Forgecraft Mcp— mcp server

Forgecraft Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by jghiringhelli·MCP Server·github.com/jghiringhelli/forgecraft-mcp

Is Forgecraft Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Forgecraft Mcp (MCP Server) and scored it 65/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 11 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
65/100
●●●●●●●○○○
↑ +0 since first scan (65 → 65)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 30d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings11 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 11 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 11 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/standards/api.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/standards/api.md· markdown
44- Support --json flag for machine-readable output.
45- Support --quiet flag to suppress non-essential output.
46- Never prompt for input in non-interactive mode (CI/CD).
47 
48### Distribution
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L46
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256c6ccbeff3f20088crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/standards/project-specific.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/standards/project-specific.md· markdown
225- Support --json flag for machine-readable output.
226- Support --quiet flag to suppress non-essential output.
227- Never prompt for input in non-interactive mode (CI/CD).
228 
229### Distribution
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L227
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256c6ccbeff3f20088crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .claude/standards/protocols.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.claude/standards/protocols.md· markdown
156- If the request has two or more meaningfully different interpretations, present the options
157briefly and ask — do not guess and hide the choice.
158- Do NOT ask about mechanical details (naming conventions, file placement, test structure) —
159apply the conventions already in this document without asking.
160- Maximum one clarification round. If told "use your judgment," proceed with the most
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L158
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2567d1c5f93d8975babrubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · experiments/treatment-v2/CLAUDE.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptexperiments/treatment-v2/CLAUDE.md· markdown
276## Clarification Protocol
277All architectural decisions for this project are pre-recorded in `docs/adrs/`.
278**Do not ask for architectural clarification** — consult the ADRs and implement.
279For ambiguous domain behavior only (e.g. exact pagination semantics), check the RealWorld AP
… (7 chars elided on L279)
280Maximum one clarification per session. If genuinely unresolved, choose the conservative opti
… (40 chars elided on L280)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L278
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · experiments/treatment-v3/CLAUDE.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptexperiments/treatment-v3/CLAUDE.md· markdown
322## Clarification Protocol
323All architectural decisions for this project are pre-recorded in `docs/adrs/`.
324**Do not ask for architectural clarification** — consult the ADRs and implement.
325For ambiguous domain behavior only (e.g. exact pagination semantics), check the RealWorld AP
… (7 chars elided on L325)
326Maximum one clarification per session. If genuinely unresolved, choose the conservative opti
… (40 chars elided on L326)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L324
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · experiments/treatment-v5/CLAUDE.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptexperiments/treatment-v5/CLAUDE.md· markdown
328## Clarification Protocol
329All architectural decisions for this project are pre-recorded in `docs/adrs/`.
330**Do not ask for architectural clarification** — consult the ADRs and implement.
331For ambiguous domain behavior only (e.g. exact pagination semantics), check the RealWorld AP
… (7 chars elided on L331)
332Maximum one clarification per session. If genuinely unresolved, choose the conservative opti
… (40 chars elided on L332)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L330
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · experiments/treatment/CLAUDE.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptexperiments/treatment/CLAUDE.md· markdown
252## Clarification Protocol
253All architectural decisions for this project are pre-recorded in `docs/adrs/`.
254**Do not ask for architectural clarification** — consult the ADRs and implement.
255For ambiguous domain behavior only (e.g. exact pagination semantics), check the RealWorld AP
… (7 chars elided on L255)
256Maximum one clarification per session. If genuinely unresolved, choose the conservative opti
… (40 chars elided on L256)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L254
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · .github/copilot-instructions.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.github/copilot-instructions.md· markdown
332- Support --json flag for machine-readable output.
333- Support --quiet flag to suppress non-essential output.
334- Never prompt for input in non-interactive mode (CI/CD).
335 
336### Distribution
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L334
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256c6ccbeff3f20088crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · experiments/treatment-v2/docs/test-architecture.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptexperiments/treatment-v2/docs/test-architecture.md· markdown
68- Before all integration tests: run migrations on test DB
69- After each test: rollback or truncate all tables
70- Never share state between test cases
71 
72## Adversarial Test Cases (required)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L70
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha2561b156a6029264b2crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · experiments/treatment-v3/docs/test-architecture.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptexperiments/treatment-v3/docs/test-architecture.md· markdown
68- Before all integration tests: run migrations on test DB
69- After each test: rollback or truncate all tables
70- Never share state between test cases
71 
72## Adversarial Test Cases (required)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L70
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha2561b156a6029264b2crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · experiments/treatment/docs/test-architecture.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptexperiments/treatment/docs/test-architecture.md· markdown
68- Before all integration tests: run migrations on test DB
69- After each test: rollback or truncate all tables
70- Never share state between test cases
71 
72## Adversarial Test Cases (required)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L70
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha2561b156a6029264b2crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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