devops-excellence — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited devops-excellence (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
These rules are mandatory. Violating them means the skill is not working correctly.
Never use long-lived static credentials. Always use OIDC or short-lived tokens.
# ❌ FORBIDDEN: Static AWS credentials
env:
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID }}
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY }}
# ✅ REQUIRED: OIDC-based authentication
- name: Configure AWS Credentials
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
with:
role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/GitHubActions
aws-region: us-east-1
# No long-lived secrets - uses GitHub OIDC providerContainers must NEVER run as root. Always specify a non-root user.
# ❌ FORBIDDEN: Running as root (default)
FROM node:20
WORKDIR /app
CMD ["node", "server.js"]
# ❌ FORBIDDEN: Explicit root user
USER root
# ✅ REQUIRED: Non-root user with UID > 1000
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN addgroup -g 1001 -S nodejs && \
adduser -S nodejs -u 1001
USER nodejs
WORKDIR /app
CMD ["node", "server.js"]Never bake secrets into Docker images. Use runtime injection or secrets managers.
# ❌ FORBIDDEN: Secrets in build args or ENV
ARG DATABASE_PASSWORD
ENV API_KEY=sk-xxx
# ❌ FORBIDDEN: Copying secret files
COPY .env /app/.env
COPY credentials.json /app/
# ✅ REQUIRED: Mount secrets at runtime
# docker run -v /secrets:/app/secrets:ro myapp
# Or use Kubernetes secrets/configmapsProduction deployments must require approval and be restricted to main branch.
# ❌ FORBIDDEN: Direct production deploy without protection
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: deploy-to-prod.sh
# ✅ REQUIRED: Environment protection
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment:
name: production
url: https://myapp.com
# Requires: approval + main branch only| Scenario | Tool/Pattern | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Public GitHub project | GitHub Actions | Native integration, free for public repos |
| Enterprise GitLab | GitLab CI | Unified platform, advanced security scanning |
| Multi-cloud IaC | Terraform | Mature ecosystem, wide provider support |
| Developer-centric IaC | Pulumi | Real programming languages, better testing |
| Kubernetes deployments | ArgoCD + Kustomize | GitOps standard, declarative config |
| Zero-downtime releases | Blue-Green or Canary | Instant rollback capability |
| Gradual feature rollout | Feature flags (LaunchDarkly) | Progressive delivery with targeting |
| Strategy | Downtime | Cost | Rollback Speed | Complexity | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rolling | Minimal | Low | Medium | Low | Regular updates, cost-conscious |
| Blue-Green | Zero | High (2x) | Instant | Medium | Critical systems, easy rollback |
| Canary | Zero | Medium | Fast | High | Risk mitigation, data-driven |
| Recreate | High | Low | N/A | Very Low | Non-critical, dev/test only |
# Short-lived credentials (not static keys)
- name: Configure AWS Credentials
uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
with:
role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/GitHubActions
aws-region: us-east-1
# OIDC provider - no long-lived secrets!
# Protected environments for production
environment:
name: production
# Requires approval + restricts to main branch# Example: conditional job execution
jobs:
backend-tests:
if: contains(github.event.head_commit.modified, 'backend/')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest /\
/E2E\ <- Few (slow, expensive)
/------\
/Integration\ <- Some (medium speed)
/------------\
/ Unit Tests \ <- Many (fast, cheap)
/----------------\# Multi-layer security scanning
jobs:
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
# SAST - Static code analysis
- uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
# SCA - Dependency vulnerabilities
- name: Run Trivy
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
with:
scan-type: 'fs'
format: 'sarif'
# Secret scanning
- name: Gitleaks
uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2
# Container scanning
- name: Scan Docker image
run: trivy image myapp:${{ github.sha }}# Build stage - includes build tools (900MB+)
FROM node:20-alpine AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY package*.json ./
RUN npm ci --only=production
# Runtime stage - minimal image (<100MB)
FROM node:20-alpine AS runtime
RUN addgroup -g 1001 -S nodejs && \
adduser -S nodejs -u 1001
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder --chown=nodejs:nodejs /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --chown=nodejs:nodejs . .
USER nodejs
EXPOSE 3000
CMD ["node", "server.js"]alpine, distroless, or scratchdocker run --read-only# Security best practices example
FROM gcr.io/distroless/nodejs20-debian12
COPY --chown=65532:65532 /app /app
USER 65532
EXPOSE 8080# Version control
.git
.gitignore
# Dependencies (install fresh in container)
node_modules
vendor/
*.pyc
__pycache__
# Secrets and configs
.env
.env.local
secrets/
*.key
*.pem
# Development files
README.md
Dockerfile
docker-compose.yml
.vscode/
.idea/
# Testing and CI
tests/
*.test.js
.github/# 99.94% of clusters are over-provisioned!
# Average CPU usage: 10%, Memory: 23%
resources:
requests:
memory: "128Mi" # Guaranteed allocation
cpu: "100m" # 0.1 CPU cores
limits:
memory: "256Mi" # Maximum allowed
cpu: "200m" # Hard cap
# Use tools: Kubecost, Goldilocks, VPA# Liveness: Is container alive?
livenessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /health
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 30
periodSeconds: 10
timeoutSeconds: 5
failureThreshold: 3
# Readiness: Can it receive traffic?
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
path: /ready
port: 8080
initialDelaySeconds: 5
periodSeconds: 5
successThreshold: 1
# Startup: Has initialization completed?
startupProbe:
httpGet:
path: /startup
port: 8080
failureThreshold: 30 # 30*10s = 5min for slow starts
periodSeconds: 10# Group related resources in single manifest
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
name: app-config
data:
APP_ENV: production
LOG_LEVEL: info
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: app-secrets
type: Opaque
stringData:
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://user:pass@db:5432/mydb
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: myapp
spec:
template:
spec:
containers:
- name: app
envFrom:
- configMapRef:
name: app-config
- secretRef:
name: app-secrets# Pod Security Standards
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
seccompProfile:
type: RuntimeDefault
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
# Network Policies (deny-by-default)
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-all-ingress
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- IngressDetailed material starting at ## Infrastructure as Code (Terraform/Pulumi) has been moved to reference/extended.md to keep this skill concise. Load that reference when the task requires the moved examples, command catalogs, checklists, platform details, or implementation templates.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.