IndyKite Agent Gateway

The Indykite Agent Gateway (IAG) is a standalone service that protects exactly one downstream - an A2A agent or an MCP server. Deploy one IAG per protected downstream. From the caller's perspective IAG appears as the Target; from the protected downstream's perspective IAG appears as the Source. IAG is not a generic reverse proxy: by default (protocol: a2a) it speaks the A2A protocol and tracks A2A sessions so JSON-RPC streams flow correctly; with protocol: mcp it proxies MCP Streamable HTTP traffic (forwarding Mcp-Session-Id and streaming SSE responses through). Either way the same authorization runs in front.

For each request IAG validates three things:

1. The caller (token introspection at the IdP).
2. The workflow (subject CAN_TRIGGER check via AuthZEN/KBAC).
3. The delegation chain (the request's act chain matches a chain modeled in the IKG).

When to use

Activate this skill when the user:

• is deploying an agent-to-agent (A2A) workflow and wants policy enforcement in front of each agent;
• is putting an enforcement point in front of an MCP server (protocol: mcp) so MCP traffic gets the same introspection, AuthZEN check, and audit as A2A;
• needs traceable user-to-agent delegation through OAuth token exchange and the act chain;
• is modeling a Workflow and Agent nodes with INVOKES relationships in the IndyKite Graph (IKG);
• is configuring JARVIS_* environment variables or a config.yaml for one or more IAG instances;
• is reading IAG audit records (AUTHORIZED / NOT_AUTHORIZED) and trying to explain a 403;
• is reproducing or extending the iag-demo (A2A) or iag-mcp-demo (A2A + MCP) reference applications.

Do not activate this skill when the user:

• wants a generic HTTP reverse proxy or service mesh - IAG only speaks A2A or MCP, not arbitrary HTTP;
• is asking about IndyKite features unrelated to A2A (token introspection alone, plain AuthZEN policies, ContX IQ queries outside of agent gating);
• is debugging the protected agent itself rather than the gateway in front of it.

Prerequisites

Before any of the steps below will succeed, the user needs:

• An IndyKite project with AuthZEN / KBAC and ContX IQ enabled, plus a Workflow node and Agent nodes already modeled (or a plan to model them - see Step 1).
• An OAuth2-compliant IdP with introspect, client-credentials, and token-exchange endpoints. Set IDP_BASE_URL to the IdP base for the target environment.
• One client_id / client_secret pair per protected downstream (A2A agent or MCP server), registered with the IdP.
• A ContX IQ query that returns (workflow, agent_list) pairs for each protected downstream - its query_id goes into IAG configuration.
• For an MCP downstream (protocol: mcp): the MCP server's origin and endpoint path, and the gateway image indykite/agent-gateway ≥ 2.0.1 (older images ignore the protocol and behave as an A2A proxy). MCP clients typically authenticate with an App Agent token, which must be introspectable and pass the AuthZEN check.
• Docker (and Docker Compose) for the reference deployment, or a Kubernetes cluster for production.

If any of these are missing, stop and tell the user - IAG cannot run without them.

Steps

1. Model the workflow in the IKG

Create one Workflow node identified by external_id, one Agent node per protected agent, and INVOKES relationships between agents. Every INVOKES relationship must carry a workflow_name property whose value matches the Workflow.external_id. The ContX IQ query in step 3 silently excludes any chain without it.

Example shape (the canonical wf1 workflow from the demo):

(Workflow {external_id: "wf1"})
(Agent {external_id: "orchestrator"})
  -[INVOKES {workflow_name: "wf1"}]-> (Agent {external_id: "retriever"})
(Agent {external_id: "orchestrator"})
  -[INVOKES {workflow_name: "wf1"}]-> (Agent {external_id: "weather"})

Capture this data through the Capture API (POST /capture/v1/nodes, POST /capture/v1/relationships), the IndyKite Hub UI, or an existing Terraform / identity pipeline - whichever the project already uses.

2. Wire the subject to the workflow

For every subject that is allowed to trigger the workflow, create the edge (:User)-[:CAN_TRIGGER]->(:Workflow) (or the equivalent AuthZEN relation). Without this edge IAG returns 403 at the AuthZEN check even if the chain is correct.

3. Build the ContX IQ query

The query must return (workflow, agent_list) pairs given a protected agent identifier, where agent_list is the ordered chain of agents the request must traverse. Save its query_id - IAG references it via JARVIS_CONTX_IQ_QUERY_ID (or contx_iq.query_id).

4. Configure each IAG instance

Pick one of the two configuration forms:

• YAML config file - pass with --config=/app/config.yaml. Best for production where configuration management is strict. See assets/config-template.yaml in this skill.
• Environment variables - keys use the JARVIS_ prefix with underscores (e.g. JARVIS_SERVICE_NAME). Best for Docker Compose deployments where multiple IAG instances share a base image and override only per-agent fields.

The full set of sections is service, identity_provider, protected_agent, authzen, contx_iq, and audit. See references/configuration.md for every field and its default.

Pick the downstream protocol with protected_agent.protocol (env JARVIS_PROTECTED_AGENT_PROTOCOL): a2a (default) for an A2A agent, mcp for an MCP server. Any other value fails startup with invalid protected_agent protocol. In mcp mode protected_agent.base_url is the MCP server origin only - IAG appends the incoming request path. The authorization sequence is unchanged; only the forwarded protocol differs. See the Protecting an MCP server section of references/configuration.md.

Per-instance values that must differ between IAG instances:

• service.name / JARVIS_SERVICE_NAME
• service.port / JARVIS_SERVICE_PORT
• protected_agent.base_url / JARVIS_PROTECTED_AGENT_BASE_URL
• protected_agent.protocol / JARVIS_PROTECTED_AGENT_PROTOCOL (if any instance protects an MCP server)
• protected_agent.authentication.client_id and client_secret

5. Deploy the IAG instances

For Docker Compose, follow the iag-demo pattern: one shared iag-base-docker.yaml plus one service per protected agent that overrides only the per-instance fields above. For Kubernetes, deploy each IAG as a standalone Pod for independent scaling, or as a sidecar to its protected agent for tighter coupling.

Verify that each IAG can reach the IdP, AuthZEN, ContX IQ, and the protected agent - common deployment failures are network-level, not IAG-level.

6. Verify the runtime path

Send a request through the gateway and confirm the nine-step path executes end-to-end. The expected HTTP responses are:

• 200 - request was authorized and forwarded.
• 400 - bad request.
• 401 - caller token missing or inactive.
• 403 - caller authenticated but not allowed (subject, chain, or both).
• 500 - internal error.
• 502 - upstream / gateway-side processing error.

Watch service logs (JSON to stdout) and audit records together - service logs explain what IAG did, audit records explain what IAG decided.

7. Read the audit trail

Audit records are emitted as a separate stream from service logs. Configure delivery as either:

• Webhook - audit.delivery: webhook, audit.http.url, optional auth (mTLS, api-key, basic, no-auth).
• File - audit.delivery: file, audit.storage_path, audit.format (csv, json, txt), audit.rotation_strategy (size, time, size_and_time).

Each record contains decision, reason, subject, actor, action, service, timestamp, traceID. The traceID correlates with the protected agent's logs and the upstream client.

8. Exercise denial paths intentionally

To gain confidence that IAG is enforcing as expected, deliberately force NOT_AUTHORIZED outcomes:

• Skip an agent in the chain (e.g. call retriever-iag directly without the orchestrator in act).
• Remove `workflow_name` from one INVOKES relationship - ContX IQ stops returning that chain.
• Delete the `CAN_TRIGGER` edge between the subject and the workflow - AuthZEN says no.
• Use a subject whose type is not in `JARVIS_AUTHZEN_SUBJECT_TYPES` - no policy matches.

Each should return 403 Forbidden and produce a NOT_AUTHORIZED audit record with a useful reason.

Outcome

When this skill has been applied successfully:

• A Workflow node, the relevant Agent nodes, and INVOKES edges (with workflow_name) exist in the IKG.
• A ContX IQ query returns the right (workflow, agent_list) pairs for each protected agent.
• One IAG instance runs in front of each protected agent with the right per-instance config.
• A canonical successful prompt flows through the gateway chain and produces AUTHORIZED audit records on every IAG it touches.
• A canonical denial path produces 403 Forbidden plus a NOT_AUTHORIZED audit record with a human-readable reason.

Files in this skill

• references/architecture.md - the nine-step IAG request path and the IKG data shape.
• references/configuration.md - every IAG configuration section, field, and default.
• references/troubleshooting.md - common failure modes mapped to fixes.
• assets/config-template.yaml - a starter config.yaml to copy and adapt.

Agent-specific notes

This skill uses generic markdown instructions and works across all agents listed in the README. It does not require Claude Code hooks, Cursor @-mentions, Copilot workspace context, or any agent-specific feature. Network access (curl, the agent's web tools, or MCP) is needed only if the agent will call IndyKite APIs directly during a task; for setup-only work no special tools are required.

References

• IndyKite Agent Gateway documentation
• iag-demo reference app - A2A only.
• iag-mcp-demo reference app - adds an mcp-iag instance (protocol: mcp) protecting the IndyKite MCP server.
• canbank dataset
• A2A protocol - see the protected agent's vendor docs for the JSON-RPC shape IAG forwards. For MCP, IAG proxies MCP Streamable HTTP (initialize, tools/list, tools/call, …).