<div align="center"> <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/I4cTime/q-ring/main/assets/social-card-optimized.jpg" alt="q-ring — never paste an API key into .env again" width="100%" /> </div>

q-ring

OS keychain secrets for AI coding agents, over MCP.

<a href="https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/I4cTime/q-ring"> <img src="https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/I4cTime/q-ring/badges/card.svg" alt="q-ring MCP server" width="400" /> </a>

Stop pasting API keys into plain-text .env files or wrestling with clunky secret managers. q-ring securely anchors your credentials to your OS's native vault (macOS Keychain, Linux Secret Service, Windows Credential Vault) and supercharges them with mechanics from quantum physics.

📖 [View the Official Documentation](https://qring.i4c.studio/docs) for a complete CLI reference, MCP prompt cookbooks, and architecture details.

Why q-ring?

• Superposition: Store one key with multiple states (dev/staging/prod) that collapse based on context.
• Entanglement: Link keys across projects so rotating one automatically updates them all.
• Tunneling: Create ephemeral, in-memory secrets that self-destruct after a set time or read count.
• Teleportation: Securely pack and share AES-256-GCM encrypted secret bundles.
• Seamless AI Integration: 46 built-in MCP tools for native use in Cursor, Kiro, and Claude Code.

🚀 Installation

q-ring is designed to be installed globally so it's available anywhere in your terminal. Pick your favorite package manager:

# pnpm (recommended)
pnpm add -g @i4ctime/q-ring

# npm
npm install -g @i4ctime/q-ring

# yarn
yarn global add @i4ctime/q-ring

# Homebrew (macOS / Linux)
brew install i4ctime/tap/qring

Docker (MCP server)

The repo ships a Dockerfile that builds the MCP server and exposes it through mcp-proxy — useful for hosted MCP deployments (e.g. Glama) or keeping the server off the host entirely:

git clone https://github.com/I4cTime/q-ring.git
cd q-ring
docker build -t qring-mcp .
docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 qring-mcp

Note: inside a container there is no OS keychain (GNOME Keyring / macOS Keychain), so this path is for the MCP protocol surface, ephemeral use, and CI experiments — not for durable local secret storage. For day-to-day use install the CLI natively via one of the package managers above.

⚡ Quick Start

# 1️⃣ Store a secret (prompts securely if value is omitted)
qring set OPENAI_API_KEY sk-...

# 2️⃣ Retrieve it anytime
qring get OPENAI_API_KEY

# 3️⃣ List all keys (values are never shown)
qring list

# 4️⃣ Generate a cryptographic secret and save it
qring generate --format api-key --prefix "sk-" --save MY_KEY

# 5️⃣ Run a full health scan
qring health

# Something not working? Diagnose the install (keyring, audit, MCP wiring)
qring doctor

# Tab completion for your shell
qring completion zsh > ~/.zsh/completions/_qring   # also: bash, fish

Quantum Features

Superposition — One Key, Multiple Environments

A single secret can hold different values for dev, staging, and prod simultaneously. The correct value resolves based on your current context.

# Set environment-specific values
qring set API_KEY "sk-dev-123" --env dev
qring set API_KEY "sk-stg-456" --env staging
qring set API_KEY "sk-prod-789" --env prod

# Value resolves based on context
QRING_ENV=prod qring get API_KEY   # → sk-prod-789
QRING_ENV=dev  qring get API_KEY   # → sk-dev-123

# Inspect the quantum state
qring inspect API_KEY

Environment Promotion — Diff, Then Promote

Once a secret carries per-environment states, promotion replaces copy-paste: compare two environments key by key (statuses only, never values), then copy a value from one state to another. diff exits 1 on drift, so it doubles as a CI gate; promote refuses to overwrite a differing target unless you say so.

# What differs between staging and prod? (same / different / missing on one side)
qring diff staging prod

# Make prod match staging for one key (asks before overwriting a different value)
qring promote DATABASE_URL --from staging --to prod

# Non-interactive, e.g. in a release script
qring promote DATABASE_URL --from staging --to prod --force --json

MCP agents get the same two operations as diff_environments and promote_secret.

Wavefunction Collapse — Smart Environment Detection

q-ring auto-detects your environment without explicit flags. Resolution order:

1. --env flag
2. QRING_ENV environment variable
3. NODE_ENV environment variable
4. Git branch heuristics (main/master → prod, develop → dev)
5. .q-ring.json project config
6. Default environment from the secret

# See what environment q-ring detects
qring env

# Project config (.q-ring.json)
echo '{"env": "staging", "branchMap": {"release/*": "staging"}}' > .q-ring.json

Quantum Decay — Secrets with TTL

Secrets can have a time-to-live. Expired secrets are blocked from reads. Stale secrets (75%+ lifetime) trigger warnings.

# Set a secret that expires in 1 hour
qring set SESSION_TOKEN "tok-..." --ttl 3600

# Set with explicit expiry
qring set CERT_KEY "..." --expires "2026-06-01T00:00:00Z"

# Health check shows decay status
qring health

Observer Effect — Audit Everything

Every secret read, write, and delete is logged with a tamper-evident hash chain. Access patterns are tracked for anomaly detection.

# View audit log
qring audit
qring audit --key OPENAI_KEY --limit 50

# Detect anomalies (burst access, unusual hours, chain tampering)
qring audit --anomalies

# Verify audit chain integrity
qring audit:verify

# Export audit log
qring audit:export --format json --since 2026-03-01
qring audit:export --format csv --output audit-report.csv

Quantum Noise — Secret Generation

Generate cryptographically strong secrets in common formats.

qring generate                          # API key (default)
qring generate --format password -l 32  # Strong password
qring generate --format uuid            # UUID v4
qring generate --format token           # Base64url token
qring generate --format hex -l 64       # 64-byte hex
qring generate --format api-key --prefix "sk-live-" --save STRIPE_KEY

Entanglement — Linked Secrets

Link secrets across projects. When you rotate one, all entangled copies update automatically.

# Entangle two secrets
qring entangle API_KEY API_KEY_BACKUP

# Now updating API_KEY also updates API_KEY_BACKUP
qring set API_KEY "new-value"

# Unlink entangled secrets
qring disentangle API_KEY API_KEY_BACKUP

Tunneling — Ephemeral Secrets

Create secrets that exist only in memory. They never touch disk. Optional TTL and max-read self-destruction.

# Create an ephemeral secret (returns tunnel ID)
qring tunnel create "temporary-token-xyz" --ttl 300 --max-reads 1

# Read it (self-destructs after this read)
qring tunnel read tun_abc123

# List active tunnels
qring tunnel list

Teleportation — Encrypted Sharing

Pack secrets into AES-256-GCM encrypted bundles for secure transfer between machines. Two ways to lock a bundle:

• Passphrase (v1): keys derived with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 (210 000 iterations); each bundle records its iteration count, so old bundles still unpack.
• Recipients (v2, 0.18): each teammate runs qring teleport keygen once and shares their recipient string (qring1…, an X25519 public key; the private half lives in their OS keyring). pack --to encrypts a fresh content key to every recipient — HKDF-SHA256 over an ephemeral X25519 agreement, AES-256-GCM throughout, node:crypto only — so nothing secret travels beside the bundle and nobody has to whisper a passphrase.

# Passphrase bundle (prompts)
qring teleport pack --keys "API_KEY,DB_PASS" > bundle.txt
cat bundle.txt | qring teleport unpack

# Recipient bundle: teammates publish their recipient once…
qring teleport keygen            # → qring1a3F…  (share this; keep the keyring)
qring teleport identity          # print it again later

# …then you address the pack to them (repeatable or comma-separated)
qring teleport pack --keys "API_KEY,DB_PASS" --to qring1a3F… --to qring1Zz9… > bundle.txt

# They unpack with the identity in their keyring — no passphrase
cat bundle.txt | qring teleport unpack

# Preview: who it's addressed to, whether that's you, and what's inside
qring teleport unpack <bundle> --dry-run

Import — Bulk Secret Ingestion

Import secrets from .env files directly into q-ring. Supports standard dotenv syntax including comments, quoted values, and escape sequences. The CLI accepts either a file path or raw content; the import_dotenv MCP tool only accepts raw content (it never reads files from disk) so an agent can't coerce it into reading arbitrary local files.

# Import all secrets from a .env file
qring import .env

# Import to project scope, skipping existing keys
qring import .env --project --skip-existing

# Preview what would be imported
qring import .env --dry-run

Selective Export

Export only the secrets you need using key names or tag filters.

# Export specific keys
qring export --keys "API_KEY,DB_PASS,REDIS_URL"

# Export by tag
qring export --tags "backend"

# Combine with format
qring export --keys "API_KEY,DB_PASS" --format json

Secret Search and Filtering

Filter qring list output by tag, expiry state, or key pattern.

# Filter by tag
qring list --tag backend

# Show only expired secrets
qring list --expired

# Show only stale secrets (75%+ decay)
qring list --stale

# Glob pattern on key name
qring list --filter "API_*"

# Script-friendly existence check (exit 0 if present, 1 if not; decay-aware)
qring has OPENAI_API_KEY --quiet && echo "configured"

Project Secret Manifest

Declare required secrets in .q-ring.json and validate project readiness with a single command.

# Validate project secrets against the manifest
qring check

# See which secrets are present, missing, expired, or stale
qring check --project-path /path/to/project

Env File Sync

Generate a .env file from the project manifest, resolving each key from q-ring with environment-aware superposition collapse.

# Generate to stdout
qring env:generate

# Write to a file
qring env:generate --output .env

# Force a specific environment
qring env:generate --env staging --output .env.staging

Secret References & Least-Privilege Run

A qring:// reference is a committable pointer to a secret — it goes in your .env file instead of the value. qring run resolves references and manifest keys at spawn time, injecting only what the project declares (unlike exec, which injects the whole scope). Output is auto-redacted.

# .env — safe to commit: these are references, not values
DATABASE_URL=qring://project/DATABASE_URL
OPENAI_API_KEY=qring://global/OPENAI_API_KEY
STRIPE_KEY=qring:///STRIPE_KEY            # auto scope: project, then global
SESSION_TTL=3600                          # plain values pass through

# Run with declared secrets injected (manifest + .env refs)
qring run -- pnpm dev

# Preview what would be injected, without running
qring run --dry-run -- pnpm dev

# Pin an environment, use a specific env file, or skip the manifest
qring run --env prod --env-file .env.prod --no-manifest -- ./deploy.sh

The key lives in the path, never the host (qring://project/KEY, not qring://KEY) — URL hosts are case-insensitive, and env-var keys are not. Malformed references fail loudly instead of leaking a literal qring://… string into the child. A reference pinned to an environment: qring://project/DATABASE_URL?env=prod.

Editor Setup

Wire the q-ring MCP server into an editor's MCP config with one command. Merges non-destructively — other servers are preserved, and an existing q-ring entry is only replaced with --force.

qring setup cursor          # .cursor/mcp.json (project) or --global for ~/.cursor
qring setup kiro            # .kiro/settings/mcp.json, with read-only autoApprove list
qring setup claude          # .mcp.json (project scope)

# Preview without writing
qring setup cursor --dry-run

Push to Deployment Platforms

Push manifest secrets to GitHub Actions, Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, fly.io, Railway, or Netlify through each platform's own authenticated CLI (gh / vercel / wrangler / flyctl / railway / netlify) — q-ring never holds platform tokens, and values travel over stdin (or, for Netlify's import-only CLI, a 0600 temp file that is removed immediately), never argv. Every push is recorded in the audit chain.

# Push the .q-ring.json manifest keys to GitHub Actions secrets
qring push github --repo you/your-app

# Push to Vercel environments
qring push vercel --vercel-env production,preview

# Push to Cloudflare Workers secrets
qring push cloudflare

# fly.io (flyctl secrets import over stdin — note flyctl deploys per import), Railway, Netlify
qring push fly --app my-app
qring push railway --service api --railway-env production
qring push netlify --site 1234-abcd

# Explicit keys, preview first
qring push github --keys DATABASE_URL,API_KEY --dry-run

Canaries can ride along: qring canary plant KEY --format aws --push github plants a honeytoken locally and seeds it into the platform without reading it back (see Canary Honeytokens).

Secret Liveness Validation

Test if a secret is actually valid with its target service. q-ring auto-detects the provider from key prefixes (sk- → OpenAI, ghp_ → GitHub, etc.) or accepts an explicit provider name.

# Validate a single secret
qring validate OPENAI_API_KEY

# Force a specific provider
qring validate SOME_KEY --provider stripe

# Validate all secrets with detectable providers
qring validate --all

# Only validate manifest-declared secrets
qring validate --all --manifest

# List available providers
qring validate --list-providers

Built-in providers: OpenAI, Anthropic, OpenRouter, Google AI (Gemini), Groq, Hugging Face, ElevenLabs, Vercel, Stripe, GitHub, AWS (format check), Generic HTTP. Keys are only ever sent in headers, never URLs. (*no safe public prefix — select explicitly with --provider or the manifest provider field.)

Output:

  ✓ OPENAI_API_KEY   valid    (openai, 342ms)
  ✗ STRIPE_KEY       invalid  (stripe, 128ms) — API key has been revoked
  ⚠ AWS_ACCESS_KEY   error    (aws, 10002ms) — network timeout
  ○ DATABASE_URL     unknown  — no provider detected

Hooks — Callbacks on Secret Change

Register webhooks, shell commands, or process signals that fire when secrets are created, updated, or deleted. Supports key matching, glob patterns, tag filtering, and scope constraints.

# Run a shell command when a secret changes
qring hook add --key DB_PASS --exec "docker restart app"

# POST to a webhook on any write/delete
qring hook add --key API_KEY --url "https://hooks.example.com/rotate"

# Trigger on all secrets tagged "backend"
qring hook add --tag backend --exec "pm2 restart all"

# Signal a process when DB secrets change
qring hook add --key-pattern "DB_*" --signal-target "node"

# List all hooks
qring hook list

# Remove a hook
qring hook remove <id>

# Enable/disable
qring hook enable <id>
qring hook disable <id>

# Dry-run test a hook
qring hook test <id>

Hooks are fire-and-forget: a failing hook never blocks secret operations. The hook registry is stored at ~/.config/q-ring/hooks.json.

SSRF protection: HTTP hook URLs targeting private/loopback IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7) are blocked by default. DNS is checked up front and re-validated at connect time, so a hostname can't pass the check then rebind to a private address before the socket opens. To allow hooks targeting local services (e.g. during development), set the environment variable Q_RING_ALLOW_PRIVATE_HOOKS=1.

Configurable Rotation

Set a rotation format per secret so the agent auto-rotates with the correct value shape, and a rotation interval so q-ring reminds you before a credential goes stale. Every secret remembers when its value last changed (rotatedAt); with --rotate-every it becomes due soon inside the last 20% of the interval (or the last 7 days, whichever is shorter) and overdue past it — in qring inspect, qring rotate:due, the dashboard's "Rotate soon" card and the inspect_secret tool.

# Store a secret with rotation format metadata
qring set STRIPE_KEY "sk-..." --rotation-format api-key --rotation-prefix "sk-"

# Store a password with password rotation format
qring set DB_PASS "..." --rotation-format password

# Remind me every 90 days
qring set STRIPE_KEY "sk-..." --rotate-every 90

# What needs rotating? (most overdue first; --all lists every scheduled secret)
qring rotate:due
qring rotate:due --json

Secure Execution & Auto-Redaction

Run commands with secrets securely injected into the environment. All known secret values are automatically redacted from stdout and stderr to prevent leaking into terminal logs or agent transcripts. Exec profiles restrict which commands may be run.

# Execute a deployment script with secrets injected
qring exec -- npm run deploy

# Inject only specific tags
qring exec --tags backend -- node server.js

# Run with a restricted profile (blocks network tools and interpreters/shells, 30s timeout)
qring exec --profile restricted -- npm test

Codebase Secret Scanner

Migrating a legacy codebase? Quickly scan directories for hardcoded credentials using regex heuristics and Shannon entropy analysis.

# Scan current directory
qring scan .

Output:

  ✗ src/db/connection.js:12
    Key:     DB_PASSWORD
    Entropy: 4.23
    Context: const DB_PASSWORD = "..."

Composite / Templated Secrets

Store complex connection strings that dynamically resolve other secrets. If DB_PASS rotates, DB_URL is automatically correct without manual updates.

qring set DB_USER "admin"
qring set DB_PASS "supersecret"
qring set DB_URL "postgres://{{DB_USER}}:{{DB_PASS}}@localhost/mydb"

# Resolves embedded templates automatically
qring get DB_URL 
# Output: postgres://admin:supersecret@localhost/mydb

User Approvals (Zero-Trust Agent)

Protect sensitive production secrets from being read autonomously by the MCP server without explicit user approval. Each approval token is HMAC-verified, scoped, reasoned, and time-limited. The gate applies to bulk reads too — export_secrets and teleport_pack over MCP skip approval-protected keys that lack a valid grant.

# Mark a secret as requiring approval
qring set PROD_DB_URL "..." --requires-approval

# Temporarily grant MCP access for 1 hour with a reason
qring approve PROD_DB_URL --for 3600 --reason "deploying v2.0"

# List all approvals with verification status
qring approvals

# Revoke an approval
qring approve PROD_DB_URL --revoke

When an agent is blocked on an approval-protected key, q-ring raises a desktop notification (Linux notify-send, macOS osascript) naming the key and the exact qring approve command — throttled per key, disabled with QRING_NOTIFY=off.

Canary Honeytokens

Plant fake credentials that look and read exactly like real ones. Anything that touches one — a compromised MCP server, an over-curious agent, exfiltrated tooling sweeping the ring — gets the fake value back with no tell, while q-ring fires a desktop alert and writes a canary event into the tamper-evident audit chain.

# Plant a canary shaped like a real AWS access key
qring canary plant AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY --format aws

# Other shapes: aws-secret, github, github-pat, openai, openai-project,
# anthropic, stripe, gitlab, slack, google, npm, generic
qring canary plant GHP_BACKUP_TOKEN --format github-pat

# See what's been tripped
qring canary list
qring audit --action canary

Values are CSPRNG noise in the provider's real token shape (an aws canary matches AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}, an anthropic one the real sk-ant-api03-…AA layout) — plausible enough to be taken, never valid. Alerts are throttled to one per key per 30 seconds; the audit trail records every read.

Get paged. Desktop notifications only help when you are at the machine. Register webhook channels and every trip reaches them too:

qring canary alert add --discord https://discord.com/api/webhooks/…
qring canary alert add --slack   https://hooks.slack.com/services/…
qring canary alert add --ntfy    https://ntfy.sh/my-canaries
qring canary alert add --url     https://example.com/canary   # generic JSON POST
qring canary alert list
qring canary alert test          # send a clearly-labelled drill

Channels live in ~/.config/q-ring/canary-alerts.json (mode 0600). Sends are fire-and-forget, SSRF-guarded like hooks, throttled with the desktop alert, and never include the fake value — only the key, scope, source, and the agent label that reached for it.

Seed a tripwire into CI. Plant a canary and push it to a deployment platform in one step, so a leaked GitHub Actions / Vercel / Cloudflare environment carries a decoy:

qring canary plant AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY --format aws-secret --push github --repo you/your-app

Honest caveat: q-ring only sees reads that go through q-ring. A leaked value used directly on the platform side is not observable here — pair it with the provider's own alerting if you need that.

Canaries are built to stay covert: they carry no identifying description (add an innocuous cover story with --description if you like), their flag never appears in MCP tool responses, and trip records are visible only from the operator's terminal — never to agents via MCP audit tools. Bulk export and delete trip them just like reads, so sweeping the ring or removing the tripwire both ring the bell. Done with one? qring canary disarm <key> turns it back into an ordinary secret (qring set over a canary warns you first — the flag deliberately survives overwrites so an agent can't launder it away).

MCP Airlock

Run a third-party MCP server behind q-ring. The airlock sits between your agent host and the wrapped server, spawns it with a stripped environment (no inherited API keys — opt back in with --inherit-env), records every tool call, resource read, and prompt fetch that crosses it as a wrap event in the audit chain (grouped per session and labeled with the calling client's identity), scrubs known secret values out of every result before it reaches the transcript, and enforces the project's policy.wrap rules. Tool and prompt arguments are never logged — they may contain secrets.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "some-server": {
      "command": "qring",
      "args": ["mcp", "wrap", "--", "npx", "-y", "some-mcp-server"]
    }
  }
}

Tools, resources, and prompts all pass through verbatim (pagination, progress notifications, cancellation, subscriptions, and the list_changed / updated notifications included); the airlock advertises exactly the capabilities the wrapped server has. Long-running tools are governed by the host's own timeout, with a generous airlock ceiling configurable via QRING_WRAP_TIMEOUT_MS.

# Wrap a remote Streamable HTTP server; the Bearer token comes from q-ring (audited read)
qring mcp wrap --url https://mcp.example.com/mcp --auth-secret EXAMPLE_MCP_TOKEN

# Keep results verbatim (default: known secret values are replaced with [QRING:REDACTED])
qring mcp wrap --no-redact -- npx -y some-mcp-server

Wrap policy. Govern the wrapped server from .q-ring.json — the same file, the same fail-closed engine:

{
  "policy": {
    "wrap": {
      "allowTools": ["github_*", "search"],
      "denyTools": ["github_delete_*"],
      "approveTools": ["github_merge_pr"],
      "rateLimit": { "maxCalls": 60, "perSeconds": 60 },
      "toolRateLimits": { "search": { "maxCalls": 5, "perSeconds": 10 } },
      "redactResults": true
    }
  }
}

Denied tools are hidden from tools/list and refused on call with a policy_deny audit event; approveTools are refused until you grant them:

qring mcp approve github_merge_pr --for 900 --reason "release 1.4"
qring mcp approvals
qring mcp approve github_merge_pr --revoke

Be clear about what the airlock is: env stripping, a tamper-evident record of every crossing, policy at the tool boundary, and best-effort redaction of secret values the ring knows about. It is not a sandbox — the wrapped process still runs as your user with normal filesystem, network, and OS-keychain access, and tool descriptions pass through uninspected. See docs/threat-model.md for the honest boundary picture.

Just-In-Time (JIT) Provisioning

Instead of storing static credentials, configure q-ring to dynamically generate short-lived tokens on the fly when requested (e.g. AWS STS, generic HTTP endpoints).

# Store the STS role configuration
qring set AWS_TEMP_KEYS '{"roleArn":"arn:aws:iam::123:role/AgentRole", "durationSeconds":3600}' --jit-provider aws-sts

# Resolving the secret automatically assumes the role and caches the temporary token
qring get AWS_TEMP_KEYS

Project Context for AI Agents

A safe, redacted overview of the project's secrets, configuration, and state. Designed to be fed into an AI agent's system prompt without ever exposing secret values.

# Human-readable summary
qring context

# JSON output (for MCP / programmatic use)
qring context --json

Secret-Aware Linter

Scan specific files for hardcoded secrets with optional auto-fix. When --fix is used, detected secrets are replaced with process.env.KEY references and stored in q-ring.

# Lint files for hardcoded secrets
qring lint src/config.ts src/db.ts

# Auto-fix: replace hardcoded values and store in q-ring
qring lint src/config.ts --fix

# Scan entire directory with auto-fix
qring scan . --fix

Agent Memory

Encrypted, persistent key-value store that survives across AI agent sessions. Useful for remembering rotation history, project decisions, or context.

# Store a memory
qring remember last_rotation "Rotated STRIPE_KEY on 2026-03-21"

# Retrieve it
qring recall last_rotation

# List all memories
qring recall

# Forget
qring forget last_rotation

Pre-Commit Secret Scanning

Install a git pre-commit hook that automatically blocks commits containing hardcoded secrets.

# Install the hook
qring hook:install

# Uninstall
qring hook:uninstall

Secret Analytics

Analyze usage patterns and get optimization suggestions for your secrets.

qring analyze

Output includes most accessed secrets, unused/stale secrets, scope optimization suggestions, and rotation recommendations.

Service Setup Wizard

Quickly set up a new service integration with secrets, manifest entries, and hooks in one command.

# Create secrets for a new Stripe integration
qring wizard stripe --keys STRIPE_KEY,STRIPE_SECRET --provider stripe --tags payment

# With a hook to restart the app on change
qring wizard myservice --hook-exec "pm2 restart app"

Governance Policy

Define project-level governance rules in .q-ring.json to control which MCP tools can be used, which keys are accessible, which commands can be executed, and what a wrapped MCP server may do behind the airlock. Policy is enforced at the MCP server, keyring, and airlock level.

Over MCP, policy is resolved from the directory the server was launched in — not from the projectPath a caller passes — so an agent can't sidestep restrictions by pointing at a directory with no policy. Launch the MCP server from your project root (where .q-ring.json lives). Edits to .q-ring.json are picked up automatically (the policy cache invalidates on file change), so you don't need to restart the server.

Policy files are schema-validated and fail closed: an invalid policy object (say, a typo like denytools) raises a PolicyConfigError instead of being silently ignored, so a malformed rule can never widen access.

# View the active policy
qring policy

# JSON output
qring policy --json

Example policy in .q-ring.json:

{
  "policy": {
    "mcp": {
      "denyTools": ["delete_secret"],
      "deniedKeys": ["PROD_DB_PASSWORD"],
      "deniedTags": ["production"]
    },
    "exec": {
      "denyCommands": ["curl", "wget", "ssh"],
      "maxRuntimeSeconds": 30
    },
    "secrets": {
      "requireApprovalForTags": ["production"],
      "maxTtlSeconds": 86400
    },
    "wrap": {
      "denyTools": ["*_delete_*"],
      "approveTools": ["deploy_*"],
      "rateLimit": { "maxCalls": 60, "perSeconds": 60 }
    }
  }
}

Exec Profiles

Restrict command execution with named profiles that control allowed commands, network access, timeouts, and environment sanitization.

# Run with the "restricted" profile (blocks network tools and interpreters/shells; 30s timeout)
qring exec --profile restricted -- npm test

# Run with the "ci" profile (5min timeout, allows network)
qring exec --profile ci -- npm run deploy

# Default: unrestricted
qring exec -- echo "hello"

Built-in profiles: unrestricted, restricted (denies network tools and interpreters/shells — python -c, node -e, bash and friends can't exfiltrate injected secrets; 30s limit), ci (5min limit, blocks destructive commands).

Tamper-Evident Audit

Every audit event includes a SHA-256 hash of the previous event, creating a tamper-evident chain. Since v0.14 the chain is also anchored with a keyed HMAC stored in the OS keyring, so qring audit:verify detects truncation and whole-file rewrites — not just in-place edits. Verify integrity and export logs in multiple formats. Events from MCP sessions are additionally stamped with the connecting client's self-reported identity (clientInfo name@version) — shown in qring audit output and filterable with qring audit --agent <label>. It's an audit label for "which agent did this", never an authorization boundary, since clients choose what to report.

# Verify the entire audit chain
qring audit:verify

# Export as JSON
qring audit:export --format json --since 2026-03-01

# Export as CSV
qring audit:export --format csv --output audit-report.csv

Agent Session Timeline

Every MCP session is stamped with the client's identity (clientInfo name@version) and every airlock session with a correlation id. audit:sessions folds the flat audit feed back into one timeline per agent process, so "what did Cursor do in that session?" is one command instead of a grep.

# One block per session: agent, source, window, event + denial counts, keys touched
qring audit:sessions

# Narrow to one client, widen the window, print every event line
qring audit:sessions --agent "[email protected]" --since 7d --verbose

# Machine-readable
qring audit:sessions --json

Airlock sessions (qring mcp wrap) show up as airlock: <wrapped command> with every proxied call in order. The status dashboard (qring status) renders the same data as an expandable Agent Sessions (24h) card.

Agents can look at their own history too — as MCP resources, not tools: qring://sessions lists session summaries and qring://sessions/{id} returns one timeline (key names and actions only, never values). Two guarantees hold on the agent side: canary trips are stripped before anything is summarised, so a honeytoken can never be discovered from a session view, and denying the audit_log tool in .q-ring.json policy hides the resources as well — one switch controls audit visibility for agents.

Encrypted File Backend (Headless / CI)

Hosts with no OS keyring at all (headless Linux, containers, CI) can opt into an encrypted file store. Everything — secrets, the audit anchor, the agent-memory key — routes through it.

export QRING_BACKEND=file
export QRING_FILE_PASSPHRASE="a strong passphrase"   # required — no passphrase, no access
qring set CI_TOKEN

The store is AES-256-GCM at ~/.config/q-ring/file-backend.enc (mode 0600, path override via QRING_FILE_BACKEND_PATH), keyed by PBKDF2 from the passphrase. It is explicit-only: a missing OS keyring never falls back to it silently, and without the passphrase every operation fails closed — q-ring never encrypts under a machine-derivable key.

Team & Org Scopes

Extend beyond global and project scopes with team and org scopes for shared secrets across groups. Resolution order: project → team → org → global (most specific wins).

# Store a secret in team scope
qring set SHARED_API_KEY "sk-..." --team my-team

# Store in org scope
qring set ORG_LICENSE "lic-..." --org acme-corp

# Resolution cascades: project > team > org > global
qring get API_KEY --team my-team --org acme-corp

Issuer-Native Rotation

Attempt provider-native secret rotation (for providers that support it) or fall back to local generation.

# Rotate via the detected provider
qring rotate STRIPE_KEY

# Force a specific provider
qring rotate API_KEY --provider openai

CI Secret Validation

Batch-validate all secrets against their providers in a CI-friendly mode. Returns a structured pass/fail report with exit code 1 on failure.

# Validate all secrets (CI mode)
qring ci:validate

# JSON output for pipeline parsing
qring ci:validate --json

Agent Mode — Autonomous Monitoring

A background daemon that continuously monitors secret health, detects anomalies, and optionally auto-rotates expired secrets.

# Start the agent
qring agent --interval 60 --verbose

# With auto-rotation of expired secrets
qring agent --auto-rotate

# Single scan (for CI/cron)
qring agent --once

Quantum Status Dashboard — Live Monitoring

Launch a real-time dashboard in your browser that turns the entire quantum subsystem into one glanceable page. It's a single self-contained HTML page served locally — no cloud, no config, fully offline — built as a Preact + htm app (runtime bundled and inlined). It streams updates every 5 seconds via Server-Sent Events and diffs the DOM in place, so data refreshes without re-running entrance animations and your search input, caret, and scroll position are preserved across ticks.

What you get:

• KPI strip — total secrets, detected environment, protected count, active approvals, hooks, 24-hour reads, and live anomaly count.
• Health summary — donut chart of healthy / stale / expired / no-decay secrets plus per-scope counts (global / project / team / org).
• Environment — wavefunction collapse details: detected env, source, branch, and any project context.
• Manifest — .q-ring.json summary with declared / required / missing / expired / stale keys.
• Policy — at-a-glance view of MCP, exec, and secret policies (allow/deny tools, deny keys/tags, allow/deny commands, approval & rotation requirements).
• Secrets table — searchable, sortable view of every secret (key, scope, env, type, decay, tags, last read), with quick chips for expired, stale, and protected filters. Press / to focus the search box.
• Quantum cards — decay timers, superposition states, entanglement pairs, and active quantum tunnels.
• Approvals & hooks — live list of valid (and tampered) approval grants and every registered hook with its match summary.
• Agent sessions (24h) — one expandable row per MCP client or airlock session: agent label, source, window, event and denial counts, recent events.
• Agent memory — count of encrypted memory keys persisted at ~/.config/q-ring/agent-memory.enc.
• Anomaly alerts — burst reads, off-hours access, tampered audit chain, and other suspicious patterns.
• Audit log (24h) — filterable feed with action chips (read/write/delete/export), source chips (cli/mcp/hook/agent), and a free-text filter.

Top-bar controls let you pause SSE updates (handy while reading the audit feed), refresh on demand, or jump to the raw JSON snapshot at /api/status. Keyboard shortcuts: / focus secrets search · P pause · R refresh.

The dashboard binds to 127.0.0.1 only and never exposes secret values, but it does surface key names, the audit log, and approval grants — so every route is gated by a random, per-launch token. qring status prints (and opens) the full URL including ?token=…; requests without the token get a 403. Stop the server to invalidate the token.

# Open the dashboard (auto-launches your browser at http://127.0.0.1:9876/?token=…)
qring status

# Specify a custom port
qring status --port 4200

# Don't auto-open the browser (copy the printed tokenized URL yourself)
qring status --no-open

MCP Server

q-ring includes a full MCP server with 46 tools for AI agent integration.

Core Tools

Quantum Tools

Tunneling Tools

Teleportation Tools

Validation Tools

Hook Tools

Execution & Scanning Tools

AI Agent Tools

Observer & Health Tools

Governance & Policy Tools

Cursor / Kiro Configuration

Add to .cursor/mcp.json or .kiro/settings/mcp.json (or let qring setup cursor / qring setup kiro write it):

If q-ring is installed globally (e.g. pnpm add -g @i4ctime/q-ring):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "q-ring": {
      "command": "qring-mcp"
    }
  }
}

If using a local clone:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "q-ring": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/q-ring/dist/mcp.js"]
    }
  }
}

Claude Code Configuration

Add to .mcp.json in the project root — or run qring setup claude, or claude mcp add q-ring -- qring-mcp (Claude Desktop is the app that uses claude_desktop_config.json, not Claude Code):

Global install:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "q-ring": {
      "command": "qring-mcp"
    }
  }
}

Local clone:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "q-ring": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/q-ring/dist/mcp.js"]
    }
  }
}

VS Code Configuration

VS Code speaks MCP natively — add to .vscode/mcp.json (note the servers key, not mcpServers):

{
  "servers": {
    "q-ring": {
      "command": "qring-mcp"
    }
  }
}

qring setup does not write this file yet — VS Code is config-only (no first-party plugin bundle).

Editor Plugins

The q-ring repo ships three first-party editor packs — each one adds rules/steering, agents, commands, skills, hooks, and the MCP connector to its host editor.

Cursor Plugin

The q-ring Cursor Plugin brings quantum secret management directly into your IDE with rules, skills, agents, commands, hooks, and a built-in MCP connector.

Install from the Cursor marketplace or see cursor-plugin/README.md for manual setup.

Kiro Plugin (Power)

The kiro-plugin/ directory is a Kiro Power per Create powers: POWER.md (metadata, onboarding, steering map), root mcp.json (MCP server must match the server name referenced in the power), and steering/ for workflows. Install from Kiro → Powers → Add power from Local Path and select kiro-plugin, or publish the folder on GitHub and use Add power from GitHub.

Always-on steering blocks hardcoded secrets and routes everything through q-ring; manual steering files act as agent personas (#qring-secret-ops, #qring-security-auditor), skill packs, and slash-style commands (#qring-cmd-scan-secrets, etc.). Optional hooks live in hooks/ for copy into .kiro/hooks/.

# Alternative: flatten into ~/.kiro (settings + steering + hooks)
pnpm run plugin:sync:kiro

# Or scope to a single project
pnpm run plugin:sync:kiro -- /path/to/your/project/.kiro

See kiro-plugin/README.md for the full breakdown.

Claude Code Plugin

For Claude Code, q-ring ships a CLAUDE.md memory file, a project-scoped .mcp.json, two subagents (secret-ops, security-auditor), eight slash commands (/qring-scan-secrets, /qring-health-check, …), six skills, and three hooks (post-edit lint reminder, pre-Bash .env guard, session-start context primer).

# Install into the current project ($PWD)
pnpm run plugin:sync:claude

# Install agents/commands/skills/hooks at user scope (~/.claude)
pnpm run plugin:sync:claude -- --user

# Or target a specific project
pnpm run plugin:sync:claude -- /path/to/your/project

Existing CLAUDE.md, .mcp.json, or .claude/settings.json files are never silently overwritten — the script writes a <filename>.qring-template next to them so you can merge by hand. Pass --force to overwrite.

See claude-code-plugin/README.md for the full breakdown.

Architecture

qring CLI ─────┐
               ├──▶ Core Engine ──▶ @napi-rs/keyring ──▶ OS Keyring
MCP Server ────┘       │
                       ├── Envelope (quantum metadata)
                       ├── Scope Resolver (global / project / team / org)
                       ├── Collapse (env detection + branchMap globs)
                       ├── Observer (tamper-evident audit chain)
                       ├── Policy (governance-as-code engine)
                       ├── Noise (secret generation)
                       ├── Entanglement (cross-secret linking)
                       ├── Validate (provider-based liveness + rotation)
                       ├── Hooks (shell/HTTP/signal callbacks)
                       ├── Import (.env file ingestion)
                       ├── Exec (profile-restricted injection + redaction)
                       ├── Scan (codebase entropy heuristics)
                       ├── Provision (JIT ephemeral credentials)
                       ├── Approval (HMAC-verified zero-trust tokens)
                       ├── Context (safe redacted project view)
                       ├── Linter (secret-aware code scanning)
                       ├── Memory (encrypted agent persistence)
                       ├── Tunnel (ephemeral in-memory)
                       ├── Teleport (encrypted sharing)
                       ├── Agent (autonomous monitor + rotation)
                       └── Dashboard (live status via SSE)

Project Config (.q-ring.json)

Optional per-project configuration:

{
  "env": "dev",
  "defaultEnv": "dev",
  "branchMap": {
    "main": "prod",
    "develop": "dev",
    "staging": "staging",
    "release/*": "staging",
    "feature/*": "dev"
  },
  "secrets": {
    "OPENAI_API_KEY": { "required": true, "description": "OpenAI API key", "format": "api-key", "prefix": "sk-", "provider": "openai" },
    "DATABASE_URL": { "required": true, "description": "Postgres connection string", "validationUrl": "https://api.example.com/health" },
    "SENTRY_DSN": { "required": false, "description": "Sentry error tracking" }
  },
  "policy": {
    "mcp": {
      "denyTools": ["delete_secret"],
      "deniedKeys": ["PROD_DB_PASSWORD"],
      "deniedTags": ["production"]
    },
    "exec": {
      "denyCommands": ["curl", "wget"],
      "maxRuntimeSeconds": 60
    }
  }
}

• `branchMap` supports glob patterns with * wildcards (e.g., release/* matches release/v1.0)
• `secrets` declares the project's required secrets — use qring check to validate, qring env:generate to produce a .env file
• `provider` associates a liveness validation provider with a secret (e.g., "openai", "stripe", "github") — use qring validate to test
• `validationUrl` configures the generic HTTP provider's endpoint for custom validation
• `policy` defines governance rules for MCP tool gating, key access restrictions, exec allowlists, and secret lifecycle requirements

📚 Docs

• Quickstart: Claude Code · Cursor · Kiro
• Troubleshooting — keyring backends, MCP connection, approval gate, policy pinning
• CLI ↔ MCP parity — every command mapped to its MCP tool
• Releasing — tag-driven release flow

Contributing

See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full guide (dev environment, conventions, files to keep in sync). The short version:

• Run `pnpm run lint`, `pnpm run typecheck`, and `pnpm run test:ci` before opening a PR.
• Tests or sandboxes can point the audit log elsewhere with `QRING_AUDIT_DIR` (directory is created if missing); default is ~/.config/q-ring/audit.jsonl.
• Optional local pre-commit: `qring hook:install` (uses this package’s precommit hook when qring is on your PATH).
• After changing one of the editor plugins:
• Cursor: pnpm run plugin:sync copies cursor-plugin/ to ~/.cursor/plugins/local/my-plugin (or pass a custom path).
• Kiro: pnpm run plugin:sync:kiro copies kiro-plugin/mcp.json → ~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json, plus steering/ and hooks/ (or pass a project .kiro path). Prefer adding kiro-plugin/ as a Power from the Powers panel instead.
• Claude Code: pnpm run plugin:sync:claude copies claude-code-plugin/ into the current directory (or pass a project path; add --user to install at ~/.claude/).
• See also docs/cli-mcp-parity.md.

🔒 Security

• Local-first. Core storage is your OS keychain — there is no q-ring cloud and no account. The MCP surface, audit log, and agent memory live on your machine (audit and memory files are written owner-only, 0600).
• Written-down threat model. What q-ring protects, what it doesn't, and where the residual risk lives — including an honest answer to the agent-exfiltration question — in docs/threat-model.md.
• Hardened by adversarial review. v0.14.0 shipped the results of an internal adversarial audit — policy-bypass, approval-scoping, and exec-profile findings all fixed, each with regression tests. Details are in the CHANGELOG Security sections (house style since 0.12.0: fix first, then disclose there).
• Reporting a vulnerability. Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting — see SECURITY.md for the supported-versions table and response commitments (48-hour acknowledgement, 7-day assessment).

📜 License

AGPL-3.0 - Free to use, modify, and share. Any derivative work or hosted service must release its source code under the same license.