harness-engineering — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited harness-engineering (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
<skill_contract> <input>An agent workflow, runtime environment, tools, data sensitivity, effects, cadence, risk, and operator constraints.</input> <output>An auditable runtime kernel with scoped permissions, scheduling, observability, recovery, and eval controls.</output> <done>An end-to-end trace and failure-path tests prove bounded, replayable, recoverable delegated action.</done> <non_goals>Business-task decomposition, prompt-only safety, broad credentials, or unbounded scheduled autonomy.</non_goals>
Treat the harness as the kernel around an LLM OS: context is RAM, durable state is disk, tools are system calls, skills are programs, the scheduler is control, and evals are verifiers. Load references/runtime-control-patterns.md for matrices and schemas. Start guarded automation from references/runtime-envelope-example.json and validate it with scripts/validate_runtime_envelope.py --strict.
Provide: workflow, users, agent roles, environment, tools/connections, data sensitivity, delegated actions, cadence, throughput/SLA, failure history, and risk tolerance.
<intake>
Run the trace gate: the harness must be able to show what the agent saw, proposed, called, changed, and verified. Separate Intent Plan (human-reviewable source), Compiled Contract (validated runtime envelope), Agent (instructions/capabilities), Environment (network/files/credential broker), and Session (mounted context/events/state). Define one auditable control path for high-risk intent and final joins. Model output is never execution authority.
</intake>
<unknowns_gate>
If state ownership, credential scope, external side effects, retention, or approval authority is unclear, return NEEDS_INPUT. Probe tools with read-only discovery where possible; unknown side effects default to denied.
</unknowns_gate>
<execute>
plan hash, tool_execution_owner: host, filesystem/network/secret boundaries, output cardinality, legal no-op, budgets, approvals, audit paths, and rollback before execution.
static Graph, connector, dynamic workflow, or agent team. Load capabilities lazily. Graph Engineering owns dependency semantics; the harness owns the ready queue, leases, duplicate delivery, concurrency, and executor health.
bind access to task, resource, operation, and time; use exact network allowlists and opaque secret handles; never expose raw credentials to model context. Stage and vet writes before external commit.
termination_reason into complete, tool request,checkpoint/truncation, refusal/error, or unknown. The host decides whether to execute, continue, checkpoint, or escalate; success prose cannot override the control signal or verifier.
NO_OP condition. Quiet execution is success only when eligibility was checked and no side effect occurred.
successors, make delivery idempotent, recover from the last verified checkpoint, and test permission denial, worker loss, duplicate events, and compensation without relying on in-memory scheduler state.
</execute>
<evaluate>
Threat-model normal, denied, timeout, partial-write, stale-context, duplicate-trigger, compromised-input, evaluator-disagreement, and rollback paths. Verify permissions with actual environment boundaries and run an independent end-to-end trace. Adoption fails if operators cannot inspect or recover the system.
</evaluate>
<retry_policy>
max_attempts: 3 per tool/failure class. Retry only idempotent or compensated actions after changing diagnosis/strategy. Use exponential delay for transient dependencies. Stop on repeated signature, permission denial, ambiguous side effect, or NO_PROGRESS.
</retry_policy>
<state_contract>
Persist {run_id, status, attempt, budget, evidence, unknowns, last_error, next_action} plus intent-plan hash, compiled-contract hash, agent/environment/session versions, context manifest, normalized termination reason, tool/permission/credential-lease registry, output quota, no-op receipt, event offsets, approvals, evals, alerts, recovery point, and rollback receipts. State transitions are auditable and replayable.
</state_contract>
NEEDS_INPUT: ownership, effect, retention, or approval authority is ambiguous.BLOCKED_PERMISSION: deny the call and continue with a safer read-only path when useful.BLOCKED_DEPENDENCY: checkpoint, back off, and expose executor health.VERIFY_FAILED: trace, eval, guardrail, or rollback test fails; block autonomy escalation.NO_PROGRESS: changed attempts repeat the signature. max_attempts: 3.BUDGET_STOP: stop scheduler/workers, checkpoint, and emit a recovery receipt.Return status, result (runtime architecture and controls), evidence (trace/eval/failure tests), unknowns, and next_action including approval or rollback.
the tool in host code, then verify its result; do not treat the text as task completion.
NO_OP receiptand zero external outputs rather than creating notification or PR noise.
identity and release successors only from one verified transition.
</skill_contract>
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.