leadbay_build_campaign— agent skill

leadbay_build_campaign — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by leadbay·Agent Skill·github.com/leadbay/leadclaw

Is leadbay_build_campaign safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited leadbay_build_campaign (Agent Skill) and scored it 71/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 7 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
71/100
●●●●●●●○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 134d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings7 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
16
5.6 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 7 flagged

Securityscore 16 · 7 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md×7
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md· markdown
14Build me a Leadbay campaign from scratch<if the user supplied this argument, render the shor
… (108 chars elided on L14)
15 
16**Run this end-to-end, autonomously, without pausing.** Do NOT stop to confirm the audience,
… (108 chars elided on L16)
17 
18GATE — DEFER TO TOOL RENDERING. When you call a Leadbay composite that ships its own RENDERI
… (108 chars elided on L18)
Occurrences
7 occurrences · first at L16, also L189, L198 +4 more
Show all 7 locations
Line
File
L16
.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md
L189
.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md
L198
.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md
L219
.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md
L243
.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md
L244
.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md
L244
.claude-plugin/plugins/leadbay/skills/leadbay_build_campaign/SKILL.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256010a4ca2189f0f8a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Vendor response · right of reply
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