Cursor Rules Java— plugin

Cursor Rules Java — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

Is Cursor Rules Java safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Cursor Rules Java (Plugin) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 310 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 129d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 310 high
EngineSaferSkills 755a9a5
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 310 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 310 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/metrics-v1.example.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/metrics-v1.example.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwo
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 2
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c509f3ce45bdb037…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T201032Z-cursor-composer.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T201032Z-cursor-composer.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3NjZW5hcmlvMS9kZW1
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 15
43}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L41
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2564cacae36cc55b8e8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T202221Z-cursor-composer.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T202221Z-cursor-composer.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"file_count": 12
42}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L40
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256cdb393e58c7d0405…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T203320Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T203320Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "c2NlbmFyaW8xL2RlbW8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBzcmMKfCAgIHwtLSBtYWluCnwgICB8ICAgYC0
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 5
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25658262875db5ac9a9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T210313Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T210313Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwo
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 10
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a0ff9f7723323e04…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T212300Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T212300Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3NjZW5hcmlvMS9kZW1
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 6
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25640ae0712f305ca42…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T214700Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T214700Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 11
44}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L42
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566418a9c807dfb966…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T215507Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260718T215507Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 11
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f985d8d57202fffb…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260721-141828-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260721-141828-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 8
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256171f6b7e4adb4e05…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260721-225100-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260721-225100-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL3lkODRkcC9EZXZlbG9wZXIvcGxpbnRoL2JlbmNobWFya3Mvc2NlbmFyaW8xL2RlbW8vCuK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 25
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256170c8a3499395eae…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260721T205321Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260721T205321Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1sCmAtLSBzcmM
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 9
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25680be196765210327…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260722T174436Z-github-copilot-claude-opus-4.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260722T174436Z-github-copilot-claude-opus-4.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHNyYwrilILCoMK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 6
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c74d7d780ee8d1ac…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260809T185527Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260809T185527Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXM
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 12
44}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L42
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566cf8ecd1b6c8a0cf…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260815T162320Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260815T162320Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 2
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c6509e86cbfbd59c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260815T190832Z-claude-code-opus5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario1/results/20260815T190832Z-claude-code-opus5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 15
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2560f4542a562d3df9e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T201505Z-cursor-composer.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T201505Z-cursor-composer.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 18
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a11c4bb491fa70e9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T202421Z-cursor-composer.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T202421Z-cursor-composer.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 18
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a11c4bb491fa70e9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T204424Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T204424Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
41"tree_format": "unix-tree",
42"tree_encoding": "base64",
43"tree_b64": "c2NlbmFyaW8yL2RlbW8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1sCmAtLSBzcmMKICAgIHwtLSBtYWl
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"file_count": 17
45}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L43
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a5142f36bf8cc7bd…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T213027Z-cursor-sonnet-4-6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T213027Z-cursor-sonnet-4-6.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3NjZW5hcmlvMi9kZW1
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 12
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2561ed5b45c106d4758…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T214223Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T214223Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 11
43}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L41
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2560f39f2ace57678c9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T215456Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260718T215456Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "c2NlbmFyaW8yL2RlbW8vCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAuZ2l0YXR0cmlidXRlcwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 19
43}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L41
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566d2495478ca956ec…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260721-145056-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260721-145056-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 8
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256171f6b7e4adb4e05…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260809T185517Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260809T185517Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXM
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 23
44}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L42
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569a8c4564e71449ba…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260815T164105Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260815T164105Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwo
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 15
44}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L42
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256bfcab2f0d44cc260…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260815T192231Z-claude-code-opus-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario2/results/20260815T192231Z-claude-code-opus-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 21
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25683394ab256597ec6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T205106Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T205106Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "c2NlbmFyaW8zL2RlbW8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1sCmAtLSBzcmMKICAgIHwtLSBtYWl
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 16
44}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L42
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2561e58bd17164650bd…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T211603Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T211603Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "c2NlbmFyaW8zL2RlbW8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1sCmAtLSBzcmMKICAgIHwtLSBtYWl
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 14
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25625ed4e2eab91f370…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T215700Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T215700Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 16
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567dc37eb87390e919…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T232651Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260718T232651Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-6.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3NjZW5hcmlvMy9kZW1
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 13
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567f4842f6af8ca467…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260721-145543-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260721-145543-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 8
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256171f6b7e4adb4e05…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260722T142821Z-github-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260722T142821Z-github-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHNyYwrilILCoMK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 39
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25671af86e5b3e915f7…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260722T153524Z-github-copilot-claude-opus-4-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260722T153524Z-github-copilot-claude-opus-4-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 21
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256504b47eee8601fcf…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260809T185257Z-cursor-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260809T185257Z-cursor-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3Byb2JsZW0xL3NjZW5
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 22
43}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L41
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2564473e8db95d8d3d2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260815T165305Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260815T165305Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1sCmAtLSBzcmM
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 19
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2563ae7cff41af57715…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260815T193638Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario3/results/20260815T193638Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "ZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAubXZuCuKUgsKgwqAg4pSc4pSA4pSAIGp
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"file_count": 24
42}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L40
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25699513a5297709f48…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T192207Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T192207Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS5
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 24
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562fead79d1c813045…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T193351Z-cursor-gpt-5-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T193351Z-cursor-gpt-5-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 26
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2561521f78b98e0416b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T195308Z-cursor-gpt-5.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T195308Z-cursor-gpt-5.5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 30
51}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L49
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25667baa9e85a0800da…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T200637Z-cursor-composer.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T200637Z-cursor-composer.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAubXZ
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 30
48}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L46
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568f95df9139636394…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T210520Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T210520Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 72
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2560857360c5360c456…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T211651Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T211651Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "Lgp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwogICAgfC0tIG1haW4KICAgIHwgICB8LS0
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 22
51}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L49
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2564f21a4a9a86cb71c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T215710Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260718T215710Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 28
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256acf2bdbb040e85c3…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T095543Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T095543Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwo
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 24
51}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L49
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c0ea8aba3226911b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T101831Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T101831Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAubXZ
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 33
47}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L45
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567e40bdd6174fe4bf…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T102739Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T102739Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
52"tree_format": "unix-tree",
53"tree_encoding": "base64",
54"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKfC0tIHNyYwp
… (104 chars elided on L54)
55"file_count": 95
56}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L54
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568b649b8ad5688fa1…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T103500Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T103500Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-6.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 28
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c96af6d3bad93fe2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T110500Z-cursor-composer.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T110500Z-cursor-composer.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC13b3JrdHJlZXMvZmVhdC1zY2VuYXJpbzQ
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 33
48}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L46
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ba59316e7c7e67e8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T111807Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T111807Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLm12bgp8ICAgYC0tIHdyYXBwZXIKfCAgICAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"file_count": 27
60}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L58
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2561b88147cd9076dd8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T112608Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T112608Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
55"tree_format": "unix-tree",
56"tree_encoding": "base64",
57"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"file_count": 93
59}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L57
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256354aae0e861aa5bf…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T113531Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T113531Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
55"tree_format": "unix-tree",
56"tree_encoding": "base64",
57"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAubXZ
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"file_count": 93
59}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L57
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256db5bf7af2feafeeb…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T114550Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T114550Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC13b3JrdHJlZXMvc2NlbmFyaW80LWFjY2V
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 33
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256cd58e67c63b41dc8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T144644Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T144644Z-cursor-composer-2.5-fast.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 81
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f1a75ac019b105d4…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T145732Z-codex-gpt5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T145732Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
24"tree_format": "unix-tree",
25"tree_encoding": "base64",
26"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8KfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwogICAgfC0tIG1haW4
… (104 chars elided on L26)
27"file_count": 23
28}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L26
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256fdaffa93009899f1…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T152526Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T152526Z-cursor-claude-sonnet-4-6.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "c3JjCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBtYWluCuKUgsKgwqAg4pSc4pSA4pSAIGphdmEK4pSCwqDCoCDilILCoMKgIOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 27
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ac3ae033d33300b1…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T161211Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T161211Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
54"tree_format": "unix-tree",
55"tree_encoding": "base64",
56"tree_b64": "ZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRhdHRyaWJ1dGVzCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAuZ2l0aWdub3JlCuKUnOKUgOK
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 37
58}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L56
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256d0ce6a252534fc58…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T162838Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260719T162838Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB8LS0gbWFpbgo
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 23
53}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L51
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ce2cc9f06d6dcd3d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260721-145724-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260721-145724-copilot-claude-sonnet-4.5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 8
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256171f6b7e4adb4e05…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260721T230500Z-github-copilot-claude-opus-4.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260721T230500Z-github-copilot-claude-opus-4.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 28
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ca3ff97778c71812…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260809T190045Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260809T190045Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXM
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"file_count": 32
60}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L58
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2564c0c0147990e4de9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260814T034327Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260814T034327Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAubX
… (78 chars elided on L59)
60"file_count": 35
61}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L59
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2561d1ab8459704e42c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260815T194353Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260815T194353Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
61"tree_format": "unix-tree",
62"tree_encoding": "base64",
63"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCDilJzilIDilIAganZtLmN
… (104 chars elided on L63)
64"file_count": 36
65}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L63
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c6be0be76962bf12…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T180003Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T180003Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
55"tree_format": "unix-tree",
56"tree_encoding": "base64",
57"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCD
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"file_count": 34
59}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L57
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256588442ac01771ff9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T180731Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T180731Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
53"tree_format": "unix-tree",
54"tree_encoding": "base64",
55"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L55)
56"file_count": 28
57}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L55
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a4bdc9803b30cc38…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T181346Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T181346Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
62"tree_format": "unix-tree",
63"tree_encoding": "base64",
64"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L64)
65"file_count": 35
66}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L64
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c9e7950d679fcd4d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T183051Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T183051Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
53"tree_format": "unix-tree",
54"tree_encoding": "base64",
55"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L55)
56"file_count": 33
57}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L55
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256dffc346f21d6a0d2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T183126Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T183126Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
54"tree_format": "unix-tree",
55"tree_encoding": "base64",
56"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCDilJzilIDilIAganZtLmN
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 33
58}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L56
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256011fa4575484062a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T184055Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T184055Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 34
53}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L51
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256376b400dbf1add5f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T184756Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T184756Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
46"tree_format": "unix-tree",
47"tree_encoding": "base64",
48"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"file_count": 26
50}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L48
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568b7a995e40aceab4…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T185252Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260817T185252Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
60"tree_format": "unix-tree",
61"tree_encoding": "base64",
62"tree_b64": "L3RtcC9nb2QtYW5hbHlzaXMtYXBpLXM0LWZpbmFsCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAubXZuCuKUgsKgwqAg4pSU4pS
… (104 chars elided on L62)
63"file_count": 30
64}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L62
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256fd9c5a4735e60e4f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260818T194111Z-claude-code-claude-opus-4-8.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260818T194111Z-claude-code-claude-opus-4-8.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS5
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 29
47}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L45
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2564f7eed1e71c05230…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260822T084036Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260822T084036Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 30
53}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L51
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568fcef71c52ca74a9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260822T085810Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260822T085810Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "ZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBwb20ueG1sCuKUlOKUgOKUgCBzcmMKICA
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 26
53}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L51
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25639b7a9cda5df09a8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T110255Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T110255Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
54"tree_format": "unix-tree",
55"tree_encoding": "base64",
56"tree_b64": "ZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOKUgOKUgCAubXZuCuKUgsKgwqAg4pSU4pSA4pSAIHd
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 34
58}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L56
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256782f65be12d13d2c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T110829Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T110829Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 32
47}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L45
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567d7fcbc48921651c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T130226Z-codex-gpt56sol.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T130226Z-codex-gpt56sol.json· json
52"tree_format": "unix-tree",
53"tree_encoding": "base64",
54"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1sCmAtLSBzcmM
… (104 chars elided on L54)
55"file_count": 32
56}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L54
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2565bf6f476902e769c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T130737Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T130737Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
66"tree_format": "unix-tree",
67"tree_encoding": "base64",
68"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8KfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwogICA
… (104 chars elided on L68)
69"file_count": 33
70}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L68
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569f7874c47252fec2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T133436Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T133436Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
64"tree_format": "unix-tree",
65"tree_encoding": "base64",
66"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8KfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwogICAgfC0tIG1haW4
… (104 chars elided on L66)
67"file_count": 23
68}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L66
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566c03f81fd12b8131…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T135820Z-codex-gpt-5-6-sol.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T135820Z-codex-gpt-5-6-sol.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRhdHRyaWJ1dGVzCnwtLSAuZ2l0aWdub3J
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"file_count": 35
60}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L58
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256cd3d0dbc17579f88…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T160849Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T160849Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
50"tree_format": "unix-tree",
51"tree_encoding": "base64",
52"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L52)
53"file_count": 34
54}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L52
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568c5414b3136d20ad…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T160958Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario4/results/20260824T160958Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
52"tree_format": "unix-tree",
53"tree_encoding": "base64",
54"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L54)
55"file_count": 33
56}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L54
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256e3c13ab030dca378…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T110956Z-codex-gpt-5.6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T110956Z-codex-gpt-5.6.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "Lgp8LS0gLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXMKfC0tIC5naXRpZ25vcmUKfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSAubXZuCnw
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 26
48}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L46
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562bfed1407f1507f3…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T113253Z-codex-gpt-5.4.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T113253Z-codex-gpt-5.4.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "ZGVtby8uCmRlbW8vLmdpdGtlZXAKZGVtby9wb20ueG1sCmRlbW8vc3JjCmRlbW8vc3JjL21haW4KZGV
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 63
46}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L44
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b4aee066374a1c59…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T114340Z-codex-gpt-5.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T114340Z-codex-gpt-5.5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWw
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 22
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2563382c6d8ec3ce40e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T120318Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T120318Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "ZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1sCmAtLSBzcmMKICAgIHwtLSBtYWluCiAgICB8ICA
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 29
46}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L44
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568bfae9132b8ca271…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T122232Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T122232Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 32
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256435629c94abfd888…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T124008Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T124008Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
54"tree_format": "unix-tree",
55"tree_encoding": "base64",
56"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXMKfC0tIC5
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 89
58}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L56
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568c1ca96edfffcb62…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T125321Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T125321Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIC5tdm4KfCA
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 34
51}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L49
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f2a869c8f88f72dc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T190050Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260809T190050Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
52"tree_format": "unix-tree",
53"tree_encoding": "base64",
54"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCD
… (104 chars elided on L54)
55"file_count": 29
56}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L54
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25677526da73f7a7192…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260814T022045Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260814T022045Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSAubXZuCnw
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 33
47}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L45
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c112dd0ab2d6602d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T190817Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T190817Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 81
51}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L49
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256e58965b3859e5832…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T192739Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T192739Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
45"tree_format": "unix-tree",
46"tree_encoding": "base64",
47"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"file_count": 32
49}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L47
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256856a59dc5a30dc48…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193139Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193139Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "L3RtcC9wbGludGgtYmVuY2gtczUtMjAyNjA4MTdUMTkyNjM4Wi9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3Byb2JsZW0xL3N
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 28
46}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L44
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a3cff5e1997f5546…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193415Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193415Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 30
43}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L41
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25640e091f1491b4e6f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193419Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193419Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
51"tree_format": "unix-tree",
52"tree_encoding": "base64",
53"tree_b64": "L3RtcC9wbGludGgtYmVuY2htYXJrLXNjZW5hcmlvNS0yMDI2MDgxN1QxOTI2NDNaLTkxNjAyL2JlbmN
… (104 chars elided on L53)
54"file_count": 31
55}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L53
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562aa441c823d09246…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193551Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193551Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 32
53}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L51
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256906451af09d54610…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193606Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193606Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
53"tree_format": "unix-tree",
54"tree_encoding": "base64",
55"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCD
… (104 chars elided on L55)
56"file_count": 32
57}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L55
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25675f2088e27a97f9b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193631Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260817T193631Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
46"tree_format": "unix-tree",
47"tree_encoding": "base64",
48"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"file_count": 90
50}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L48
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256829bc7fc2507d7d6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260824T215602Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260824T215602Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
48"tree_format": "unix-tree",
49"tree_encoding": "base64",
50"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCDilJTilIDilIAgd3JhcHB
… (104 chars elided on L50)
51"file_count": 29
52}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L50
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567a480471119d1d36…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260825T215752Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260825T215752Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
54"tree_format": "unix-tree",
55"tree_encoding": "base64",
56"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 29
58}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L56
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25624ddc32ad3fbe7b2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260826T132039Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260826T132039Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 27
46}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L44
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256327ccecfa70eb734…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T120547Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T120547Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 26
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25679c3bd8059afdc3e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T120851Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T120851Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 29
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2561527a53bb5935e22…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T134902Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T134902Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCDilJTilIDilIAgd3JhcHB
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 27
43}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L41
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25624011ede56170f5c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T135446Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T135446Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
45"tree_format": "unix-tree",
46"tree_encoding": "base64",
47"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"file_count": 27
49}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L47
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256de85c3c48db8ca85…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T140657Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T140657Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSBwb20ueG1
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 21
51}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L49
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256df30ad9b90458a7f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T140934Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T140934Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXMKfC0tIC5
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 31
48}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L46
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256323fd3628edcd3fc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T141535Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T141535Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 31
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256843e95c5422a6376…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T141541Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T141541Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"file_count": 28
40}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L38
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256379739307483b506…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T191222Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T191222Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
45"tree_format": "unix-tree",
46"tree_encoding": "base64",
47"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXMKfC0tIC5
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"file_count": 33
49}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L47
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568c0a188be978501b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T192126Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T192126Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWw
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"file_count": 21
42}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L40
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567c454cdc7ad01ad6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T192610Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T192610Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
45"tree_format": "unix-tree",
46"tree_encoding": "base64",
47"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRhdHRyaWJ1dGVzCnwtLSA
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"file_count": 28
49}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L47
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25618aa3728a98ef04c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T195132Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260828T195132Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXMKfC0tIC5
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 30
48}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L46
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567e234d98e5448888…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260829T120756Z-codex-gpt-5.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem1/scenario5/results/20260829T120756Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMS9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 25
48}
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L46
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256fb1971dd2000af34…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/metrics-v2.example.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/metrics-v2.example.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwo
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L39)
40"file_count": 2
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L38, also L39
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L38
benchmarks/problem2/metrics-v2.example.json
L39
benchmarks/problem2/metrics-v2.example.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c509f3ce45bdb037…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T152722Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T152722Z-codex-gpt5-6.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pS
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"pom_xml_b64": null,
42"file_count": 8
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L40
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2560711a643951bea13…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T165756Z-codex-gpt5-6.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T165756Z-codex-gpt5-6.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L39)
40"file_count": 6
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L38, also L39
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L38
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T165756Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
L39
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T165756Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562b63322e47c3185f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T172123Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T172123Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json· json
41"tree_format": "unix-tree",
42"tree_encoding": "base64",
43"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRhdHRyaWJ1dGV
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 21
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L43, also L44
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T172123Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T172123Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256d24b0c9f55ff7189…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T173221Z-cursor-composer-2-5-fast.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T173221Z-cursor-composer-2-5-fast.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pS
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 11
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T173221Z-cursor-composer-2-5-fast.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T173221Z-cursor-composer-2-5-fast.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566e23533d31809c67…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T180238Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T180238Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"file_count": 13
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L42, also L43
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T180238Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T180238Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2565c30372d6d448dbc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T183816Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T183816Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L39)
40"file_count": 12
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L38, also L39
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L38
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T183816Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L39
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T183816Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b2c97043addd9c21…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T184743Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T184743Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json· json
41"tree_format": "unix-tree",
42"tree_encoding": "base64",
43"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3Byb2JsZW0yL3NjZW5
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 18
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L43, also L44
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T184743Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260809T184743Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b8cff16f7e372058…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260814T144600Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260814T144600Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
41"tree_format": "unix-tree",
42"tree_encoding": "base64",
43"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzEvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 19
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L43, also L44
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260814T144600Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260814T144600Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c9007c4bbd85a2da…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260815T172106Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260815T172106Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "Lgp8LS0gLmdpdGF0dHJpYnV0ZXMKfC0tIC5naXRpZ25vcmUKfC0tIC5naXRrZWVwCnwtLSAubXZuCnw
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 17
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L41, also L42
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260815T172106Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario1/results/20260815T172106Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256993e4f9f4e435653…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T153855Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T153855Z-codex-gpt5-6.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWw
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"pom_xml_b64": null,
44"file_count": 13
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L42
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569a9dd3a295a2e553…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T170358Z-codex-gpt-5-6.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T170358Z-codex-gpt-5-6.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLmd
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 24
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L45, also L46
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T170358Z-codex-gpt-5-6.json
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T170358Z-codex-gpt-5-6.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256224489ba21a55a90…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T172311Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T172311Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3Byb2JsZW0yL3NjZW5
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"file_count": 18
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L42, also L43
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T172311Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T172311Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a3c7569420d3f390…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T173213Z-cursor-composer.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T173213Z-cursor-composer.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pS
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 13
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L41, also L42
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T173213Z-cursor-composer.json
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T173213Z-cursor-composer.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256044bf54fae9298c0…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T175044Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T175044Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmd
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 22
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T175044Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T175044Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25616dbf5530f277b5f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T183619Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T183619Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 12
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T183619Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T183619Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567cd6a8b971f4a5b7…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T184936Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T184936Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3Byb2JsZW0yL3NjZW5
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 21
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T184936Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260809T184936Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566ab08e26f94bca37…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260814T150453Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260814T150453Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 15
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L45, also L46
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260814T150453Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260814T150453Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568c8cd27056bc5f99…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260816T042711Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260816T042711Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzIvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIFJFQURNRS5tZArilJz
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"file_count": 14
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L42, also L43
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260816T042711Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario2/results/20260816T042711Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562350e3ebc8b8ef86…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T154757Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T154757Z-codex-gpt5-6.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"pom_xml_b64": null,
44"file_count": 13
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L42
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568f8cfd6ef2f46b4a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T164739Z-codex-gpt5-6.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T164739Z-codex-gpt5-6.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 18
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T164739Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T164739Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b345071e382daba0…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T170024Z-codex-gpt5-6.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T170024Z-codex-gpt5-6.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "Lgp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwogICAgfC0tIG1haW4KICAgIHwgICB8LS0
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 14
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L41, also L42
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T170024Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T170024Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c77f9af74ec0d2b6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T171832Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T171832Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3Byb2JsZW0yL3NjZW5
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 27
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T171832Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T171832Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256390c036091ab05b2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T173305Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T173305Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 17
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T173305Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T173305Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25632c47dffaaacf090…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T175515Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T175515Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmd
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 23
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T175515Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T175515Z-claude-code-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25602c31f210d8fffce…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T184853Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T184853Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5kb2NrZXJpZ25vcmU
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 23
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T184853Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260809T184853Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256692e6608940660f2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260814T223642Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260814T223642Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L39)
40"file_count": 15
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L38, also L39
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L38
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260814T223642Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
L39
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260814T223642Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566071afceef0ee78f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260816T044818Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260816T044818Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzMvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pS
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L39)
40"file_count": 16
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L38, also L39
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L38
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260816T044818Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
L39
benchmarks/problem2/scenario3/results/20260816T044818Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567376005b30bb045e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T161029Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T161029Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLmd
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L50)
51"file_count": 36
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L49, also L50
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T161029Z-codex-gpt5.json
L50
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T161029Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f537b8842d330c8d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171249Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171249Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8KfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwogICA
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"file_count": 28
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L58, also L59
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171249Z-codex-gpt5.json
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171249Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25623fc597750eaab79…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171831Z-cursor-grok45.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171831Z-cursor-grok45.json· json
58"tree_format": "unix-tree",
59"tree_encoding": "base64",
60"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5kb2NrZXJpZ25vcmU
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L61)
62"file_count": 35
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L60, also L61
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171831Z-cursor-grok45.json
L61
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T171831Z-cursor-grok45.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2565e4199c3cc9e3479…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T173731Z-cursor-composer.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T173731Z-cursor-composer.json· json
52"tree_format": "unix-tree",
53"tree_encoding": "base64",
54"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pS
… (104 chars elided on L54)
55"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L55)
56"file_count": 29
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L54, also L55
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L54
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T173731Z-cursor-composer.json
L55
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T173731Z-cursor-composer.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569fd9eaddc2d764dd…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T182321Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T182321Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"file_count": 38
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L59, also L60
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T182321Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T182321Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2564b997bea5bbbd073…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T184410Z-cursor-grok45.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T184410Z-cursor-grok45.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQr
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L58, also L59
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T184410Z-cursor-grok45.json
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260809T184410Z-cursor-grok45.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2565da4f0218654e2de…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T025217Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T025217Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "ZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCICAg4pSU4pSA4pSAIHdyYXBwZXIK4pSCICAgICAgIOKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L59, also L60
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T025217Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T025217Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b0f0d9a1ebb8a3fc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T103000Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T103000Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
55"tree_format": "unix-tree",
56"tree_encoding": "base64",
57"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRpZ25vcmUK4pS
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"file_count": 34
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L57, also L58
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L57
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T103000Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260814T103000Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2563390622c725d4c36…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183509Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183509Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
53"tree_format": "unix-tree",
54"tree_encoding": "base64",
55"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgUkVBRE1FLm1kCuKUnOKUgOKUgCBtdm53CuKUnOKUgOKUgCBtdm53LmNtZArilJz
… (104 chars elided on L55)
56"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 31
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L55, also L56
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L55
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183509Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L56
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183509Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2565726676ac1bc713a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183908Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183908Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
55"tree_format": "unix-tree",
56"tree_encoding": "base64",
57"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLm12bgrilIIgICDilJTilIDilIAgd3JhcHBlcgrilIIgICAgICAg4pSU4pSA4pS
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"file_count": 36
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L57, also L58
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L57
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183908Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T183908Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25619c0aa12e724ffd6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184346Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184346Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"file_count": 36
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L58, also L59
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184346Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184346Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256216e5017a6ad19e4…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184701Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184701Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"file_count": 36
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L58, also L59
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184701Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184701Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b7bf5c9788715901…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184800Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184800Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
59"tree_format": "unix-tree",
60"tree_encoding": "base64",
61"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pS
… (104 chars elided on L61)
62"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L62)
63"file_count": 22
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L61, also L62
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L61
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184800Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L62
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T184800Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256887d118229426cd8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T185006Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T185006Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
59"tree_format": "unix-tree",
60"tree_encoding": "base64",
61"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L61)
62"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L62)
63"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L61, also L62
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L61
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T185006Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L62
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T185006Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f4f09e1d9249a16f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T190400Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T190400Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
55"tree_format": "unix-tree",
56"tree_encoding": "base64",
57"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"file_count": 36
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L57, also L58
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L57
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T190400Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260818T190400Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569c889f1c9a35f2a4…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T120628Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T120628Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
54"tree_format": "unix-tree",
55"tree_encoding": "base64",
56"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLm12bgrilIIgICDilJTilIDilIAgd3JhcHBlcgrilIIgICAgICAg4pSU4pSA4pS
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"file_count": 38
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L56, also L57
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L56
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T120628Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L57
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T120628Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2565fdb1dc82dfd78b7…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T195615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T195615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLm12bgrilILCoMKgIOKUlOKUgOKUgCB3cmFwcGVyCuKUgsKgwqAgICAgIOKUlOK
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"file_count": 39
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L58, also L59
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T195615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260828T195615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256765489d4de9c0304…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T084919Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T084919Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
58"tree_format": "unix-tree",
59"tree_encoding": "base64",
60"tree_b64": "ZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgbXZudwrilJzilIDilIAgbXZudy5jbWQK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pS
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L61)
62"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L60, also L61
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T084919Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L61
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T084919Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256d59e766e27c1d9f0…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091313Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091313Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
53"tree_format": "unix-tree",
54"tree_encoding": "base64",
55"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pS
… (104 chars elided on L55)
56"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 24
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L55, also L56
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L55
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091313Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L56
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091313Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256cb13680562347bee…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091441Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091441Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilIDilIAgc3JjCiAgICDilJzilIDilIAgbWFpbgogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"file_count": 28
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L59, also L60
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091441Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T091441Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b31e4795a1990f98…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T135711Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T135711Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pS
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L52)
53"file_count": 31
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L51, also L52
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L51
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T135711Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L52
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T135711Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256459873242f465081…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T140138Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T140138Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilIDilIAgc3JjCiAgICDilJzilIDilIAgbWFpbgogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"file_count": 28
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L59, also L60
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T140138Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T140138Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562552ad6c596efef8…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T194528Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T194528Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
53"tree_format": "unix-tree",
54"tree_encoding": "base64",
55"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pS
… (104 chars elided on L55)
56"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L56)
57"file_count": 26
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L55, also L56
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L55
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T194528Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L56
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T194528Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567470361e9cc5815d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T195559Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T195559Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
55"tree_format": "unix-tree",
56"tree_encoding": "base64",
57"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pS
… (104 chars elided on L57)
58"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"file_count": 29
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L57, also L58
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L57
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T195559Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T195559Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ff0dd4e082b0c8ac…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200215Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200215Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
59"tree_format": "unix-tree",
60"tree_encoding": "base64",
61"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L61)
62"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L62)
63"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L61, also L62
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L61
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200215Z-codex-gpt5.json
L62
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200215Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ebaa1e86d593dc47…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200728Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200728Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pS
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"file_count": 25
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L59, also L60
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200728Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T200728Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569781dbf48660d30d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T203214Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T203214Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilID
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"file_count": 22
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L59, also L60
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T203214Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260831T203214Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c492293fe5edf392…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T121800Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T121800Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
63"tree_format": "unix-tree",
64"tree_encoding": "base64",
65"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilID
… (104 chars elided on L65)
66"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L66)
67"file_count": 26
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L65, also L66
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L65
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T121800Z-codex-gpt5.json
L66
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T121800Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25693d702e3790858a7…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T122141Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T122141Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
59"tree_format": "unix-tree",
60"tree_encoding": "base64",
61"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L61)
62"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L62)
63"file_count": 31
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L61, also L62
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L61
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T122141Z-codex-gpt5.json
L62
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T122141Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25617ad37ee5b90353c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173237Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173237Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
56"tree_format": "unix-tree",
57"tree_encoding": "base64",
58"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L58)
59"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"file_count": 32
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L58, also L59
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L58
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173237Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173237Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2561fae288ddeb84ed6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173246Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173246Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
62"tree_format": "unix-tree",
63"tree_encoding": "base64",
64"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L64)
65"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L65)
66"file_count": 29
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L64, also L65
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L64
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173246Z-codex-gpt5.json
L65
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260901T173246Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256523916b4f005d408…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T084932Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T084932Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
57"tree_format": "unix-tree",
58"tree_encoding": "base64",
59"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L59)
60"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L60)
61"file_count": 31
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L59, also L60
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L59
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T084932Z-codex-gpt5.json
L60
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T084932Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2563ef09e886b2caf61…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T093940Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T093940Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
60"tree_format": "unix-tree",
61"tree_encoding": "base64",
62"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtby8KfC0tIC5naXRpZ25vcmUKfC0tIC5tdm4
… (104 chars elided on L62)
63"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L63)
64"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L62, also L63
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L62
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T093940Z-codex-gpt5.json
L63
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T093940Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25674737859f073ff3b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T094000Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T094000Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
59"tree_format": "unix-tree",
60"tree_encoding": "base64",
61"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzQvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L61)
62"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L62)
63"file_count": 34
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L61, also L62
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L61
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T094000Z-codex-gpt5.json
L62
benchmarks/problem2/scenario4/results/20260902T094000Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256db410287968c687f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T163342Z-codex-gpt5-6.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T163342Z-codex-gpt5-6.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGtlZXAKfC0tIHBvbS54bWw
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 25
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L45, also L46
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T163342Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T163342Z-codex-gpt5-6.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f9fab74e3d3bb08d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T170156Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T170156Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 25
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T170156Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T170156Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b6f28179f988f2e6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T172308Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T172308Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "ZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5tdm4K4pSCwqDCoCDilJzilIDilIAganZ
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"file_count": 26
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L42, also L43
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T172308Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T172308Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25640a2011509891ed2…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T173600Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T173600Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json· json
40"tree_format": "unix-tree",
41"tree_encoding": "base64",
42"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pS
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"file_count": 24
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L42, also L43
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T173600Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T173600Z-cursor-composer-2.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25649549fdd4edb64c6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T175300Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T175300Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pSA4pSAIHBvbS54bWwK4pSU4pSA4pSAIHNyYwogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 23
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L40, also L41
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L40
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T175300Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T175300Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2563462516519ffef20…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T184847Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T184847Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json· json
41"tree_format": "unix-tree",
42"tree_encoding": "base64",
43"tree_b64": "L1VzZXJzL2phYnJlbmEvSWRlYVByb2plY3RzL3BsaW50aC9iZW5jaG1hcmtzL3Byb2JsZW0yL3NjZW5
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 32
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L43, also L44
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T184847Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260809T184847Z-cursor-grok-4-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256b6d19cab7b29088d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023454Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023454Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "Lgp8LS0gLm12bgp8ICAgYC0tIHdyYXBwZXIKfCAgICAgICB8LS0gbWF2ZW4td3JhcHBlci5qYXIKfC
… (78 chars elided on L45)
46"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh
… (78 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 27
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L45, also L46
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023454Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023454Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25636d81a392ce019db…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023824Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023824Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json· json
41"tree_format": "unix-tree",
42"tree_encoding": "base64",
43"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8NCqanpqGmoSAuZ2l0a2VlcA0Kpqemoaa
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 32
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L43, also L44
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023824Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T023824Z-claude-code-claude-fable-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569d4e0004f4fddbd6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T220114Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T220114Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8K4pSc4pSA4pSAIC5naXRrZWVwCuKUnOK
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 27
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L45, also L46
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T220114Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260814T220114Z-claude-code-claude-opus-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2568fe408db6ef82170…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141502Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141502Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
46"tree_format": "unix-tree",
47"tree_encoding": "base64",
48"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 29
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L48, also L49
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L48
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141502Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141502Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256e9d7dad3a124d123…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141617Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141617Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
46"tree_format": "unix-tree",
47"tree_encoding": "base64",
48"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLmd
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 37
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L48, also L49
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L48
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141617Z-codex-gpt5.json
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260824T141617Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ab227336e76bb1fc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134059Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134059Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L52)
53"file_count": 32
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L51, also L52
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L51
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134059Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L52
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134059Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2562272543a8c2d2634…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134340Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134340Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmd
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 30
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L41, also L42
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134340Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134340Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c4a5de2bdf6c30ff…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134640Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134640Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "ZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIA
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 31
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L45, also L46
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134640Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134640Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567403522b2062aa92…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134839Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134839Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L50)
51"file_count": 32
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L49, also L50
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134839Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L50
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134839Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256e1e6acaf18173d63…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134912Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134912Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
48"tree_format": "unix-tree",
49"tree_encoding": "base64",
50"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L50)
51"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 32
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L50, also L51
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L50
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134912Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L51
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134912Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256dd248057701a9c4b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134938Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134938Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
46"tree_format": "unix-tree",
47"tree_encoding": "base64",
48"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm1
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L48, also L49
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L48
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134938Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T134938Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a6df3287a3beb80d…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T135920Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T135920Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
39"tree_format": "unix-tree",
40"tree_encoding": "base64",
41"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgUkV
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L42)
43"file_count": 31
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L41, also L42
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T135920Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L42
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T135920Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25618ad81ae1a75ffd3…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T140855Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T140855Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json· json
45"tree_format": "unix-tree",
46"tree_encoding": "base64",
47"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGlnbm9yZQrilJzilIDilIAgLm12bgrilILCoMKgIOKUlOKUgOKUgCB3cmF
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"file_count": 28
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L47, also L48
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L47
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T140855Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
L48
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260828T140855Z-cursor-grok-4.5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25638396453ef4690dc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084439Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084439Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8KLgrilJzilIDilIAgc3JjCuKUgsKgwqA
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L39)
40"file_count": 25
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L38, also L39
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L38
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084439Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L39
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084439Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256dd62fd01c2b00208…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084557Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084557Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilIDilIAgc3JjCiAgICDilJzilIDilIAgbWFpbgogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"file_count": 27
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L46, also L47
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084557Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L47
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T084557Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256463b7d83334da35b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T090615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T090615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilID
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 25
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L40, also L41
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L40
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T090615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T090615Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25649f57b7185f309df…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T094105Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T094105Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "Lgp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp8ICAgYC0tIHdyYXBwZXIKfCAgICAgICBgLS0gbWF2ZW4
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"file_count": 33
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L46, also L47
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T094105Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L47
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T094105Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256238c7bbe3beb8e68…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T102540Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T102540Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
46"tree_format": "unix-tree",
47"tree_encoding": "base64",
48"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLmd
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 37
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L48, also L49
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L48
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T102540Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T102540Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256abbfa5b45b446a36…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T103838Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T103838Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilIDilIAgc3JjCiAgICDilJzilIDilIAgbWFpbgogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 24
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L40, also L41
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L40
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T103838Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T103838Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256d9c375a3b11f9caa…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T134944Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T134944Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
42"tree_format": "unix-tree",
43"tree_encoding": "base64",
44"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8KfC0tIHBvbS54bWwKYC0tIHNyYwogICA
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"file_count": 26
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L44, also L45
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T134944Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T134944Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2569c67ce3c5f1e3b43…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T135339Z-codex-gpt5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T135339Z-codex-gpt5.json· json
46"tree_format": "unix-tree",
47"tree_encoding": "base64",
48"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"file_count": 30
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L48, also L49
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L48
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T135339Z-codex-gpt5.json
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T135339Z-codex-gpt5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25632ff4e5eb722063f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T142105Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T142105Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
47"tree_format": "unix-tree",
48"tree_encoding": "base64",
49"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L49)
50"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L50)
51"file_count": 35
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L49, also L50
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L49
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T142105Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L50
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T142105Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567112bd359df11ad7…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T172437Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T172437Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
36"tree_format": "unix-tree",
37"tree_encoding": "base64",
38"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgLmdpdGtlZXAK4pSc4pS
… (104 chars elided on L38)
39"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L39)
40"file_count": 26
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L38, also L39
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L38
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T172437Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L39
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T172437Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256ebb66a0595316841…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T174844Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T174844Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "LgrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilIDilIAgc3JjCiAgICDilJzilIDilIAgbWFpbgogICAg4pS
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 26
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L40, also L41
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L40
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T174844Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T174844Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f67fbaa9f396d478…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T194959Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T194959Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
44"tree_format": "unix-tree",
45"tree_encoding": "base64",
46"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gcG9tLnhtbApgLS0gc3JjCiAgICB
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"file_count": 27
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L46, also L47
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T194959Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L47
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T194959Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256edc7df62a0b7dfde…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T202034Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T202034Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
45"tree_format": "unix-tree",
46"tree_encoding": "base64",
47"tree_b64": "ZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp8ICAgYC0tIHdyYXBwZXIKfCAgICAgICBgLS0gbWF
… (104 chars elided on L47)
48"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L48)
49"file_count": 28
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L47, also L48
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L47
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T202034Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L48
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260831T202034Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256dd690661f84fedf0…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075127Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075127Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
41"tree_format": "unix-tree",
42"tree_encoding": "base64",
43"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilID
… (104 chars elided on L43)
44"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L44)
45"file_count": 23
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L43, also L44
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L43
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075127Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L44
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075127Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567b89b2730c34a4c5…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075352Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075352Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
43"tree_format": "unix-tree",
44"tree_encoding": "base64",
45"tree_b64": "ZGVtbwrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJTilIDilIAgc3JjCiAgICDilJzilIDilIAgbWFpbgogICA
… (104 chars elided on L45)
46"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L46)
47"file_count": 25
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L45, also L46
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L45
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075352Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L46
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075352Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256f4f25a6553884850…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075411Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075411Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
48"tree_format": "unix-tree",
49"tree_encoding": "base64",
50"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L50)
51"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 30
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L50, also L51
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L50
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075411Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L51
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075411Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2567c19ce1df155d103…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075426Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075426Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
48"tree_format": "unix-tree",
49"tree_encoding": "base64",
50"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmdpdGlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLm12bgp
… (104 chars elided on L50)
51"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"file_count": 31
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L50, also L51
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L50
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075426Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L51
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T075426Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256a3e9b7eae8962d77…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080924Z-codex-gpt-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080924Z-codex-gpt-5.json· json
49"tree_format": "unix-tree",
50"tree_encoding": "base64",
51"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtbwp8LS0gLmRvY2tlcmlnbm9yZQp8LS0gLmd
… (104 chars elided on L51)
52"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L52)
53"file_count": 37
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L51, also L52
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L51
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080924Z-codex-gpt-5.json
L52
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080924Z-codex-gpt-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha25604500deace06834a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080958Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json×2
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080958Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json· json
38"tree_format": "unix-tree",
39"tree_encoding": "base64",
40"tree_b64": "YmVuY2htYXJrcy9wcm9ibGVtMi9zY2VuYXJpbzUvZGVtby8KLgrilJzilIDilIAgcG9tLnhtbArilJT
… (104 chars elided on L40)
41"pom_xml_b64": "PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0iVVRGLTgiPz4KPHByb2plY3QgeG1sbnM9Imh0
… (104 chars elided on L41)
42"file_count": 27
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L40, also L41
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L40
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080958Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
L41
benchmarks/problem2/scenario5/results/20260901T080958Z-claude-code-claude-sonnet-5.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256c1000d7f0a362d8f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Vendor response · right of reply
Are you the maintainer? Submit a response →

Audit the pieces. Scan the whole. Decide.

~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.