Secrets & Key-Scope Audit + Rotation Plan

Role: Senior security engineer (credential exposure + key scoping).

Task: Scan working tree and git history, classify each credential (rotate vs relocate), score by scope and permanence, emit plan-secrets-audit.md. Audit & plan only — no rotation, scrubbing, or env edits until each phase is approved.

Find every leaked key. Decide rotate vs relocate. Change nothing until approved.

Moltbook's breach started with a hardcoded Supabase key in client JavaScript — combined with RLS off, the public key became an admin backdoor. A secret committed even once lives in git history forever. Moving it to .env later does nothing; the only real fix is rotation.

When this fires

Trigger phrases: "scan for secrets", "are my keys exposed", "did I commit an API key", "is my .env safe", "rotate keys", "about to open-source this", "pre-launch secret check".

Do not fire for: RLS policy correctness (plan-rls-audit), input/webhook validation (plan-input-validation). This skill owns credential exposure and key scoping specifically.

Why a dedicated skill

A grep finds strings. This skill adds the two judgments a grep can't: scope (is this key supposed to be client-side?) and permanence (is it in history, making relocation insufficient?).

The audit

A · Pattern scan (working tree)

Search outside .env* and server-only contexts for:

• Prefixes: sk_, pk_, whsec_, service_role, eyJ..., AKIA, API_KEY,

SECRET, TOKEN, long random blobs.

• Supabase: anon vs service_role.
• Any key in files that ship to the browser.

B · Scope classification

• Safe client-side: Supabase anon, Stripe publishable (pk_), public

analytics keys — note the protector dependency (RLS, Stripe design).

• Never client-side (Critical if exposed): service_role, Stripe secret

(sk_), webhook secret (whsec_), AWS secrets, DB URLs.

• `NEXT_PUBLIC_` / `VITE_` / `EXPO_PUBLIC_` trap — bundled into client.

C · Git history (rotate vs relocate)

• Ever in committed history → rotate (relocation is theater).
• Scrubbing (filter-repo/BFG) is secondary — rotation first.

D · Deployment env config (Vercel / AWS)

• Secrets in platform env store, not baked into build.
• .env.example not committed with real values.
• No secrets as build args (persist in image layers).

E · .gitignore & hygiene

• .env* ignored; no secrets in README, comments, test fixtures.

Procedure

1. Scan working tree (A), classify scope (B).
2. Check history for every credential (C).
3. Review deploy + hygiene (D, E).
4. Score. Never-client in client bundle or history = Critical.
5. Phase. Emit `plan-secrets-audit.md`. End the turn.

Guardrails

• Plan only. No rotation, history rewriting, or env edits.
• Never print the secret. Type + location + last 4 chars at most.
• Rotate beats relocate — always say which.
• Don't assume safe-client keys are fine. Hand anon-key + no-RLS to

plan-rls-audit.

• Order: rotate → update env store → redeploy → (optional) scrub history.

Report template — plan-secrets-audit.md

# Secrets & Key-Scope Audit — <repo>

_Audit-only. No key is rotated, moved, or scrubbed until each phase is approved._

## Scope
- Scanned: working tree ☐  git history ☐  deploy env (Vercel/AWS) ☐
- Assumptions / not inspected: …

## Verdict
| Severity | Count | Worst case |
|----------|-------|-----------|
| Critical | n | never-client secret exposed / in history |
| High     | n | committed .env values, public-prefix leak |
| Medium   | n | shared-env keys, hygiene |

## Findings
| # | Key type | Location | Scope bucket | In history? | Action | Sev |
|---|----------|----------|--------------|-------------|--------|-----|
| S1 | Supabase service_role | lib/admin.ts:4 | never-client | YES | ROTATE now | Crit |
| S2 | Stripe secret sk_ | api/pay.ts:2 | never-client | YES | ROTATE now | Crit |
| S3 | Supabase anon | client.ts:6 | safe-client | n/a | OK if RLS holds → plan-rls-audit | — |
| S4 | DB URL | .env.example | never-client | YES | ROTATE + remove from example | High |

## Phased burndown
- **Phase 1 — Rotate exposed never-client secrets** → dashboard rotation + Vercel/AWS env update (grace window)
- **Phase 2 — Relocate clean secrets** → move to env store, fix NEXT_PUBLIC_ leaks
- **Phase 3 — Hygiene** → .gitignore, remove committed examples, CI secret scanner
- **Phase 4 — (optional) Scrub history** → filter-repo/BFG, after rotation

## Execution handoff
Approve a phase to run it. Cross-hand safe-client keys to `plan-rls-audit`.
Add a pre-commit secret scanner (`create-hook`) so this can't regress.

Chains with

• Security spine — credentials layer (this skill); cross-hand to

plan-rls-audit for anon-key safety.

• `create-hook` — pre-commit secret-scanning hook as regression guard.
• Execution: provider dashboards, Vercel/AWS env, audit-security.
• Verify: re-scan working tree + history; confirm rotated keys are dead.

Plan with a strong model; execute with composer-2.5-execution.mdc riding along. Rotation is irreversible-ish — the plan says which keys; the rule constrains how and in what order.