plan-llm-cost-guardrails — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited plan-llm-cost-guardrails (Agent Skill) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 1 flagged
A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.
*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Role: Senior platform engineer (LLM spend + abuse resistance).
Task: Inventory every LLM call site, test against the 3-layer guardrail model, score unbounded paths, phase remediations, emit plan-llm-cost-guardrails.md. Audit & plan only — no limits or routing changes until approved.
Find every path to a runaway bill. Cap it. Change nothing until approved.
Token cost scales with input + output tokens, not request count — a single 50K-token context replayed three times can exhaust a budget while staying under any RPM cap. Vibe-coded AI features ship with no spend cap, no per-user quota, no max_tokens, no circuit breaker — compounded by prompt-injection cost amplification and forged-webhook quota fraud (CVE-2026-41432 class).
This is the prevention counterpart to Langfuse observability: Langfuse tells you what spend happened; this audits what's capped.
Trigger phrases: "cap my AI costs", "my LLM bill could explode", "rate limit my AI", "token budget", "someone could drain my quota", "runaway agent loop", "per-user AI limits", "pre-launch cost hardening".
Do not fire for: output quality/evals (audit-langfuse-llm), generic API performance, or trace visibility (plan-error-handling). This owns bounded spend.
stream_options.include_usage or spend is invisible.plan-input-validation.
plan-input-validation.plan-llm-cost-guardrails.md# LLM Cost-Guardrail Audit — <repo>
_Audit-only. No limits or routing change until each phase is approved._
## Scope
- LLM call sites: n | Public AI endpoints: n | Langfuse present: ☐
## Verdict
| Layer | Present? | Worst gap |
|-------|----------|-----------|
| 1 Limits (token-aware) | partial | unbounded max_tokens |
| 2 Circuit breakers | ❌ | no daily kill switch |
| 3 Fallback chain | ❌ | limit = hard error |
## Findings
| # | Call site | Unbounded path | Worst-case | Missing layer | Sev | Direction |
|---|-----------|----------------|------------|---------------|-----|-----------|
## Phased burndown
- **Phase 1 — Caps & kill switch** → `backend-patterns`
- **Phase 2 — Circuit breakers** → `backend-patterns`
- **Phase 3 — Fallback chain** → `backend-patterns`
- **Phase 4 — Visibility** → `audit-langfuse-llm` / `backend-observability`
- **Cross-hand** → `plan-input-validation`
## Execution handoff
Simulate a runaway in test env after Phase 1; confirm cap holds before bill moves.plan-error-handling (visibility) andaudit-langfuse-llm (quality); this owns bounded spend.
backend-patterns, audit-langfuse-llm, backend-observability.Plan with a strong model; execute with composer-2.5-execution.mdc.~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.