simulate, prepare changes | Human approves every external action. |
| Training wheels | Execute low-risk scoped actions | Logs, rollback, and post-action checks pass. |
| Supervised autonomy | Run reversible routines | Alerts, receipts, and anomaly review exist. |
| Autonomy | Run high-frequency low-risk loops | Periodic permission audit and failure review. |
Do not give a tool key and rely on text instructions to prevent misuse. The real boundary is the key, endpoint, account, filesystem, network, budget, and approval path.
Prompt
Use harness-engineering for this agent workflow. Design permissions, tools, feedback loops, observability, and failure handling.Use Case
Expected Result
Output Example
Verification Case
Verified Effect
| Domain | Object | Maturity |
|---|---|---|
| Physical | Wire harnesses (automotive/aerospace) | ⭐ Mature |
| Software | CI/CD pipelines (Harness.io) | ⭐ Mature |
| Cognitive ⭐ | AI Agents | 🌱 Emerging |
CLAUDE.md for project-level contextcontext-manager for token budgetingThree-Tier Permission Model:
| Tier | Scope | Mechanism | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Safe tools | Always allowed | Read, search, grep, glob |
| 2 | In-project | Auto-approve (git reviewable) | Write/edit in project dir |
| 3 | High-risk | Classifier/human approval | Shell, API calls, deletes |
Tier 3 heuristic:
1. Can destroy data irreversibly? → BLOCK
2. Accesses credentials? → BLOCK
3. Affects shared infrastructure? → BLOCK
4. Target inferred (not explicit)? → BLOCKDelegated action gate:
Before any tool call that buys, publishes, schedules, messages, edits shared state, or acts through a user's account, require:
Mandate: what the user explicitly authorized
Scope: allowed accounts, surfaces, vendors, files, or domains
Limit: budget, time, rate, data, or blast radius cap
Preview: what the user can inspect before execution
Receipt: durable audit record after execution
Rollback: how to undo or compensate if wrong"Tuning a standalone evaluator to be skeptical is far more tractable than making a generator critical of its own work."
Generator ←──sprint contract──→ Evaluator
│ │
▼ ▼
Produces output Playwright/TestImplementation:
| Physical | AI Agent | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Zonal Architecture | Permission scopes | AGENTS.md domain restrictions |
| IP68 Protection | Security isolation | Sandbox, token in vault |
| HiPot Test | Stress testing | Edge-case test suite |
| Continuity Test | Tool verification | describe-tools pre-flight |
| EMC/Interference | Multi-agent isolation | Separate sandbox per agent |
| Pattern | Description | When to Use |
|---|---|---|
| Supervisor | Orchestrator delegates to sub-agents | Complex tasks with sub-steps |
| Peer Review | Agents review each other | High-risk changes |
| Competitive | Multiple agents try same task | Creative work, optimization |
| Pipeline | Sequential chain | Document processing |
| Zonal | Domain-based routing | Enterprise systems |
| Closed-Loop | Output feedback shapes input | Continuous improvement |
Define every tool like a system call:
| Field | Required question |
|---|---|
| Purpose | What state can this tool read or change? |
| Inputs | Which arguments must be explicit, not inferred? |
| Bounds | Which paths, domains, records, or resources are allowed? |
| Failure mode | What is the safe fallback when it fails or is denied? |
| Evidence | What output proves it succeeded? |
| Audit | Where is the call logged? |
Prefer narrow tools with explicit inputs over broad shell/API access. If broad access is unavoidable, wrap it with approval gates and post-action verification.
Before shipping high-risk agent output, run an adversarial review:
| Risk area | Minimum adversarial check |
|---|---|
| Auth, permissions, secrets | Attempt privilege escalation and secret exposure paths. |
| Data mutation or deletion | Verify backups, rollback, idempotency, and explicit target bounds. |
| Public claims or launch copy | Check evidence, source quality, and unsupported promises. |
| External API actions | Confirm rate limits, credentials, audit logs, and retry safety. |
| Commerce or delegated account actions | Verify mandate, budget, merchant/payment boundary, receipt trail, and rollback path. |
| Generated media or public content | Verify provenance, disclosure/watermark path, and unsupported claim risk. |
| Multi-agent integration | Check ownership conflicts, stale assumptions, and unverified joins. |
Use simulated hostile agents, security tests, or a skeptical evaluator before release. Do not let the same builder be the only judge of safety.
Data Lake → Risk Engine → Optimizer → Stress Test → OMS → Compliance → Feedback Loop
↑ ↓
└──────────────────── 反馈闭环 ────────────────────────────────┘| Aladdin Module | Agent Harness |
|---|---|
| Data Lake | Session log, knowledge base |
| Risk Engine | Risk assessment, threat detection |
| Optimizer | Task decomposition, resource allocation |
| Stress Test | Edge-case testing, failure simulation |
| OMS | Order execution, tool calls |
| Compliance | Guardrails, policy enforcement |
| Feedback Loop | Results → learning → improvement |
Key: Closed loop is the moat — not any single component. MECE principle applies.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.