MCP server for opencode that queries GitHub Copilot models via a persistent opencode server, requiring no API keys.
SaferSkills independently audited mcp-opencode (MCP Server) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
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MCP server for opencode — query github-copilot models via a persistent opencode server.
<a href="https://kud.io/projects/mcp-opencode">Website</a> · <a href="https://kud.io/projects/mcp-opencode/docs">Documentation</a>
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MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_ALLOW and MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_BLOCK environment variables using glob-style patterns.list_sessions, send and read let your assistant hold a conversation with a running opencode session, such as the one open in your TUI, and the exchange shows up there live.start_instance, task, wait, list_instances and stop_instance run work on a private opencode server per job, with guard rails (no git push, no credentials, no permission prompts) and a ready-made opencode --server command to watch it live.query and list_models start it the same way the TUI does.query call creates and destroys its own opencode session, so one-off questions leave nothing behind.npm install -g @kud/mcp-opencodeRequires opencode 2.x (npm i -g @opencode/cli) with at least one provider configured, and Node.js ≥ 20. For opencode 1.x, stay on @kud/mcp-opencode@1.
Add the server to your MCP client configuration:
{
"mcpServers": {
"opencode": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@kud/mcp-opencode"]
}
}
}To restrict which models are available, pass environment variables:
{
"mcpServers": {
"opencode": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@kud/mcp-opencode"],
"env": {
"MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_ALLOW": "github-copilot/*",
"MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_BLOCK": "github-copilot/gpt-4o-mini"
}
}
}
}opencode 2 runs one background service that every TUI window shares, and records where it listens (and its password) in its state directory. The MCP reads that registration, so any window you open with a plain opencode is reachable: no ports, no wrapper.
1. Open opencode and say something. opencode only creates a session once you send the first message.
2. Ask your assistant to talk to it. For example: _"list my opencode sessions and ask the one in my-project what it thinks of this plan"_. It calls list_sessions to find the session, send to talk to it, and read to catch up on its history. Messages appear live in the window, and you can reply there yourself.
A window started with opencode --standalone runs a private server with a throwaway password, so the MCP cannot reach it. To use a server of your own instead of the background service, set MCP_OPENCODE_URL (and MCP_OPENCODE_PASSWORD if it has one); a TUI joins that server with opencode --server <url>.
For work you want done in the background rather than in a window you are watching, ask your assistant to start an instance and hand it a task. For example: _"start an opencode instance in ~/Projects/my-app, have it add a health-check endpoint, and tell me what changed"_. It calls:
start_instance({ directory }) → { port, url }: a private opencode serve on a free port behind a generated password, separate from the background service your windows use.task({ port, prompt }) → { session_id, port, attach }: returns at once while the job runs.wait({ port, session_id }) → status, the last assistant text and the files changed. Call it again if it comes back busy.stop_instance({ port }) when done. Idle instances are reaped after MCP_OPENCODE_INSTANCE_TTL, and the MCP stops its own instances when it exits.Guard rails. Nobody is there to answer a permission prompt, so a task's session never gets one: reading, editing and shell commands are allowed, while git push, git remote, gh, npm publish, git reset --hard, web fetches and searches, questions and anything outside the directory are denied. Every deny is set twice: as an opencode permission rule (session and server config) and as a policy, which opencode applies after all rules, so a repository's own opencode config cannot allow it back. The server itself runs with no git credentials (GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0, GIT_SSH_COMMAND=false, an empty credential.helper), without GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN, and with its model pinned to MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL.
Sandboxing (opt-in OS sandbox). Set MCP_OPENCODE_SANDBOX=srt to wrap each instance's opencode serve in srt (npm i -g @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime), enforced by the OS (macOS sandbox-exec, Linux bubblewrap) rather than by opencode's own permissions. Off by default; when the variable is unset everything behaves exactly as before. Any other non-empty value is refused with an error listing the supported values, and if srt is not on PATH the instance fails to start rather than running unsandboxed.
The server generates an srt settings file per instance (kept in a temp dir under the state dir, removed on stop_instance) and passes it as srt --settings <file> opencode serve … — always explicit, so a stray ~/.srt-settings.json can never decide the policy. The generated file allows writes only to the instance directory (realpath), its git dir(s) (both --git-common-dir and --git-dir, so worktrees work), opencode's own data/config/cache/state dirs (XDG-aware, so provider auth keeps working) and the temp dir; denies reads of credential paths (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config/gh, ~/.gnupg, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, **/.env, **/.env.*, ~/Library/Keychains, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.kube, ~/.docker/config.json, and the background service's service.json files, which hold its password); and allows only these network destinations plus local binding for the server's own port: opencode.ai, *.opencode.ai, models.dev, api.githubcopilot.com, openrouter.ai, github.com, *.github.com, api.github.com, registry.npmjs.org, localhost, 127.0.0.1.
Sandboxed instances also get extra shell denies merged into their opencode permission config (session ruleset and OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT alike): rm -rf*, sudo *, curl *|* and wget *|*. These are deny, never ask — a headless session cannot answer and would hang — and they are heuristic glob matches, a second layer behind the OS sandbox, not a guarantee. The opencode.ai / *.opencode.ai / api.githubcopilot.com entries were verified against the opencode 2.1.2 binary's strings (Zen API, model registry at models.opencode.ai, Copilot provider), and openrouter.ai serves the openrouter/* models; models.dev, the 1.x registry, is kept for older lookups; the rest are assumed useful for public clones and npm installs. Non-existent allowWrite entries are dropped when the file is written, so a missing opencode dir cannot break the wrap on any platform.
This is defence in depth, not a guarantee: it raises the cost of escape and of credential or network misuse, but a determined agent inside the sandbox still has the instance directory, git, and whatever the allowlist permits. Combine it with the guard rails above and review what jobs do.
Model fallback. A job tries [its model, ...MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_FALLBACK] once each, in order. When the session stays in retry for MCP_OPENCODE_RETRY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (default 90) or its run ends in a provider error (a provider.* error type, or model not found), the watchdog interrupts it, switches the session's model and re-prompts the same session on the next model, so history and worktree edits carry over. When the list is exhausted the job settles as error. wait and list_instances report the current model and the fallbacks taken ({ from, to, reason, at }), and wait reports retry as its own status.
Watching or stepping in. Paste the attach command from task into a terminal. It opens the session in the TUI against the instance, with the instance's password:
OPENCODE_PASSWORD=… opencode --server http://127.0.0.1:53817 --session ses_…#### Instance registry
Instances are recorded in ~/.local/state/mcp-opencode/instances.json (or $MCP_OPENCODE_STATE_DIR/instances.json). Other tools may read it directly; this shape is a stable contract:
[
{
"runtime": "opencode", // always "opencode" for now
"sandbox": "srt", // "srt" when OS-sandboxed, else null
"port": 53817, // where the server listens, on 127.0.0.1
"pid": 41234, // the opencode serve process (or the srt wrapper, when sandboxed)
"mcpPid": 41200, // the mcp-opencode process that started it
"directory": "/Users/me/Projects/my-app",
"startedAt": "2026-10-02T12:04:34.453Z",
"password": "…", // basic-auth password (user "opencode") for the server
// one entry per task, appended when task starts it
"sessions": [
{
"id": "ses_…",
"title": "add health check",
"model": "github-copilot/gpt-4.1",
"startedAt": "2026-10-02T12:04:35.021Z",
// model switches so far, oldest first; empty until one happens
"fallbacks": [
{
"from": "github-copilot/gpt-4.1",
"to": "github-copilot/gpt-5",
"reason": "retry timeout after 90s (attempt 3: rate limited)",
"at": "2026-10-02T12:06:05.111Z",
},
],
},
],
},
]Live state (busy or idle, last activity) is deliberately not in the file: read it from the server at http://127.0.0.1:<port> with the row's password. The file is written owner-only (0600) because it holds those passwords; list_instances leaves them out. A sandboxed row also carries an internal sandboxSettingsDir with the generated srt settings file; it is cleaned up on stop and is not part of the contract.
| Variable | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
MCP_OPENCODE_URL | the background service | Use this opencode server for everything instead of the background service and its discovery |
MCP_OPENCODE_PASSWORD | none | Password for MCP_OPENCODE_URL, when that server has one |
MCP_OPENCODE_SEND_TIMEOUT | 600 | Seconds send waits for a reply before handing back and letting you read it later |
MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL | github-copilot/gpt-4.1 | Model query uses when none is passed |
MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_ALLOW | all | Comma-separated models or provider/* patterns query may use |
MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_BLOCK | none | Comma-separated models or patterns to block. Filters apply to query, list_models and a model passed to send; without one, send uses the session's own model |
MCP_OPENCODE_MODEL_FALLBACK | none | Ordered, comma-separated fallback models (provider/model) a headless job tries in order after its chosen model when that model stalls or fails. Filtered by the allow/block filters; disallowed entries are dropped |
MCP_OPENCODE_RETRY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS | 90 | Seconds a job's session may stay continuously in retry before the watchdog switches it to the next fallback model |
MCP_OPENCODE_INSTANCE_TTL | 1800 | Seconds every session on an instance may sit idle before the reaper stops it |
MCP_OPENCODE_STATE_DIR | ~/.local/state/mcp-opencode | Where the instance registry (instances.json) and instance logs live |
MCP_OPENCODE_SANDBOX | unset (off) | srt wraps headless instances in an OS sandbox via srt (npm i -g @anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime); any other non-empty value fails start_instance |
MCP_OPENCODE_SANDBOX_SETTINGS | generated | Path to an srt settings file used as --settings verbatim instead of the generated one (must exist; implies srt) |
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
query | Send a prompt to an opencode model. Accepts prompt (required) and model (optional, default: github-copilot/gpt-4.1). |
list_models | List models available through the running opencode server. Accepts an optional provider filter (e.g. anthropic). |
list_sessions | List sessions on the background service and on headless instances, most recent first, with the port(s) each is served on. Accepts an optional directory filter. |
send | Send a message to an existing session and return the reply. Accepts session_id, prompt, and optional agent, model (allowlist-checked; either switches the session for later turns too, as picking it in the TUI does), port and timeout_seconds. Routes to the server that owns the session. Never creates or deletes sessions. |
read | Read a session's recent messages as a condensed transcript. Accepts session_id and optional limit (default 20) and port. |
start_instance | Start a private headless opencode server in directory. Returns { port, url }. |
task | Start a job on an instance: port, prompt, optional model (allowlist-checked), agent (default build) and title. Tries [model, ...fallbacks] in order when a model stalls or fails. Returns { session_id, port, attach } at once. |
wait | Wait for a job (port, session_id, timeout_seconds up to 570). Returns status (idle, busy, retry or error), the current model, the fallbacks taken so far, last assistant text and changed files (diffed across the whole session, fallback re-prompts included). |
list_instances | Reap, then list registered instances with their task sessions' live status, current model and fallbacks. |
stop_instance | Interrupt busy sessions, stop the server on port and confirm the port has closed. |
git clone https://github.com/kud/mcp-opencode.git
cd mcp-opencode
npm install
npm run build
npm testUse the local .mcp.json to connect Claude Code to your dev build, or npm run inspect to open the MCP Inspector against the compiled output.
| Script | Purpose |
|---|---|
npm run dev | Run from source via tsx |
npm run build | Compile TypeScript to dist/ |
npm test | Run the Vitest test suite |
npm run inspect | Open MCP Inspector against the built server |
📚 Full documentation → [mcp-opencode/docs](https://kud.io/projects/mcp-opencode/docs)
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